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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Rationale of the study, methodology and overview of the report 
 
History teaches us that all advances that are the result of revolutions were secured in the 
period of popular enthusiasm, when either a recognized government did not exist or was 
too weak to make a stand against the revolution. But once the government was formed, so 
reaction started which served the interest of the old and the new privileged classes and 
took back from the people all that it could.1
Participation in parliamentary politics has affected the Socialist labour movement like an 
insidious poison. It destroyed the belief in the necessity of constructive Socialist activity 
and, worst of all, the impulse of self help, by inoculating people with the ruinous delusion 
that salvation always comes from above... Socialism steadily lost its character of a 
cultural society, and, therefore, could not let itself be halted by the artificial frontiers of 
the nation states... So inevitably the labour movement was gradually incorporated in the 
equipment of the national state and restored to this the equilibrium which it had actually 
lost before.
 (Malatesta E) 
2
1.1 Prologue  
 (Rocker, R) 
When we can look back from where we stand in the year 2010, twenty years after the apartheid 
government formally pronounced its preparedness to negotiate the democratisation of South 
Africa, we can say that part of our history points to the importance played by organisations of 
workers in the fall of apartheid. Indeed, by 1987 the African labour movement, in the form of the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), was the single most powerful organised 
formation in the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa3
                                                             
1Malatesta E,  
. From the early 1970s to the late 1980s, 
the African labour movement had evolved as a stronghold for the expression of the aspirations of 
http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_Archives/malatesta/tar.html  
2 Rocker R, 1938, Anarcho-Syndicalism: Theory and Practice, AK Press: Scotland, pages 54 - 55 
3 Baskin J, 1991, Striking Back: A History of COSATU, Ravan Press: Johannesburg, South Africa, pages 277 - 286 
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the working people, characterised in a widespread but not always well-defined aspiration to 
“socialism”. 
This struggle saw labour emerging as a militant, radically democratic and politically unavoidable 
force. This history, which tells the stories of the agency and potential of the labour movement in 
pursuing its goals, is of critical importance to our generation, when the masses of the working 
people suffer with the neoliberal restructuring that has resulted in retrenchments, privatisation, 
outsourcing and casualisation. This history ought to be recalled when the masses of the working 
class continue to experience high levels of unemployment and poverty in an economy that has 
relatively benefited the few on the top of the social hierarchy in society. This history reminds us 
that unions have not so long ago put an authoritarian regime on its knees and secured real gains 
on the shop floor regardless of repression or economic crisis. 
Who today will deliver workers from the retrenchments they face, privatisation and outsourcing? 
Who today will provide them with the tools to reshape their lives for a better society in which 
means of administration and production serve their needs, eradicating poverty and giving them 
access to produce living for themselves? How will the aspiration towards socialism which had 
inspired and formed the end goal of workers be realised today? Indeed, does the labour 
movement, once so militant, threatening to the ruling minority in the years of apartheid, still 
serve as the means through which workers can fight for their liberation, imposed by the 
neoliberal state of post apartheid South Africa? 
Can we still aspire to a revolution, “...the creation of new living institutions, new groupings, new 
social relationships; the destruction of privileges and monopolies; the new spirit of justice, of 
brotherhood, of freedom which must renew the whole of social life”4 – based on the abolition of 
wage labour? Is it the unions who will “..raise the moral level and the material conditions of the 
masses by calling on them to provide, through their direct and conscientious action, for their own 
futures”5
                                                             
4 Malatesta E,  
 when the democratic state, once trusted to provide building blocks for this socialist 
future, shifted to the adoption and implementation of neoliberal policies? 
http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_Archives/malatesta/tar.html  
5 Ibid 
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It is in the shadow of the above concerns that this report engages trade union strategy in South 
Africa today. The report asks, looking at the trade union strategy in and of itself, what accounts 
for the decline in worker control, the loss of the battle to defend gains such as jobs and high 
wages; and the defeat suffered against casualisation, privatisation, and outsourcing. This 
requires an engagement with the dominant intellectual tradition in trade union studies in South 
Africa, which provides much evidence to suggest the occurrence of the above factors and might 
be called the “Websterian” tradition (in honour of its pre-eminent figure Eddie Webster), and the 
writers associated with him (notably Glenn Adler, Sakhela Buhlungu and Karl von Holdt).  
This tradition provides key insights into the unions’ current strategy, which it describes as 
“radical reform” using “strategic unionism”, wherein a “radical version of social democracy” is 
to be realised through social democratic reforms via “legal means of struggle”.6
Labour, it is argued by the Websterian tradition, was not only critical to making the democracy 
possible, but now uses the legal means of struggle it provides to push that democracy in a radical 
direction. The agenda is to have labour make “a historic compromise [with] capital”
 It is also 
characterised by a very optimistic assessment of the “radical reform” strategy, which the unions 
have embraced since the early 1990s.  
Moving from description to prescription, the Websterian tradition tends to see labour’s reformist 
approach as a successful challenge to neo-liberal orthodoxy. Labour’s power – built from 
radically democratic and militant shop floor-based organisation and operating in alliance with 
social movements – supposedly can and does successfully use the opportunities provided by the 
advent of parliamentary democracy to change society in a pro-working class direction.  
7 via the 
creation of a “left version of social democracy”8. Labour seeks to put in place radical reforms 
that can act as building blocks for a gradual transformation of society to socialism. While this 
literature has focussed increasingly on union efforts at the transformation of the “apartheid 
workplace regime”,9
                                                             
6 Adler G and Webster E, 1995, Challenging Transition Theory: Labour movement, radical Reform, and Transition to 
Democracy in South Africa, Politics and Society, Vol. 23. No. 1 
7 Adler G and Webster E (ed.), 2000, Trade Unions and Democratisation in South Africa, Wits University Press: Johannesburg, 
page 18 
8 Ibid 
 it remains aware of this larger transformative project. Thus, union activity 
9 Ibid 
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is viewed as “strategic unionism”: the unions participate in structures of power to ensure specific 
reforms via policy interventions and corporatist engagements, yet maintain an independent 
power outside of these structures through their mass character and demonstrable willingness to 
undertake mass actions in support of reforms10
                                                             
10 Ibid 
. 
The report is critical of the strategy of radical reform practiced by COSATU, and thus, of the 
optimistic prognosis of the Websterian tradition. Drawing on the traditions of Marxism and 
anarcho-syndicalism, it develops a critique of the practice of radical reform through a case study 
of the activities of the Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU), a COSATU affiliate that 
was a leading advocate of the strategy. It is argued that the Websterian tradition has understated 
the failings of the radical reform approach and the manner in which the strategy has weakened 
the unions. In praising radical reform, this tradition has also paid inadequate attention to 
elements of union strategy and discourse that are at odds with radical reform, and which envisage 
a more radical challenge to class relations and capitalism than a “left version of social 
democracy”. 
The CWIU was born in 1974 out of the 1973 Durban strikes; it merged with Paper, Printing, 
Wood and Allied Workers Union (PPWAWU) in 1999 to form the Chemical, Energy, Paper, 
Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union (CEPPWAWU). This study focuses on CWIU efforts 
at radical reform, and shows that the union has not benefited from the usage of this approach for 
its core demands; instead it has experienced ongoing losses, manifested in retrenchments, 
outsourcing, privatisation and low salaries. In addition, the union has developed a technocratic 
style of politics, based on expert negotiations and high-level research, reducing rank and file 
union members to passive spectators in the theatre of “legal means of struggle” that centre on 
bargaining via industrial and corporatist structures like the National Economic Development and 
Labour Council (NEDLAC). Overall, the practice of radical reform has resulted in unions co-
managing capitalism without securing gains for working class people, and facilitating their own 
decline as agents of the working people to defend gains like employment and working 
conditions; in no sense has the strategy led to significant steps towards the achievement of their 
socialist vision. 
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Using the unions’ own views, the report discusses the history of its activism in fighting for the 
interest of the class it belongs to as captured by its struggles, and its engagements with the state, 
capital and the Alliance – that is, the tripartite alliance between African National Congress 
(ANC), South African Communist Party (SACP) and COSATU, formalised in 1990. The report 
examines the CWIU’s outlook from 1987-1993: this establishes what unions sought before 
radical reform became dominant, recapturing the revolutionary activity of those times; it looks, 
then, at the period from 1993 to 1999, examining the radical reform approach that eclipsed the 
earlier radicalism. Particular attention is paid to the union’s own perceptions: the union’s view of 
its unionism, and its assessment of whether it has benefited, or not.  
The remainder of this chapter outlines the rationale for the study of union strategy in-and-of- 
itself, the need to look at COSATU affiliates, the time frames chosen, and the tools of data 
collection employed in this study. The chapter will conclude by providing a brief overview of the 
whole report in its various chapters. 
1.2 Trade union study 
There are many studies that have examined trade union strategy, and these have largely been on 
the COSATU federation (for example Lehulere, 2003). Indeed, very few look into a specific 
COSATU affiliate over a long period of time; fewer still look at other federations. Studies that 
have looked at trade union strategy have often done so through case studies, thus allowing a 
process where strategy is seen in practice specifically using the case study (for example Webster, 
1985, Buhlungu, 2001, 1996, Von Holdt, 2003), but usually these studies have focused on 
particular workplaces, rather than at industrial level or affiliate level. 
In these ways, union strategy remains understudied, even though it has been seen as central in 
understanding unions in contemporary South Africa. Looking at union strategy at an industrial, 
and affiliate, level entails providing space for the union to voice the objective it seeks to achieve 
and its understanding of the socioeconomic situation confronting it. Through strategies unions 
communicate what they stand for, how they understand their political situations, how they intend 
on approaching them, and, lastly they reflect on their progress on various ends. A focus on a 
given industry (rather than at the micro-level of a selected workplace) and the industrial union 
operating in that sector (the affiliate, rather than the macro-level of a federation), allows 
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strategies to be examined in detail, and over time, with a precision that micro- and macro-level 
studies cannot provide. 
If we begin by looking at this, we open our texts or studies for specific unions’ voices to be 
captured by congresses, and meetings’ resolutions and deliberations. It is this voice that we then 
enter with in conversation about the political economy of its context. This provides an 
opportunity to learn from the intellectual work that goes into planning strategies over a period of 
time in real confrontation with challenges and actually engage it as we enter into conversations 
about the situation of the working class in a specific epoch. This departs from assuming that we 
can understand unions only by talking to members about specific situations (for instance, the 
Vaal Stayaways, 1984), or through case studies of specific circumstances (for instance, case 
studies of restructuring at particular automobile plants). 
1.3 Sampling and time frame for the study 
It is noteworthy in consideration of labour studies in South Africa that not much has been done 
to conduct intense studies of specific union affiliates, with rare exceptions like Forrest’s PhD on 
the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA). Forrest herself notes the 
following in that work: 
Nowhere in the academic literature can an integrated study of the developments within a 
singular South African manufacturing union over a sustained period be found. Some 
studies are available which examine particular workers’ organising efforts such as 
Allen’s three volumes on black mineworkers but these focus on miners’ organisation 
between 1871 -1992 and are thus not a history of a particular union (although Volume 
Three does substantially focus on the National Union of Mineworkers).
 
Some popular 
trade union studies are available, including Sachs’ personal account of the Garment 
Workers Union between1928-1952
 
and the Chemical Workers’ Industrial Union and 
National Education Health & Allied Workers Union’s popular photographic histories but 
obviously reflect an insider bias.11
                                                             
11 Forrest K, 2005, Power,Independence and Worker Democracy in NUMSA and its predecessors, 1980 – 1995, Thesis submitted 
to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy, page 2 
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While there are studies of both trade union federations at a macro level (such as those in Adler 
and Webster, 2000), and of specific workplaces (for example, von Holdt 2003), such studies of 
specific union affiliates over a set period of time remain rare. 
Yet, as Forrest argues, the “...academic study of a particular union allows for the opening up of a 
rich and detailed area of analysis. It also offers the opportunity to gain holistic insight into 
constraints and unforeseen problems, the implementation and impact of particular policies and 
strategies and the contradictions that emerged, and an understanding of how the union furthered 
its agenda in both expected and unanticipated ways.”12
This study chooses the CWIU largely because of its history as one of the most radical unions in 
COSATU in the 1970s and 1980s, and its key role in implementing radical reform in the 1990s. 
Three reasons make it of particular interest. One is its association with the tradition Baskin calls 
“independent worker bloc” in COSATU in the 1980s: “...organisationally they placed great stress 
on democratic grassroots-based structures... Politically they were often, but not always, hostile or 
cautious towards the ANC/UDF [United Democratic Front] tradition, and tended to be suspicious 
of community organisations as well as nationalist politics”
 These are powerful advantages, and this 
author agrees that they should inform study. 
13
There are, as Forrest notes, only three studies of CWIU, all by insiders. One, from 1994, is by 
Tanya Rosenthal, a CWIU official, and is a popular history by the union; another is an official 
union history, produced in 1984. These are narratives, recounting events without an 
accompanying critique
. The second reason is that its history 
remains largely unaccounted and uncollected within academic literature. Thirdly, as it will be 
shown in this report, the CWIU was a champion of radical reform, and played an active role in 
its implementation; its experiences are thus a key means to assess the successes (or otherwise) of 
that strategy. 
14
                                                             
12 Ibid, page 3 
13 Struggle for Workers Rights: A History of The Chemical Workers and Industrial Union, 1994, Produced by CWIU: Durban, 
page 103 
14 See A History of The Chemical Workers and Industrial Union – 1974 – 1984, Produced in 1984, and Struggle for Workers 
Rights: A History of The Chemical Workers and Industrial Union, 1994, both Produced by CWIU: Durban 
. Rosenthal’s book focuses on the union’s historical role as a radical and 
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militant union often influential in the federation, despite its relatively small size. Rosenthal’s 
book drew on her Honours research into the union; she later expanded elements of the book into 
a thesis on the CWIU-linked SASOL workers who participated in the Vaal Stayaways, 1984.15
There is a related work by Sakhela Buhlungu, another insider, a former PPWAWU stalwart 
turned academic. He examined workers’ control in three unions, including the CWIU/ 
CEPPWAWU, asking what accounted for the development of the tradition of worker control in 
the CWIU from inception. His study sheds light on the CWIU as a union with origins of strong 
worker control tradition. It does not, however examine union strategy over this period; instead it 
traces changes as far as worker control in concerned; it looks at the dilemma of leadership and 
full-time officials
 
These works do not interrogate the union’s strategy over a period of time, and they do not cover 
the era of radical reform. 
16
Collecting union history provides an opportunity to also learn from the past to inspire 
contemporary debates and struggles. Clearly, for instance, the CWIU has always been shaped by 
a decision-making process that included the broader membership with emphasis on worker 
control. The union had serious interests and programmes that were pushing non-factory issues, 
such as programmes on the environment. In addition, the union possessed a radical political 
culture: in the 1980s, it had slogans like “no holding hands with the bosses”
.  
17 demonstrating an 
attitude that was then militantly anti-corporatist; it was also notable for its internationalism, 
efforts to join hands with other workers offshore and in other countries.18
The period 1987 and 1998, the focus of this work, is critical in that it marks three important 
changes in African trade union movement history. Firstly, it opens with the year of the largest 
strike in South Africa – the great miners’ strike; COSATU offices were bombed; there was the 
 
                                                             
15 Rosenthal, T. 1997  Collective Action and Worker Consciousness in the Chemical Industry, 1980-1987, thesis submitted for the 
fulfillment of the degree of Master of Arts to the faulty of Humanities, School of Social Sciences, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 
16 Buhlungu S, 2001, Democracy and Modernization in the Making of the South African trade Union Movement: The Dilemma of 
Leadership, 1973 – 2000, thesis submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Sociology) 
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid 
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proposal of the new Labour Relations Act that was to see the banning of strikes and limits in a 
number of significant gains by the labour movement. From February 1988, with the banning of 
the UDF, which had been COSATU’s closest ally in resistance to apartheid, COSATU emerged 
as the leading force against apartheid, having previously survived repression that came with 
states of emergency in 1985 and 1986 successively19
The second shift was with the unbanning of certain political organisations in 1990, the 
consolidation of the formation of the tripartite Alliance between ANC, SACP and COSATU, and 
the official beginning of negotiations for the removal of apartheid, leading to the closure of the 
UDF
. 
20. Finally, there is the period of democratic installation in 1994 and the subsequent 
consolidation thereof. In this period there were many policy and legislation changes, ranging 
from macroeconomic policies to Acts such as the Labour Relations Act (LRA, 1997) and the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act (1997). Moreover, taking discussions on trade unionism, it 
is the immediate period after transition to democracy, South Africa’s economic exposure to the 
world and adoption of neo-liberal policies as economic frameworks21
1.4 Methodological tools 
. This, it can be said, is a 
period of classical radical reform for the union before its merger with PPWAWU. In addition, it 
is also the shifts in macroeconomic policy that make the period critical, particularly for the type 
of choices in unionism the trade union movement makes. 
 
This study falls within the broad fields of historical and industrial sociology. As regards 
historical sociology, it is said to be a complex combination of various other disciplines and 
traditions of enquiry within humanities and social sciences. A claim must thus be avoided that 
this study is only sociological; rather it is better to say it will find its “centre of gravity within the 
academic discipline of sociology”22
                                                             
19 Baskin J, 1992, pages 168 - 239 
20 Ibid 
21 Adler G and Webster E, 1995 
22 Skocpol T, (1979), Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies. Vision and Method in Historical Sociology Cambridge 
University Press: New York, page 359 
. Skocpol is insistent in her indication that historical 
sociology “...blends at its edges into economic and social history, and completely melds in one of 
16 
 
its prime areas, political sociology, with the endeavours of scholars who happen to be political 
scientists by disciplinary affiliation”23. She continues, saying it is a field oriented with 
“...research into the nature and effects of large scale structures and long term processes of 
change”24
The two methods did not come without a challenge. Firstly, I was given unprecedented access to 
the archival work in the union offices, an advantage I found very useful and appreciate a great 
deal. This is because in the execution of this research I was sponsored by Philip Bonner, National 
Research Foundation (NRF) Chair in local history at the University of the Witwatersrand, who 
was involved in 2009 in organising and writing the official history of CEPPWAWU in 
celebration of its ten years of existence (dated from the merger of CWIU and PPWAWU). Noor 
Nieftagodien, working in the Chair, was in charge of this project, which involved the NRF Chair 
receiving funding from the union, which it could use to recruit researchers to the project – among 
them, this writer. 
. 
This study focuses on official positions of the CWIU as an organisation, since it is concerned 
with official strategy. It is not a social history, as such, but an organisational and political history.  
As we have seen in the discussion around trade union strategy, by state we mean a centralised, 
hierarchical, territorial organ of administration and coercion, which thereby functions as a major 
pillar of class rule (with its own dynamic that is not entirely economically determined). In this 
report much focus will be given to institutions of policy planning and co-ordination that bring 
together labour, government and business. These institutions exist in different sectors of the 
economy and industry, as well as in different sections of the state, like the cabinet, parliament, 
legislature, provincial and local government. 
Thus, a combination of archival documents and in-depth interviews was used to collect data, yet 
emphasis was put on archives as the study’s central concern is assessment of trade union 
strategy. This means the interviews were used to gain intellectual analysis by strategic actors in 
the time, engaging their views based on the developments of this period in union strategy and 
asking for assessments in retrospect.  
                                                             
23 Ibid 
24 Ibid 
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This sponsorship did not have any direct implications for my research agenda and its critique; it 
also did not mean direct supervision by the NRF Chair, or reporting to the union. Its condition 
was simply that I would share all the information I collected both in archives and in interviews 
with key informants, whilst they would sponsor my research expenses. The access to 
interviewees also was facilitated by the union and the NRF chair. The project was largely 
independent, despite the generous help received in terms of finance, and through support in 
locating and interviewing respondents of my own interest. 
One limitation arose from the interest of the NRF chair in conducting life history studies using 
in-depth interviews; my project did need most of the data generated in this way. This meant 
complications with regards to access to interviewees whose time was always limited. Thus, 
whilst it took several meetings with respondents which resulted in covering fewer people than 
expected, but also because most of them no longer work in the union, and thus were hard to find, 
historical developments and life outside the union gave me a language with which to engage 
strategic questions about union strategy. Indeed, for the purposes of this study, it is the 
intellectual analysis of interviewees which was important, that is, how they understood the 
strategy and its implementation in retrospect. 
The union’s own archives were also accessed to tell what the strategy was; I was not interested in 
specific events and case studies, like the SASOL case of Rosenthal, which would require 
historical contextualisation that gets affirmed by interviews. Indeed, my study focused on reports 
on events submitted in meetings, and deliberations in minutes about that occurrence and the 
other. For its analysis these were enough, taking that it is the strategy and how union’s reflection 
on events as opposed to events themselves is important. In essence, it means the study concerned 
itself with the official voice of the union, its official assessments and that of strategic actors, but 
for the latter, in retrospect. 
Thus, is can be said that this study is a systematic assessment of the official thought of the 
collective expressed as a union over a period of time. It takes us through the union’s official 
documents like a read of one’s philosophical thought developed over an academic career. It is 
also the history of CWIU’s strategy: it does not report on the chronological development of the 
union, but its strategy, yet with the purpose of its critical assessment. The study of the CWIU is 
18 
 
thus an example of the progress of the federation on radical reform as a union strategy and its 
conclusions can be further tested using other affiliates within COSATU. 
1.5 Archives and Documents  
The archival access to the union has already been mentioned. The archives are kept at the union 
head office, and are fairly well-organised; it is likely that they will be relocated to a university 
archive at some nearby date. I also utilised the Historical Papers at the University of the 
Witwatersrand as well as the Trade Union Library in Cape Town for additional CWIU materials 
that were housed there. Needless to say, the CWIU archives in these places were fairly small and 
often ending before 1994. Thus, most of the data used came from the union’s archives in 
Johannesburg which although largely unorganised have kept most of the useful information 
about the union including minutes of the National Executive Committee (NEC) Meetings, 
Reports on Congresses, Policy Workshops, Branches, Secretary, policy research units, 
Discussion Documents, and more. 
Choices about which documents to use in order to see the union’s strategy, and how it had been 
practiced, were not that easy, as most of them had something to say about CWIU’s unionism. 
Congress resolutions, policy workshop documents and reports, secretariat reports, NEC minutes, 
were thus prioritised. This is because they focus on the overall picture, and shed light on much of 
the underlying activities of the union. A choice had to be made on looking at union restructuring, 
occupational health and safety, collective bargaining, industrial restructuring, and education 
documents and work that the union was engaged in. Due to the space for this report and to 
achieve an in-depth discussion of strategy, one aspect had to be the focus: this became industrial 
restructuring policy, chosen for the information it carried about actual engagements with capital 
and the state about industry policies and developments. Arguably, looking at collective 
bargaining and how it developed, or occupational health and safety, and so on, could also give 
light on the industrial policies in the chemical sector, dealing with the state and capital, but I 
believe that this choice was the best one, not random but relevant. 
Archival documents are not without limitation even in a study that merely seeks the tabling of a 
strategy and official pronouncements thereof. As Ulrich puts it, “the content of archival 
documents needs to be interpreted and tested for reliability [thus] historians need to be aware of 
distortions and inaccuracies. Scholars... have already highlighted a number of problem areas 
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when dealing with union records and draw our attention to political silences, the authorship of 
union documents; and inaccuracies in the documents.”25
1.6 Interviews 
 I sought to address this through 
interviews (see next section). 
 
 
A selection of key informants was made on the basis of the role played in the union: thus, only 
strategic leaders who mostly participated in NEC meetings, NEDLAC structures and who were 
organisers and in research units were targeted. The study used 9 life history in-depth interviews 
with key leaders who played prominent roles in the CWIU during 1987 – 1999. More interviews 
could have been conducted; however, most of these individuals were met more than twice, many 
three times. Most union officials are no longer in the union and work in the state, private 
business or consultation, in COSATU or even in other unions outside the COSATU federation. 
 
As with another work, “Perhaps the most notable weakness of this study is the absence of shop 
stewards voices. Until attention is given to the voices of worker leaders and union members 
much of the history will remain eclipsed”26
 
; so shall it be with their intellectual contribution to 
this study in particular. That is to say a voice from the shop stewards about the experiences of 
union’s strategy and its practice would have been of even greater contribution to this study. 
Nonetheless, it was not feasible or strictly essential. 
1.7 Ethical considerations  
 
Proper consideration of rights of the participants was respected and of ethics provisions as per 
the University of the Witwatersrand Ethics Committee. Indeed, the proposal for pursuit of this 
study received the approval of the committee. 
                                                             
25 Ulrich N, 2007, Only Workers can Free the Workers: the origin of the workers’ control tradition and the Trade Union 
Advisory Coordinating Committee (TUACC), 1970 – 1979, thesis submitted for the fulfillment of the degree of Master of Arts to 
the faulty of Humanities, School of Social Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, page 69 
26 Ibid, page 70 
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The study gave strict adherence to making clear to participants that participation is voluntary, 
with no consequences if subjects chose not to participate or to withdraw from the study; the 
objectives of the study were made clear to respondents; commitment to confidentiality of 
respondents was also guaranteed, except that none of the respondents demanded such. 
Participants were asked whether or not they wish to be identified in the research report, and their 
wish would be honoured with no consequences for them. Consent was sought on usage of 
recorders, such that in case the participant wished not to be recorded, recorders would not be 
used. Opportunity was also provided for participants to obtain appropriate information about the 
nature, results and conclusions of the study. 
The limitations of the study come with the earlier advantage that the union itself had requested 
studying the union. This may have led into attempts to influence its direction in terms of who 
gets interviewed; however, strict adherence to objectivity and academic freedom was maintained 
as earlier noted, indeed ultimately not even a single interview was facilitated by the union. In 
conclusion the material gathered, except interview recordings and transcriptions will be given to 
the University of the Witwatersrand archives for public use without time frames. 
 
1.8 Overview of the report  
 
The central concern of this report is with the examination of CWIU’s trade union strategy and 
practice, rooted in the history and experience of labour (COSATU) in this country against the 
apartheid regime and capitalist exploitation as highlighted in the beginning of this chapter. The 
report will therefore begin by examination of literature in chapter 2, mainly looking at how trade 
unionism has been captured in studies of labour strategy, theorised and conceptualised. In 
addition, this chapter seeks to set a context within which this study takes place in literature, 
arguing that the strategy of labour has been understood as “radical reform”, linked to social 
democracy, and identifies it with its optimistic advocates – the Websterian tradition. The report 
further introduces the traditions of Marxism and anarcho-syndicalism to which it turns for 
assessment of the Websterian tradition, and of the practice of radical reform itself. 
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Chapter 3 deals with the first set of findings between 1987 and 1993, a period before the official 
fall of apartheid in 1994. Here, the report examines the period before the rise of the CWIU’s 
practice of radical reform, and then the emergence of that approach, identifying shifts, 
consistencies, tensions both in practice and in theory that the strategy carries. It deals with the 
period of transition, showing how the CWIU imagined a different outcome from what actually 
occurred. This chapter concludes with a concern building up about the union scoring fewer 
victories in its partnerships and cooperation with the state, capital and political parties. It notes a 
major shift around 1993 in attitudes to the state and to class struggle, where the union’s focus is 
on interest group politics that cater for its members, as opposed to the identification with the 
working class as seen in the period before 1993. 
This concern about failures of the strategy is further carried over in chapter 4: in the context of 
these major shifts as indicated above, this part looks at industrial and plant based restructuring. 
Here the practice of radical reform is examined using industrial and plant based restructurings. 
The report records further failures on core demands, and shows that the union’s concern about 
the strategy not working is growing. It notes the weakening of worker control, development of 
technocracy and a resultant tension that is building up between this objective of intensifying 
worker control and the pursuit in usage of radical reform. This chapter ends with a matured 
concern about why the union persists to use radical reform in spite of the losses exemplified in 
industrial restructuring. 
Chapter 5 draws threads together from chapter 3 and 4, and the union's decision to stick with the 
(arguably) failed strategy discussed, and starts by a brief look at the 1997 congress resolutions. 
The 1997 congress was the last CWIU congress, as the merger that led to CEPPWAWU 
followed soon after. The report showed that radical reform continued to be a choice of the CWIU 
despite failures and losses. It concludes by discussing part of the reasons why the union stuck 
with radical reform despite the union’s own admission that it had weakened it organisationally 
(particularly in terms of worker control), and been largely unsuccessful in its aims. 
In concluding, the report discusses the relationship between the practice of this type of unionism, 
“strategic unionism”, and the achievement of socialism. It insists that there is a tension in the 
pursuit of radical reform, and the objective of maintaining worker control. More importantly 
beyond this tension it discusses whether radical reform succeeds in defending workers’ gains, or 
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drawing society closer to socialism. The argument is made that it is a historical fact that radical 
reform does not work, has weakened labour organisation and, perhaps worse, has not brought it 
any nearer to the ideal of socialism. 
The report argues that a call for the recovery of the agency of the trade union movement begins 
with rejection of radical reform, and that it is important to return to – but update – the union’s 
pre-1993 revolutionary politics in order to realise socialism. It urges the trade union movement 
to engage in “militant class politics outside and against the state”, for here it regains worker 
control and restores the solidarity and mutual aid of the workers, fighting for the defence of its 
existing gains and also for drawing nearer to the realisation of socialism. This drawing nearer is 
in that the movement begins to take a form of an embryo for a radically different society, a 
movement that will be able to lead itself to the realisation of socialism. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Interpreting and Conceptualising Trade Union Strategy: 
Radical Reform and Strategic Unionism 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Trade unions have been a central locus of study as organisations of working class people in the 
social sciences. Trade union movements proved critical in the struggle against apartheid in South 
Africa; thus they have been central in understanding anti-apartheid history and the transition to 
democracy. In post-apartheid South Africa, they continue to play a critical role in the 
development of democracy and society broadly. However, many studies have identified 
challenges unions face in post-apartheid South Africa that may inhibit them from being central to 
the shaping of society and being agents by which the working class improves their living 
standards and contributes to the realisation of a class-free society. 
 
A raging debate exists in the literature about the role of the trade union movement in the struggle 
for liberation against apartheid, the transition to democracy and its consolidation. On the one 
hand, the dominant interpretation frames the scholarship on these very terms: the struggle against 
apartheid, transition from apartheid to democracy, and its consolidation. Here are scholars like 
Webster, Lambert, Adler, Von Holdt, Buhlungu and others27
These scholars have argued that the African labour movements have been highly militant, and 
usually grassroots-based, in their operations in the era of political domination and exclusion of 
black people in South Africa. Equally, they have stressed the emergence of a tradition of “worker 
control” (that is, of a democratic union practice centred on participatory democracy and shop-
, who argue that the African labour 
movements in South Africa have been critical to the fight against the authoritarian racist regime 
since the early twentieth century, and emerged out of the transition to democracy as an 
independent force that cannot be ignored in the shape of post-apartheid South Africa.  
 
                                                             
27 See Adler and Webster, 1995, 2000, Webster and Von Holdt, 2000, Lambert, 1988, Buhlungu, 2000 
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steward structures) in the early 1970s as a sharp break with the earlier African unions of the era 
before the banning of political parties in the early 1960s28
On the other hand, scholars like Barchiesi, Bramble, Callinicos, Lehulere, McKinley, Van der 
Walt and Nash agree regarding the historical importance of militancy and worker control
.  
 
29
The cleavage between these scholars is clearest in their different interpretation of the role of the 
African labour movement in post-apartheid South Africa. The former “Websterian” crop of 
scholars, often beginning their work in the 1970s and 1980s, stress apartheid as the central 
obstacle to the battle that the African labour movement waged in the pre-1990 era, although they 
did  not necessarily suggest that the movement did not have an equal stress on anti-capitalism 
and striving for socialism. However, this crop of scholars has, in the post-apartheid era and the 
advent of open markets and neo-liberal restructuring of the workplace, tended to view the rise of 
radical reform in positive terms. They have also stressed the struggle to transform the workplace 
regime from one that is characterised by white, authoritarian, domination to one characterised by 
(social) democracy
, but 
have treated the development of the African trade union movement with more scepticism, 
particularly in the post-apartheid era. This minority tradition in the scholarship focuses much of 
its attention on the post-apartheid role of the African trade union movement, and much of its 
work is the product of a new crop of scholars, working from the 1990s onwards. In general, this 
school is informed either by independent Marxism, or by anarcho-syndicalism. 
 
30
This is what separates the “Websterians” from the Marxist and anarcho-syndicalist group, which 
rejects radical reform, arguing that, rather than being an innovative and successful approach, it is 
. In their positive views of the current union strategy, what binds them is 
arguably an acceptance of the trade unionism that is represented by COSATU. If this school is 
influenced by some Marxist concepts, its overall outlook is nonetheless shaped by a social 
democratic approach. 
 
                                                             
28 See Ulrich N, 2003. I do not suppose that Ulrich falls in the same tradition of trade union interpretation with these scholars; 
presumably she belongs to the anarcho-syndicalist tradition … but it is her work that best revealed the fact of the emergence of 
worker control from the late 1960s, mainly in unions that are part of TUACC in Natal and later in the Witwatersrand. 
29 See Barchiesi F and Bramble T, 2003, Callinicos, 1992, Van der Walt, 1997 
30 See Von Holdt K, 2003, 2005, Masondo D, 2005  
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substantially responsible for the ills of COSATU. There are indeed differences within this crop 
in terms of what type of trade unionism should be adopted by COSATU; however, for the 
purposes of this study, it is the concern with the ills that will be important, although 
understanding them is critical for presenting more options for trade union practice in South 
Africa. In characterisation of the ills of the African trade union movement, it will be more 
helpful to begin by a discussion of conceptualisations of trade unionism largely developed by the 
earlier crop, and then look into case studies that speak to each of these crops of scholars.  
 
It will be the purpose of this chapter to assess literature pertaining to trade unionism, both 
theoretical and empirical material. The chapter seeks to situate the study within the broad 
practice and thought of trade unionism in secondary literature so as to not only inform its 
narrative, but engage the thought and practice at the same time. This it will do, whilst developing 
a structure within which the findings in this study will be engaged. Indeed, it goes beyond merely 
stating what the secondary literature says, of course critically, but positions itself to challenge or 
test, indeed assess, some conceptual narratives developed in the secondary literature to 
characterise the trade union strategy in the South African labour movements. 
 
2.2 Radical reform and trade union strategy in the South African labour movement 
 
Adler and Webster respond to a broader scholarship on interpretation of South Africa’s 
democracy that centred on transition theory; a perspective that the negotiations that ensued, 
dominated by the ANC with the apartheid state, were largely between moderates in the former 
and reformers in the latter, thus leading to a pact enabling democratisation, between these 
elites31
In line with their largely optimistic prognosis, however, Adler and Webster argue that “...pacting 
should not be seen simply as a function of the consolidation of democracy, but as a conflictual 
process of class compromise, the result of which may produce workers loyalty to 
.  
 
                                                             
31 See Adler G and Webster E, 1995, Challenging transition theory: labour movement, radical reform, and transition to 
democracy in South Africa, Politics and Society, Vol. 23. No. 1, Sage Publications, pages 75 -106. Also see Ginsburg D, 1996, 
The Democratisation of South Africa: Transition Theory Tested, Transformation Vol. 29 
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democratisation”32. Indeed, popular movements, in which labour is central, played a significant 
role in the “origin, development, and outcome”33 of the talks. It is their contention that even prior 
to the moment of transition, labour was able to use its power of mobilisation combined with 
strategic engagements with the state to win concessions that translated to change of laws and 
other conditions. Thus, they insist, “...movements may be able to inject more content into the 
democratisation process and wrest important concessions from reformers and moderates alike”34
The fledgling unions, in particular those affiliates to FOSATU [Federation of South 
African Trade Unions, COSATU’s main forerunner], had made important strategic 
innovations, which profoundly affected trade union development as well as the course of 
political struggle in South Africa. They successfully combined a radical vision with a 
strategy of reform; we call this strategic use of power radical reform.
. 
They add that: 
 
35
This is, they suggest, demonstrated by labour’s proactive role in initiating talks on industrial or 
economic negotiations, leading directly to the formation of structures like NEDLAC, which 
brings business, government, labour and civil society to secure agreements on various 
socioeconomic issues.
 
 
36
In pursuit of the long term goals of struggle of ending apartheid and of creating a socialist 
economy, the unions emphasised legal means of struggle. They sought inclusion of all 
workers within the industrial relations system and decided to register their unions under 
 Labour, in short, had a “strategic use of power” that made it a player in 
the transition, and an author of corporatist bodies that (they argue) laid the basis for a future 
radicalisation of democracy. Adler and Webster see elements of this approach as dating back to 
FOSATU: 
 
                                                             
32 Adler G and Webster E (eds.), 2000, Trade Unions and Democratisation in South Africa, 1985 – 1997, Macmillan Press: 
Britain, page 3 
33 Ibid. page 76 
34 Ibid 
35 Ibid, page 80 
36 Ibid 
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the LRA [Labour Relations Act, 1956]. Finally, they eschewed involvement in national 
political issues and refused to align themselves publicly to any political movement.37
Adler and Webster conclude by recommending that labour must maintain what they call its “dual 
emphasis”, meaning participation within the formal institutions of power combined with the 
strategic mobilisation of power in civil society
 
 
However, they stress that “...the most significant difference from past action is that labour is both 
on the streets and inside the centres of power”, whereas under apartheid it was mainly on the 
streets and outside and against the state.  
 
38
Therefore, the underlying framework for understanding the democratic consolidation, from this 
perspective, is that “...labour shifts from deploying its power to impose its will – regardless of 
the resistance – to using its power to secure voluntary consent from other actors in the industrial 
relations system and beyond”
. This participation in formal structures of power 
is an attempt to influence policy directions, and includes the tripartite alliance and state 
institutions.  Labour’s role in initiating NEDLAC gave it a power that is not captured by the 
notion that the democratic transition rested merely on an elite pact; using NEDLAC and the 
Alliance, and other structures “inside the centres of power”, labour can nonetheless supposedly 
push the new democracy well beyond the terms that elites might have agreed on, in any case.  
 
39. Adler and Webster argue that “...this more nuanced use of power 
– characteristic of democratic polities – involves a shift from the mobilisation of power to the use 
of influence in the heart of decision making at the enterprise, industry and national level”40
Thus, the Websterians shift between description and prescription, and view the new strategy of 
radical reform in the most positive light. There is confidence that, in the framework of 
democratic consolidation, labour has proven a legitimate force in society and a force to be 
. This 
is because, as earlier indicated, organised labour is understood to have become an important part 
of democratic society, for decision making in the spheres of the economy and politics.  
                                                             
37 Ibid, page 80 
38 Ibid, page 18 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid 
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reckoned with. These scholars argue for labour to continue making gains, it has to use 
democratic institutions whilst maintaining its independence outside of them; these institutions 
include those in industrial bargaining, besides the space created through the Alliance and the 
state, This means that democracy is seen as a process in which coexistence by rival forces of 
society can be ensured, whilst these forces continuously shape each other and society in general. 
Labour should thus use the democracy it has brought about in order to negotiate its vision and 
interests in society. 
 
It is noteworthy that Webster and Adler believe that revolutionary rupture is not possible at this 
time, and insist that “...if... socialist solutions are unfeasible, the conclusion we reach is for the 
need for a historic compromise between capital and labour: a left version of social democracy”41. 
The recommendations of “dual emphasis” - combine politics of interest representation and those 
of social movement forms of protests and struggle42 - and use of power to influence - 
participation of formal institutions of power combined with strategic mobilisation of power in 
civil society43
Adler and Webster correctly point out the shifts in how the exiled / underground ANC and SACP 
1990 imagined liberation before. The exile movement discouraged participation in the apartheid 
state due to its illegitimacy, and hoped to completely overthrow the apartheid state. On the other 
 - come to be seen as requirements for implementation of a “left version of social 
democracy”. 
 
Radical reform is therefore posed in two ways by Webster and Adler: one is as an interpretation 
of union strategy, but the other, secondly, is as a recommendation for moving forward - a case 
for a “left version of social democracy”. It is a trade union strategy carrying a vision of 
socialism, which is radical; in its historic meeting with capitalism, it nonetheless compromises a 
radical vision, realising socialism now, via strategic partnerships in a democratic capitalism, 
resulting in radical reforms that create building blocks for the realisation of socialism in the 
future.  
 
                                                             
41 Adler and Webster, 2000, page 18 
42 Ibid  
43 Ibid 
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hand, the independent African trade union movement, mainly FOSATU took a different and 
pragmatic direction, in the teeth of ANC/ SACP opposition. It strategically contributed to the 
reforms of the LRA in the late 1970s, which resulted in the legalisation of African trade unions, 
although it still maintained racial segregation. They argue that this demonstrated the 
independence of the new labour movement, but also that radical reform could work44
In his conceptualisation of the type of unionism that had characterised the labour movement in 
this period, the 1980s, Webster engages with the notion that unions in capitalist societies 
“mature” within the a formal industrial relations system
.  
 
From 1990, of course, the ANC/ SACP dropped their insurrectionary hopes, and entered into 
negotiations with the state. Trade union willingness to engage (and reform) was no longer 
viewed with scepticism; it was now seen as perfectly fitted to the new era, and the ad hoc 
reforms of the past were replaced by a fully developed strategy of radical reform. Meanwhile, the 
formation of the tripartite Alliance signalled a deeper reconciliation between the ANC/ SACP 
and COSATU approaches. In the 1970s and early 1980s, after the 1973 rise of African trade 
unions, much emphasis was placed on being independent from political parties and activities 
occurring in communities (although this did not mean working against them). The formation of 
COSATU began the process of linking the unions to the ANC/ SACP and a softening of the 
positions of the “independent worker bloc”. From 1990, even that bloc saw its future as lying 
within the Alliance.  
 
45
One, the economic dimension, is that of a union trying to win increases and 
improvements in living conditions; the other is that of a voice institution, i.e. a 
social and political institution. Where, as in South Africa, the majority does not 
have a meaningful voice within the political system, unions will inevitably begin 
: conflict gets institutionalised, unions 
become less bottom-up, and the militancy of their early years fades. This did not seem to be the 
case with African unions. In South Africa (and other late industrialising countries), a different 
type of unionism emerges which seemed at odds with this teleology. Webster spoke of the “two 
faces” of South African unionism in the 1980s:  
                                                             
44 Adler and Webster, 199, page 81 
45 Huntington S, 1968 
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to play a central role within the political system. However, it was the decline in 
living standards accompanying the economic recession that brought the two faces 
of unionism together. It is this fusing of the economic with the political – two 
faces of unionism – that began to take place after the November 1984, that I call 
social-movement unionism.46
However, do these characteristics dispel the telos of bureaucratisation and institutionalisation 
that Webster noted? Webster’s analysis did not really dispute the notion of an inevitable 
“maturation”, as much as it is dismissed in specific cases as inapplicable: it was the condition of 
political exclusion and absence of voice in political sphere that prevented maturation and 
generated SMU. Implicitly, at least, he indicates that there was no reason why, upon removal of 
these conditions, SMU would not be replaced by the moderate unionism already seen in Western 
countries. (It is imperative to mention that SMU was not viewed as unique to South Africa, but 
rather as a type of “militant, mobilised industrial” unionism in newly industrialised countries 
such as Brazil, South Africa, South Korea and the Philippines in the 1980s.
 
It is the blending of the two faces that makes social movement unionism (SMU). Webster argues 
that it is the conditions of living that came about due to recession in conjunction with the 
exclusion from the political system that brings about SMU. Thus, the economic conditions 
imposed by recession on the workplace as well as issues such as rents and bus fees, in 
combination with the political repression that swept the country from the 1970s, led to a 
combination of school boycotts, rent strikes, bus boycotts, consumer boycotts and stayaways 
(general strikes), in which unions played no small role. In essence, SMU here is a description of 
developments that characterised the trade union movement in the 1980s; integral to it are the 
organising traits that characterised it, democracy, worker control, militancy and grassroots 
organisation – it is a union strategy interpretation.  
47
                                                             
46 Webster E, 1994, The rise of Social Movement Unionism: The Two faces of the Black Trade Union Movement in South Africa, 
In Webster E, Alfred L, eds., Work and Industrialization in South Africa: An Introductory Reader, Ravan Press: Randburg, page 
268 
47 See the following citations in von Holdt; Lambert, 1990, Lambert and Webster, 1988, Munck 1087, Scipes 1992, Siedman 
1994, Waterman 1984, 1992, Webster 1988; also see Ulrich N, 2007 
). 
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Other scholars have used this conception too. Tanya Rosenthal, in her study of the CWIU 
workers at SASOL during the Vaal Stayaways in 1984, argued that SMU “...explains the 
structural and organisational conditions necessary for militant unions to take up broader political 
issues. It also acknowledges the voluntarism of agents; however, the explanation offered is elite 
driven focusing almost entirely on the decisions of leadership. But both structural and elite-
driven explanations leave crucial questions unanswered.”48 She goes on to say the question that 
must be raised is “why the labour movement gained grassroots support for articulating the needs 
of the working class more broadly. Why did workers, in a hostile political environment, embark 
on collective action around broad political demands?”49
Rosenthal argues that beyond “workers’ identity, consciousness and sense of moral outrage” was 
identification with the broader labour movement
 
50 providing “a sense of strength and 
solidarity”51. She insists that part of what explains the risk that these workers took in the action at 
SASOL, indeed standing to lose their jobs, is “their confidence that they would have support of 
other unions and workers, should they suffer any negative consequences from embarking in the 
stayaway”52
Von Holdt proceeds to claim that the development in the practice of SMU in Highveld Steel 
deepens the understanding of this unionism. In his study of the Highveld Steel, “...exploring the 
nature of the apartheid workplace regime... and the potential for union driven project of 
transformation of this regime”
.  
53
                                                             
48 Rosenthal T, 1994, Collective Action and Worker Consciousness in the chemical industry, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of 
Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, page 107 
49 Ibid  
50 Ibid, page 110 
51 Ibid  
52 Ibid 
53 Von Holdt, 2003, Transition from Below: Forging trade Unionism and Workplace Change in South Africa, University of Natal 
Press: Scottsville, page 143 
, Von Holdt argues that unions’ links with popular movements 
produce a nuanced and often contested union identity, emphasising this in its internal practices 
and institutions. He says the “...popular political identity of social movement unionism forged in 
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the broader struggle against apartheid shaped union practices on the shopfloor”54
...the union to have been as much a popular organisation as a class-based one, constituted 
through amalgam of collective identities forged both beyond and within the workplace... 
its internal organisational culture and practices, its goals, strategies, tactics and meanings 
were subject to continuous contestation and redefinition... and rising from this, the 
internal practices of the union were not unproblematically democratic and committed to 
debate. Indeed, the failure of union democracy to empower less literate migrant workers 
led them to resort to coercion to empower themselves... solidarity was formed through 
revolutionary bullying.
. He further 
shows 
55
Indeed, it was noted by the Websterians that, by the late 1980s, the African trade union 
movement was changing. It had combined the usage of “emphasis of legal means of struggle” 
with a radical vision of socialism, whilst a social movement character was still maintained – 
meaning employment of strategies like protests, strikes and stayaways. As noted earlier, the trade 
union movement emerged out of the 1980s as the single most powerful anti-apartheid movement, 
which had demonstrated leadership at the forefront of the struggle with the weakening and 
banning of the UDF and other movements
 
Even though such solidarities, as Rosenthal says, were useful in cementing and consolidating the 
risk taken, they were also problematic in the practice of SMU. Critical, though, is the influence 
that popular movements had on the unions in the practice of internal democracy, envisioning and 
organisation. Still, neither Rosenthal nor Von Holdt  give no reason to suppose that South 
African unions would not “mature” as conditions changed, and as the grievances that fed them 
faded.  
56
The FOSATU/ COSATU unions had used reforms under apartheid, “not regarded as ends in 
themselves but rather as dynamic phases in a progressive struggle to achieve the longer-term 
.  
 
                                                             
54 Ibid 
55 Ibid, page 175 
56Ibid, page 82  
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goals”.57
Labour combined a radical vision of a future society with a reformist, incrementalist 
strategy... In pursuit of the long-term goals of ending apartheid and creating a socialist 
economy, the unions emphasised legal means of struggle. Through its independent power 
base it had the capacity both to mobilise and restrain its members, a capacity it used in 
negotiating with its enemy – both capital and the state – to win and expand legal space in 
which to pursue its goals
 As the 1990s opened, the COSATU unions shifted quickly to radical reform. As put by 
Adler and Webster: 
 
58
To achieve this requires a partnership that will now find expression in statutory 
arrangements involving all the major role-players in the economy. The decision to set up 
. 
 
The post-1994 era would also be conceptualised as that of democratic consolidation, in which 
old school SMU was replaced by strategic unionism, with the unions envisaged as legitimate 
parts of the new South African order. This was expressed by President Nelson Mandela at the 
1994 COSATU congress, calling for the unions to not only assist but be at the forefront of the 
development of democracy. Mandela, acknowledging the unmatched contribution of the labour 
movement to where the country is, argued: 
 
It will always be crucial for the trade union movement to play the role of a critical extra-
parliamentary force. But today you also have to take active part in determining and 
implementing Government policy. It is fundamental that the trade union movement 
should jealously guard its independence. But today you also have to use, to maximum 
effect, the elements of political power that we have together achieved in struggle... 
What sets this Congress [the COSATU 1994 congress] apart from all others before it is 
the fact of the elements of political power that the democratic movement as a whole is 
wielding. The challenge therefore is to use this power to consolidate democracy at the 
same time as the union movement promotes its own interests!  
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of the National Economic, Labour and Development Council is an important part of this 
process. (We are determined as Government that this body should be formally constituted 
before the end of this month.) ... 
Among the many urgent tasks that face this Council is the question of industrial 
restructuring so necessary for us to become a full and competitive partner in international 
economic relations. 
The Government is fully committed to the protection of the integrity of the collective 
bargaining system. Yet, among the lessons that we have all learnt from recent industrial 
actions is that this system should be improved, particularly with respect to mechanisms of 
mediation that should help resolve disputes before they come to a head.  
It is quite instructive that major sectors such as mining, clothing and textile, and the iron, 
steel and metallurgical industries concluded their negotiations without recourse to strike 
action. Besides the fact that the number of strikes in this period this year was much lower 
than in previous years, this goes to demonstrate that we have healthy industrial relations 
in South Africa. The psychology of crisis, fanned by some enthusiasts in the media, has 
little to do with reality...59
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These extracts demonstrate the understanding that existed between the government and the 
labour movement, and avoiding a “psychology of crisis”: industrial conflicts were symptoms of 
“healthy industrial relations” and democracy, and were, of course, supposedly easily resolved 
under democracy. Old school SMU no longer had a place in an order in which “all major role 
players” would abide by the rules; the illegitimacy of state power that fostered massive conflict 
was a thing of the past. Democratic consolidation meant the working together of all major 
parties, business, labour and government, in redirecting and restructuring of the economy and 
country. It is in this context, in the spirit espoused by Mandela’s address, that we should not only 
understand, but also position the practices of the labour movement in the post-1994 era.  
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/speeches/1994/sp940907.html 
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In addition to this political environment, and indeed the type of state that labour participated in 
shaping, are the macroeconomic policy developments of the time, adopted by the tripartite 
Alliance first and turned into a macroeconomic policy for the first democratic government. As 
Adler and Webster insist, they locate labour as an important force and an indication of the 
success of its ‘strategic use of power’60
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the nominal macroeconomic policy of 
the ANC government from 1994 to 1996, emphasised two aims: the alleviation of poverty and 
the reconstruction of the economy; indeed, it treated them as interrelated, using a Keynesian 
approach that viewed redistribution as the key to growth. The programme asserts that there will 
be no balanced economic growth without the simultaneous promotion of economic development 
and “economic growth without development would fail to bring about ‘structural 
transformation’, that is, a more advanced economy and a more equitable and prosperous 
society”
.  
2.3 RDP and GEAR: radical reform and macroeconomic practice 
61. This simply tells us that a myopic emphasis on growth would just stress the already 
existing disparities and poverty, in that the poor will remain poor and the rich would get richer. 
The programme’s aim is therefore to promote the state’s role in ensuring that its growth is 
accompanied by economic reconstruction and social development62
The RDP intended to realise this vision through, firstly, what it called “meeting basic needs”. 
Here the programme refers to job creation, land redistribution, housing, water, electricity, 
telecommunications, transport, health care and social welfare
 . 
63. Second is the development of 
human resources, premised on the view that the RDP is “...a people-centred programme… 
People must be involved in the decision making process, in implementation, in new job 
opportunities requiring new skills, and in managing and governing… society…but an education 
and training programme is crucial”64
                                                             
60 See Adler G and Webster E, 1995 
61 Lodge T, 2002, Politics in South Africa from Mandela to Mbeki, David Phillip: Cape Town. page 54 
62 Ibid 
63 ANC, Reconstruction and Development Programme, Umanyano Publications: Johannesburg, 1994 
64 Ibid 
 in order for this to be successful. It envisaged making 
education and training available to all, from high school to tertiary institutions.  Thirdly, the 
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programme aims at “building the economy”, by which it speaks heavily of strengthening labour 
laws to the extent of allowing labour to be included in the reconstruction and development of the 
economy through consultation65
Fourthly, the programme speaks of the democratisation of the state and society, where the aim is 
to link democracy, development and a people centred approach, and determine a new democratic 
order. Here the programme speaks of strengthening bureaucratic measures of the state at 
provincial and local level, the judiciary, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 
facilitating socio-economic development. Lastly, it deals with the implementation measures, in 
which it stipulates ways of mobilising funds for the programme
.  
66
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The RDP is characterised by different economic paradigms. First, as indicated, is a large dose of 
Keynesianism: it intends to roll out employment through a huge public works programme where 
infrastructural development will ensue. This was not seen as a passive handout of reforms – as 
noted, the unions and other popular forces were seen as active partners in the implementation and 
governance of the RDP. Secondly, there is some neoliberalism: it intends to open up South 
Africa’s economy through reduction of tariffs and envisages export oriented growth. There is 
emphasis on creating a competitive industry in light of the above, where industries like mining 
are competitive abroad as South African firms, or South Africa leads in terms of producing 
certain products at a cheap price in a global economy.  
It is a Keynesian concept to have high wages. This works in that the few that have jobs will be 
earning on behalf of the household and will be able to provide for it, and this will ensure that 
people have money to spend on the economy. In the long run the economy will expand and 
create more jobs. This is dependent on the fact that they will buy from domestic companies, 
which can directly boost the economy. This activist role for the state, which suggested that 
economic growth can be realised through the redistribution of wealth, driven by the state, clashed 
with the outgoing apartheid government’s conversion to neoliberalism, which called for 
“redistribution through growth”: grow the economy first, and then there is something to 
redistribute.  
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It is noteworthy that the RDP was initially conceived by the labour movement as a 
Reconstruction Accord,67 and was the result of compromise arising from a popular consultative 
process that included labour, civil society and business. Indeed, it originated with labour’s efforts 
to strike relations with the ANC government in realisation of a union-led transformative vision. 
Labour sought to enter in agreement with its struggle partner before its inauguration into leading 
the South African state, hoping to bind it to a pro-poor and union-friendly policy. Through the 
Reconstruction Accord, as Gotz shows, “COSATU hoped to… tie the ANC to express wishes of 
organised labour by subtly pointing out that it could never hope to be the government if it failed 
to take on board a set of goals that its huge membership base would identify with”68. Indeed, this 
would be “...a relationship by which an ANC government’s identity would be overdetermined by 
what the ANC itself has always been – the leader of a range of liberation forces fighting side-by-
side”.69 “The unions wanted a programme which would enable workers to gain increasing control 
over their lives, an empowerment process facilitated by a decisively interventionist government 
prepared, with working class interests specifically in mind, to force rapid change in atrophied, 
deeply exploitative and discriminatory social and economic relations.”70
Social movement unionism in South Africa emerged in the struggle against 
apartheid generally, and white power in the workplace specifically. With the 
democratic breakthrough of the negotiated transition, there was a fundamental 
political reorientation within the union, although the workplace regime barely 
 
This was, of course, an approach arising from strategic unionism – the RDP as a package of 
radical reforms hopefully fostering “a left version of social democracy”. It is this accord that led 
to the development of the macroeconomic policy as discussed above, with demonstrable 
evidence of the influence labour espouses, as Gotz, Von Holdt, Adler and Webster show. In 
addition, this is a policy which guaranteed the interventionist state seen as critical to the 
achievement of socialism as a future vision. Von Holdt argues:  
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changes. The trade union movement responded with the new strategy of 
reconstruction.71
...the union movement had shifted from a stance of all-out challenge to an 
economy structured by apartheid and capitalism, to a concern with the problems 
of economic reconstruction and industrial restructuring, and a quest for various 
channels and institutions through which to participate in national economic policy 
formulation. Concern with building institutions rather than destroying them, 
solving problems rather than precipitating crises, governing rather than opposing, 
had profound implications for the organisational policies and practices, culture 
and identity.
  
 
This strategy aimed, essentially, at contesting and radicalising the democratic process. With the 
RDP:  
 
72
The macroeconomic strategy that eventually emerged – significantly, developed without 
participation of labour (unlike in the case of the RDP) – is Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR). Adopted in 1996, its vision was of building “...a competitive fast-
growing economy which creates sufficient jobs for all work seekers, a redistribution of income in 
favour of the poor, a society in which sound health, education and other services are available to 
 
 
Yet, the RDP, the greatest of the radical reform initiatives, was a failure. It was never 
implemented, the RDP White Paper of September 1994 essentially recasting the document as an 
orthodox neoliberal strategy. The goals of the RDP – reducing poverty and so on – were 
retained, but its methods were replaced by the very vision of “redistribution through growth” that 
the outgoing apartheid government had proposed. The neoliberal framework was also applied in 
industry, not just at macro-economic level, as will be seen in the experience of the CWIU with 
the chemical industry (below).  
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all and an environment in which homes are secure and places of work are productive”73. It 
intended to reduce the role of the state in the economy, to lead to market-led growth. “This 
presupposes a set of policy measures to facilitate the withdrawal of the state from the productive 
activities, regulatory functions, as well as the provision of social services. Accordingly, the 
private sector is supposed to play a leading role in the reconstruction and development 
process.”74
In assuring this, the government’s strategy speaks of adopting a “...tight fiscal policy… to 
increase domestic savings and benefit from the expansionary impact of the stronger investment 
and export performance”
. Consequently it meant the private sector was to have its own way in the market 
without much intervention by the state; instead the state would level or engineer conditions 
favourable for the market to flourish.  
75. It further speaks of keeping a check on inflation and releasing 
domestic resources to finance capital formation (investment), therefore proposing the lowering of 
the fiscal deficit. By implication, the government would, as the strategy puts it, let the private 
sector take care of some social services, as they would be servicing the debt and aiming at 
investment for the creation of growth, which would mean reliance on the private sector.76
Secondly, the strategy addresses monetary and exchange rate policy, where the central aim is the 
“maintenance of financial stability and the reduction of the inflation rate”
 
77, so as to create a 
favourable environment for the creation of employment and generation of growth. To lower 
inflation rates through trade liberalisation, whilst maintaining lower (but positive) interest rates, 
as per the strategy, would attract investment and promote savings. Third are trade, industrial and 
small enterprise policies: here the strategy seeks to speed tariff reform by consolidating the trade 
and industry policy, and in addition to provide supportive measures for small and medium 
enterprises as a key area for employment creation and income generation.78
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The strategy calls for public investment and asset restructuring, where the government trades 
assets totally or sells them whilst retaining strategic interests in them. This part encourages the 
government to form partnerships with the private sector for the strategic objective of maintaining 
four basic sources of finance: “fiscal transfer, concessional finance from multilateral institutions 
and other international sources, development finance channelled through development finance 
institutions, and loans raised on commercial terms”79. This is to lead the creation of employment 
and distribution of wealth through optimising investment of resources.80 Lastly, GEAR envisages 
labour flexibility, which will “...produce a labour intensive growth path, accelerate investment, 
lower inflationary pressures; wage increases limited by productivity growth; as well as variable 
application of employment standards”81
This holds negative consequences for labour and what it had initially thought as its Alliance 
vision of reconstruction, as there is emphasis on the reduced role of the state, less social 
spending, flexibility of labour law and privatisation, which may result in lower wages. 
Nevertheless, the presentation of GEAR by government was not one that posed it as a strategy 
that fundamentally departed from RDP. Instead, it was presented as having incorporated the RDP 
(or at least, the RDP goals) and made it a more governable, viable, policy
.  
The core fact in GEAR is the reduction of the state’s role in the market, except for creating an 
investment-friendly environment: this the state attains through trade liberalisation, privatisation, 
reduction of government spending, and deregulated trade, financial and labour markets, whilst 
redistributing wealth and reducing poverty through job creation. Therefore its intervention is in 
favour of capitalism and a competitive economy. Also, it depends on investment to ensure 
sustainable growth and create employment. 
82. Gotz insists that the 
RDP is “...the metamorphosis [of the] growth and development strategy and in turn 
macroeconomic framework, government may believe that it has found a seamless fit between the 
development of a society in which no interest might feel itself excluded”83
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He adds, though, that the continued reference to the RDP by the ANC “necessitated a profound 
rearticulating of its meaning, one with profoundly negative consequences for organised labour.”84 
This is the context in which the CWIU and many other affiliates had to look to secure their 
members’ interests, a period known as one of consolidating democracy, as Mandela puts it. 
Writing four years after GEAR, we find Adler and Webster concluding: “If, at this time, socialist 
solutions are unforeseeable, the conclusion we reach is for the need of a historic compromise 
between capital and labour: a left version of social democracy... there is a need for labour to shift 
from deploying its power to impose its will – regardless of resistance – to using its power to 
secure voluntary consent from other actors in the industrial relations system and beyond.”85
Perhaps because the record of the strategy of radical reform at a macro-economic level is so 
discouraging, scholars in the Websterian tradition have, since 2000, focused their attention on 
workplace case studies. In this context, Von Holdt argues that usage of the notion of radical 
reform by Adler and Webster entails an over-emphasis on the institutional role of labour in 
transition and on its influence from above. For Von Holdt, the focus must extend to include 
transformation of the workplace regime by looking at “transition from below – the workplace, 
the trade union, the town council, the ANC branch”
 
Yet the record of the ANC in power, from 1994 to 2000, showed few signs of this “historic 
compromise”, nor provided much reason to see labour as successful in achieving “social 
democracy”, “left” or otherwise, via radical reform and “using its power to secure voluntary 
consent from other actors in the industrial relations system and beyond”. 
2.4 Strategic unionism and shop floor emphasis of radical reform  
 
86
Von Holdt looked at NUMSA’s strategy to confront industrial restructuring, which inevitably 
entailed consequences such as retrenchments, outsourcing, new technology, reorganisation of 
production, and the opening of closed markets to the world which comes with increased 
competition for employers. His focus was on a single case study; “Highveld Steel”. In this 
.  
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context, NUMSA’s strategy of “reconstruction”, or let us say, strategic unionism and radical 
reform, included “skills training, grading and narrowing the ‘apartheid wage gap’ as a strategy 
for addressing pressures for improved productivity”. In addition, the union developed “research 
groups for shop stewards... which comprised of seminars and overseas study tours to a number of 
countries, including Australia”.87 This “strategic unionism” was closely identified with 
Australian unionists working at NUMSA; it had been developed in Australia88
• reduced autonomy in the context of economic globalisation 
. 
 
Like radical reform on a national institutional level, Von Holdt sees strategic unionism focuses 
on the transformation of the “apartheid workplace regime” and trade liberalisation, and its impact 
on the shop floor. It also stresses participation of labour in restructuring of the economy and 
society at a macro and micro level. In addition, it is seen as a shift from an emphasis on 
resistance identified with the militancy of SMU: if the latter entailed alliances with social 
movements to resist a hegemonic order on the shop floor, strategic unionism focuses on 
contesting incorporation, not resisting it and not wishing for its destruction as SMU does.   
 
In a recent collection edited by Von Holdt and Webster, they argue that the South African 
workplace restructuring is producing a work order with the following characteristics: 
• two dominant trends in formal-sector workplaces: authoritarian restoration, and 
stalemate brought about by ineffective management and resistant trade unions; 
• the persistence and reconfiguration of the apartheid legacy in the majority of workplaces; 
• the differentiation of the world of work into three zones (the core, the non-core and the 
periphery) through processes of re-ordering the lines of variable inclusion and exclusion 
of South African citizens;  
• the weakening of trade unions; and  
• deepening poverty and exclusion among the great numbers of households, generating a 
crisis of social reproduction.89
                                                             
87 Ibid, page 187 
88 Ibid 
89 Webster E and von Holdt (eds.), 2005,Beyond the apartheid workplace: studies in transition, Work restructuring and the crisis 
of social reproduction, UKZN Press: South Africa, page 32 
 
43 
 
 
They attribute these to the liberalisation period in the post-apartheid political economy and 
globalisation brought by GEAR policy practices. They argue for the need for a “counter-
movement” which constitutes the state, trade unions and other social movements. Predictably, 
the “counter-movement” is envisaged as centring on strategic unionism – although with some 
elements of social movement unionism. They argue that labour will have to organise casualised 
workers and reinstate its power by uniting all workers. In addition, labour should go into 
alliances with other social movements such as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and the 
South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO). It is believed that this will provide a necessary 
offensive against the destruction caused by global neo-liberal restructuring.  
They also maintain, in this light, that the state has already shown significant shifts towards 
redistributive policies, despite its key role in the very liberalisation of which they complain;  they 
see the state as potentially important in leading an offensive against the “social destruction 
wrought by the market”, despite its role in enabling the market’s “social destruction” via GEAR 
and the RDP White Paper90
It is striking that these scholars do not question the limitations or consequences workers suffer in 
relation to failures with regard to the process of incorporation in democratic consolidation. They 
do not ask what the process of participating in structures of power has brought labour when the 
RDP culminated in GEAR; there is no real grappling with the failures of radical reform. What is 
the evidence of the rise of a “left version of social democracy”? What has its pursuit done to 
defend gains and secure necessary shifts or reforms for workers? How has “dual emphasis”, 
where labour is both on the streets and in structures of power, influencing policy formation; the 
demand for restructuring with a human face, whilst stressing skills development and training; 
narrowing the “apartheid wage gap” as a strategy for addressing pressures for improved 
productivity; building of research capacity within the union to support negotiation efforts and 
. Their prescriptions are reached despite the fact that, by the time of 
the writing of their book (2005), the state had never tilted from a neo-liberal macroeconomic 
practice, regardless of the losses labour suffered – the findings that their volume demonstrates 
amply. 
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influence on policy; and lastly, formations of alliances with social movements and the state to 
resist “the wreath brought by the market”, brought the labour movement any hair’s breadth 
closer to socialism?  
While the Websterian tradition insists that “...socialist solutions are unfeasible”, it provides little 
evidence to suggest that “a left version of social democracy”91
Buhlungu argues that the aim of his study is an “...assessment of union capacity to grapple with 
issues thrown by the transition to democracy and the entry of South Africa into the general 
global economy”
 is any more likely.  
2.5 Case study - Websterians and research practice: The case of PPWAWU 
In the same collection co-edited by Adler and Webster, we find Buhlungu’s piece on PPWAWU, 
which looks at trade union capacity from a Websterian perspective. He accepts radical reform as 
a union strategy, but points to its weakness through an evaluation of PPWAWU and its capacity 
to carry on dual participation. 
92. He then concludes that “...trade union resources have been stretched and that 
this limits their ability to maintain their influence on the shop floor, at industry, and at national 
levels”93
He defines capacity as “...organisational capabilities to regain the initiative and maintain the 
influence unions have exercised in industrial relations and in society generally”
. In addition, the unions are unable to transform their politics from being reactive to 
proactive, making proposals on how best to restructure production. 
94
Buhlungu identifies important developments in PPWAWU in terms of political education for 
both shop-stewards and members, complex skills required to deal with production issues and the 
. This definition 
is based on identifying unions as operating in different circumstances than those of apartheid. 
The new circumstances put pressure on labour to develop this capacity and initiative in terms of 
managing capitalism. 
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brain drain experienced by the union. He says: “The history and struggle of the trade union 
movement did not equip the unions to deal with new issues in a democratic society.”95
2.6 Radical unionism: Marxist and anarcho-syndicalist critique of the Websterian tradition 
 Thus, 
unions need to focus on strengthening their education and capacitating themselves to continue 
making gains in the transition process. This coincides with the needs of radical reform as the 
dominant strategy as opposed to SMU. That is to say radical reform needs technical skills and 
practices which SMU did not require. 
Indeed, Buhlungu’s attribution of problems to “brain drain”, incapacity and required complex 
skills speaks to trade union strategy, the way in which the union chooses in the first place to 
engage. Thus, problems that come about in implementation of the strategy must also provoke a 
reflection on the strategy, in case this is where the predicament is. Nevertheless, the trade union’s 
new strategy of radical reform is not evaluated, interrogated in light of these ills, by Buhlungu 
himself. It is just noted that the union is weak; it is blamed for merely being incapacitated; that 
the strategy’s very prospects rest upon the presence (or rather, absence) of a few leaders is left 
unremarked. 
This case study provides rich insight into the relationship between workers and employers. But 
in the analyses of Buhlungu, the question of union strategy is posed only at the level of 
implementation – and union capacity. The strategy itself is not critically interrogated and the 
assumption that the strategy results from transition and global competition are not proved. So, 
here, the Websterian tradition ends with claiming nothing more for labour than simple 
recognition in policy formulation and restructuring processes. It does not consider whether the 
workers are exploited more; or how a union’s strategy affects its revolutionary potential, benefits 
the working class and actually causes fundamental shifts in capitalist society. 
 
Much criticism of the Websterian tradition has come from a crop of scholarship from different 
ideological traditions: independent Marxists (e.g. Callinicos, McKinley, Lehulere, Bramble), 
autonomist / libertarian Marxists (e.g. Barchiesi), and anarcho-syndicalists (e.g. Van der Walt). 
In this study, these scholars are grouped together, mainly on the basis of their rejection of the 
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Websterian case for radical reform and strategic unionism, and their support for labour not 
participating in the co-management of capitalism and capitalist society. Here, we will refer to 
them as the radical unionism tradition, which is characterised by scepticism towards corporatism, 
the ANC and radical reform.  
Richard Hyman’s work, which had a great influence on intellectuals in the trade union 
movement in the 1970s, is worth considering as it helped lay the basis for the thinking of the 
independent Marxists. In his exegesis of Marxists’ views on trade unionism, Hyman notes two 
interpretations, which he characterises as “optimistic” and “pessimistic”. The optimistic 
interpretation, he argues, can be identified with Marx and Engels, whereas the other 
interpretation incorporates three analyses identified with Lenin, Michels and Trotsky96
His goal is to reconcile or “synthesise” these two antagonistic interpretations, which he argues 
represents “a certain dialectic” in the tradition of thinking about trade unionism
. 
97. The main 
question he is dealing with, and relevant to this report, is whether trade unions possess the 
revolutionary potential in their activities as unions or whether they do “...facilitate (or even … 
inhibit) the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society”98
Both the “optimists” and “pessimists’“viewed unions as inherently limited. Marx and Engels 
developed their perspective over a period of time, concluding that trade unionism had limited 
revolutionary potential. Workers’ irreconcilable interests with those of the capitalist class created 
an inevitable antagonism. Thus, the co-operation of the workers with the capitalist class can be 
seen as weakening labour, but not fundamentally so as to disable its revolutionary potential to 
disrupt  capitalism
. He asks this in particular 
regarding their external role as opposed to internal activities. This is a question of union strategy 
and helps identify some of the theoretical underpinnings of unionism; beyond this, it sheds light 
on the treatment of labour as a social force and the role it is capable of playing. In essence, this 
translates into the justifications of expectations we can put on unions. 
99
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power to, the vanguard party, aiming at state power. The pessimists tended to the idea of 
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integration advocated by Lenin: union activity does not pose a fundamental threat to the stability 
of the capitalist system, and can even be counter-revolutionary when the time matures for a 
revolution. He distinguished between “trade union consciousness” and “socialist consciousness”, 
and maintained that unions only possessed the former, while the latter, necessary, outlook was 
the preserve of the vanguard.  
Hyman, however, using Rosa Luxemburg, suggests that trade union activity brings socialist 
consciousness as well as “trade union consciousness”. He concluded by arguing that you cannot 
separate the struggle from the development of consciousness, and maintains that what will bring 
about the revolutionary hour in trade union activity is subject to contextual peculiarities as 
opposed to unions’ inherent limits in terms of their potential to assault capitalism.  
He also disputed Michels’ (not a Marxist himself) “iron law of oligarchy”: the few at the top in 
unions could face democratic overthrow from below by the rank-and-file if they failed to deliver 
as expected. Unions are never quite “incorporated”; even in ideal situations of high wages etc., 
unions can be suprising radical. This leads Hyman to conclude that pessimistic views are “...one-
sided, merely one moment in what best be regarded as a dialectical relationship between trade 
unionism and capitalist society”100
The independent Marxists do not favour participation in the co-management of capitalism or the 
operations of the capitalist state as means towards fundamental change. In a debate with Enoch 
Godongwana (then regional secretary of NUMSA (1992), now ANC deputy minister of Public 
Enterprises), Callinicos rejected the very idea of a Reconstruction Accord. He saw this move by 
.  
The point is that Hyman does not see trade unions as adequate in and of themselves as tools by 
which workers can create an alternative society. The (vanguard) party is still needed, and so is 
state power. This is critical, as the independent Marxists in South Africa should not be 
mistakenly viewed as advocates of a process where the labour movement leads a societal change 
to socialism by itself. They do not, as does anarcho-syndicalism, see unions as adequate tools of 
struggle for a fundamental change of capitalist society.  They also differ from the Websterians, 
however, who argue for labour working within the capitalist state, promoting competitiveness, 
and class compromise.  
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labour as entering into agreements with capital and sharing the responsibility of managing 
capitalism.  
He argued, first, against the perception that South Africa is not ready for socialism, arguing that 
the country possesses great proletarianisation, industrialisation, and a big socialist constituency, 
reflected, for instance, in the membership of the SACP. The possibilities of a socialist 
transformation are available to be exploited101. He is confident that labour carries seeds for a new 
society, and this must not be left to the future, as participation in managing capitalism will take 
this power away. He was “optimistic” about COSATU, and recommended instead of a social 
contract that the union should refrain participating in co-management of capitalism, calling for 
“militant abstentionism”102. By this he means “...combining the development of strong workplace 
organisation with the refusal to take any responsibility for the management of South African 
capitalism”103. He says “...the embryo of an authentically socialist form of society exists in the 
workplace and delegate based democracy that has evolved in the unions”104
Furthermore, he recommends that unions or labour should strike an international alliance with 
other unions from the rest of the world as the victory of one country will not suffice for the 
sustenance of the victory itself. He finally argues that the ideological creativity or what he calls 
“crisis of ideas” can be revived by a strengthening of shop floor activism without participating in 
the co-management capitalist state, a “socialism from below” existent in trade union activity and 
struggle, characterised by Neocosmos as “politics from below”
 (although such an 
embryo of socialism, according to Callinicos, must be brought to term by a vanguard party). 
105. Thus, for Callinicos, labour’s 
“agency” is not undermined by the transition; it is its decision to manage capitalism that weakens 
it106
 
. “Dual power’, as described by Grtamsci, as opposed to “dual emphasis” as seen by the 
Websterians, was needed. 
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2.7 Radical Unionism in South Africa and research practice  
An edited collection by Barchiesi and Bramble makes a significant contribution to this 
interpretation. This starts by arguing that we have seen, “in parallel with the legalisation and rise 
to power of the ANC, the predominance of a nationalist-oriented current of analysis”107. This is 
seen in the identification of democratisation with the ANC, as well as, they continue, comes 
“with an overwhelming emphasis on COSATU to the detriment of other union traditions”, and] 
“focused on the role of trade union inside national liberation” and “defining the political role of 
the unions in democratisation and capitalist modernisation”108. They maintain that this tradition 
reveals “a scenario of contradiction between unions’ policy ambitions on the one hand and 
political marginalisation on the other, a situation whose social and economic roots remain totally 
unexplained” by Webster et al109
They speak for a different approach to trade union studies, which goes “beyond assuming a 
‘double’ identity of the unions, as collective organisations and as movements for social 
change”,
. 
110 which they attribute to the Websterian literature. They argue that this tradition has 
emphasised the institutional politics of unions as opposed to studying grassroots militancy, and 
the working class in its own right. The latter is merely seen, by the Websterians, as possessing 
“nebulous disruptive tendencies to be controlled”, or as “a passive mass to be mobilised by the 
union leadership to reinforce institutional positions and policy influences”111
Their study then seeks “to open a new line of enquiry that investigates the impact of the social 
foundations of trade unions of the shifts that are now under way in the structure of the black 
working class”
. 
112. In addition they discuss “challenges facing organised labour as a political and 
institutional actor”113
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. They are explicitly critical of the approach taken by the “radical reform” 
social democrats: they extend their different approach to include an enquiry into the challenges 
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facing labour as an actor. That is to say, they do not dismiss the fact that labour is in these 
structures, but they also they do not assume that the current strategic unionism pursued by labour 
is an inevitable (let alone desirable) outcome of the democratic transition or the global exposure 
of South Africa’s capital. This tradition, then, examines COSATU’s strategic unionism without 
assuming its inevitable. It further gives insight into some of the grassroots explanations of some 
of what seem to be challenges to COSATU unionism. These are briefly considered below, with a 
view to demonstrating the strength of their critique: that is, labour’s choice in becoming part in 
managing capitalism has yielded its defeat. 
2.8 Case study for radical unionism: NUMSA in the East Rand 
Tom Bramble assesses “Social Movement Unionism since the Fall of Apartheid”114 using 
NUMSA in the East Rand as a case study. He aims to focus on what he believes is central to this 
type of unionism: “...the presence of representative and participatory democracy (including 
factory-level membership mobilisation). Consideration is also given, however, to independence 
from political parties and links to non-workplace political struggles.”115
...participatory democracy and membership mobilisation are now under 
significant threat. Although formal structures continue to exist and much of the 
rhetoric of mandate and accountability is apparent, the participatory element of 
 In so doing he seeks to 
examine the fate of SMU and the tradition of worker control.  
He notes the changes that occurred in membership between young and old, as well the role of 
unions. He notes that the sacrificial spirit of the 1980s where members are spontaneous and 
interested in participation has been replaced by dependence on shop stewards, as well as union 
organisers. Shop stewards, further, spend less time on the shop floor and more in union 
workshops and conferences, resulting in a gap between them and members. He concludes that 
the information gathered through interviews indicates that  
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democracy that animated the unions in the 1980s – grassroots mobilisation – 
appears to be in the process of slowly disintegrating.116
Bramble suggests a link between this “disintegration” and NUMSA’s radical reform and 
”strategic unionism”. Bramble, quoting Hirschsohn, says: “Whereas SMU involves mobilisation 
around a common set of demands, strategic unionism requires commitment to a coherent 
developmental vision and a paradigm of economic, social political transformation.”
 
117 He notes 
that that this strategy has indeed changed the union: for instance, on organisers, “Their work is 
increasingly tied up in preparing for legal cases, and they are required to spend a considerable 
amount of their time preparing for appearances before the Commission of Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration [CCMA], rather than factory-level organising.”118
As for “independence from political parties”,
  
119 he notes that “NUMSA’s leadership is 
ideologically and personally predisposed to close ties with the ANC Government, but must 
contend with a more critical minority current within the union which is able to count on the 
support of many thousands of rank and file members who are sceptical, if not completely hostile, 
to the neoliberal drift of ANC Government policy”120. This results in a situation where the union 
does not too easily identity with government. The unions’ involvement in the tripartite Alliance 
makes it difficult to identify and engage with new social movements in the community, like the 
Anti Privatisation Forum, which battle with the ANC government which the union is in alliance 
with. He concludes that SMU in democratic South Africa “...appears to be giving way to the type 
of social partnership unionism common to Continental Europe”121 as Callinicos predicted. He 
says that taking into consideration the continuing exclusion of the majority of working class from 
the national pie, the result may be a “...return to some of the organising principles of SMU used 
with such success in the struggle years and which contributed immensely to the destruction of 
apartheid”122
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A similar impression is given of the effects of radical reform on CWIU. When John Appolis, the 
regional secretary of CEPPWAWU, interviewed in the Barchiesi and Bramble collection, was 
asked “...what has been the impact on trade union grassroots structures of … processes involving 
the leadership, which becomes a partner in policy-making and restructuring processes”,123
The… important thing that has emerged is in fact that in most cases, not all, 
workers and shop stewards are mere spectators in terms of the issues that are 
negotiated around at NEDLAC. If you take this over the past two to three years, 
particularly around the labour law amendments, it is when there is no agreements 
with the other side, when the employers and the state dig in their heels, that you 
find that the leadership will be mobilising. But as soon as the door is open, the 
whole process of workers being part of the process in no longer present. The fact 
is the workers and shop stewards are merely spectators, or are used as battering 
rams to open the door, or make a movement around some of these areas.
 he had 
the following to say: 
124
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This manifestation in the unions of distance between leadership and rank-and-file membership, 
the role of membership as an audience for a change to be inaugurated from above, and not as 
participatory or as determining as it used to be in the 1980s, is thus certainly attributable to the 
way the unions choose to conduct business. The Websterian tradition insist on sticking to the 
strategy beyond its effects on the internal union dynamics, or its proven failure to resist 
government from taking a neoliberal route; but the trade union movement’s influence measured 
against its vision of socialism, is certainly in decline. 
That said, there is to date no serious case study of how these processes have played out in CWIU 
similar to those undertaken by Buhlungu and Bramble on NUMSA. Nor is there, as previously 
noted, any overall study of the CWIU strategy in and of itself over a long period of time, despite 
the intriguing points by Appolis.  
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The emphasis made by classical Marxists boils down to a return to the type of unionism that 
characterised the 1980s, where unions were independent, outside and against the apartheid state, 
engaging in politics from below.  
2.9 Radical unionism tradition and anarcho-syndicalism  
In this respect, Van der Walt is also in agreement, although he stands on a different theoretical 
framework. The report will delve into his theoretical framework to demonstrate that a larger pool 
of possibilities exists for labour. Moreover, it sheds a light on the question of union strategy and 
the critique of the Websterians that is slightly different to the other traditions. 
In his assessment of the Websterian interpretation approach to unionism in South Africa, Van der 
Walt argues against corporatism: not only does it weaken the labour unions, and empower the 
leaders at the expense of the rank-and-file, but in addition, it is not a viable strategy for creating a 
fundamental change in South African capitalist system125
Labour’s participation in NEDLAC does not translate into improvements of living standards for 
the broader working class people
. Van der Walt rejects both the 
Websterian approach of radical reform to secure a “left version of social democracy”, and the 
Marxists’ stress on subordinating the unions to a vanguard party aiming at state power. He 
examines how corporatist trends have developed in South Africa since the 1980s in the form of 
partnerships between labour, state and business, and he insists that corporatism is not the 
inevitable (let alone ideal) approach. 
126. It is often assumed by Websterians that corporatism leads to 
economic growth by promoting industrial stability, and that it then enables social democratic 
gains for workers, like increased welfare. Van der Walt disputes this, suggesting that economic 
growth does not arise from corporatism, and that corporatism outside of specific historical 
epochs in the political economy of capitalism associated with growth, cannot deliver even 
modest reforms.127
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 In other words, it is not corporatism that leads to social democracy, but a 
powerful working class in the context of a capitalist boom that makes some social democratic 
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reforms possible. South Africa has a powerful working class but no boom, and so its corporatism 
cannot possibly deliver on its promise of radical reform. In other words, it is perfectly possible 
for corporatism to exist in a context where labour is on the retreat, and COSATU’s participation 
in NEDLAC in no sense denotes the rise of a “left version of social democracy”. 
No matter the situation, however, corporatism also weakens labour, says Van der Walt, in the 
form of a widening gap between labour leadership and the rank and file. This is not, contrary to 
Michels, inevitable in unions, but the consequence of strategies centred on corporatism. The 
problem with this is that unions become weakened as forces of change. There is, in other words, 
a profound contradiction, rather than a productive synergy, between labour being “on the streets” 
and “inside the centres of power”.   
 
Since Van der Walt places no faith in corporatism or the other aspects of radical reform, he then 
argues that unions should focus “on the streets” and leave “the centres of power”. It is “on the 
streets” that the unions must focus: as an anarcho-syndicalist, he sees mass action as the heart of 
union power, and insists that unions can create socialism, from below, through participatory 
democratic unionism, aiming at the seizure and self-management via union structures of the 
means of production.  In conclusion, he makes a proposition different from the Websterians and 
classical Marxists. He says: 
A strategy which combines building of a strong workplace organisation, mass 
struggle as a key tactic for pressing demands, and a refusal to identify with the 
goals of capital may be a more rational approach to the struggles of the broad 
South African working class. Trade unions should not necessarily confine 
themselves to simple economic demands. The hegemony of capitalism in South 
Africa, and the necessary acquiescence of State in that domination indicates that 
unions should address both ‘political’ and ‘economic’ issues, and struggle for 
both immediate reforms and broader anti-capitalist project. What this project 
could mean in the 1990s is unclear – one possibility could be… “Libertarian 
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socialism” (anarcho-syndicalism) – but the key issue is surely that it is chosen 
through democratic union processes. A free future demands no less.128
Rudolf Rocker, in his work on Anarcho-Syndicalism: Theory and Practice, provides the 
framework underlying van der Walt’s proposals. In this book his central argument relating to this 
discussion is that participation in the state will yield no fruits for labour; rather labour ought to 
organise outside and against the state through the principles of anarchism. He argues that the role 
of the union should be as a “fighting organisation for the safeguarding and rising of living 
standards”
 
This proposition suggests a different theoretical framework to the one underlying the Websterian 
interpretation, as well as the Marxists. It requires a development of anti-statism within the 
political culture and vision of unionism, against not merely the capitalist state, but all forms of 
state – anarchism. He could only reach this proposition using this framework as it advocates for 
organising outside and against the state and the vanguard party. The key is not to influence the 
state, a task that he suggests (looking at NEDLAC) is futile; the key is to build organs of 
counter-power that can enable the revolutionary break with capitalism and the state that he 
claims is essential to any substantial economic or social advances for the black working class. 
129 and a “school for the intellectual training for the management of production 
means”.130
There is substantial support for these claims in radical analyses of the transition to democracy 
and the role played by labour, which hold that if social movements were critical to enabling the 
transition, they were also weakened by it. The work of Michael Neocosmos, From people’s 
politics to state politics: aspects of national liberation in South Africa, is the best example; his 
analysis is consistent with the anarchist tradition. The question he is centrally dealing with in this 
paper is what accounts for the change from a people-oriented, bottom-up-driven kind of politics 
embodied in the 1980s UDF and COSATU, to a top-down state and elitist kind of politics, 
emboidied in ANC/SACP and the new state. In so doing, he also deals with the question of the 
transition process, which yields a statist politics and society. Neocosmos argues that no 
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understanding of the transition can be complete without clearly understanding this arena of 
politics131
He argues: “Statism was not an inevitable outcome of independence. Rather, its features… have 
their origins in… the defeat of popular movements in the period of transition from colony to 
independence.”
. 
132
If we apply Neocosmos’ interpretation to labour, then we have a rather different view to the 
Websterian interpretation, which stresses the role of unions in the transition
 He then sets out to account for these features in the South African case, in how 
they too, despite their uniqueness, are asphyxiated by a more statist political approach. 
Neocosmos structures his argument by a brief descriptive of the UDF and the labour unions in 
the period 1984 to 1994, and a theoretical formulation of ideas and structures of the two. In his 
view, there was an “elite pact” in the early 1990s, which could only succeed by statising 
“popular movements”, limiting them, and inaugurating change from above, shifting political 
action from a “people’s orientation” to a “state orientation” as a key to the success of transition. . 
This does not mean the masses were completely left out; rather, their role is changed from one of 
self-management to dependency on a minority to lead and initiate transition and democratisation. 
The success of this shift depends centrally on state incorporation. Indeed, any state must be 
legitimised by organised popular movements for its existence. 
133. Rather than praise 
strategic unionism as an innovative union response, his approach suggests that “the historic 
compromise between capital and labour”, embodied in the entanglement of unions in the new 
state (“using its power to secure voluntary consent from other actors in the industrial relations 
system and beyond”134),  was part of the “defeat of popular movements  in the period of 
transition” and the victory of “Statism”135
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.  This interpretation argues that grassroots politics have 
been asphyxiated even as workers work within a framework of loyalty to democracy through 
their leaders from above; they have lost out, in that “politics” are oriented and located above, and 
the decisions of societal change centre on an elite, top-down orientation. 
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This thinking or interpretation is what underlies Van der Walt’s claims, and is grounded on a 
different political outlook altogether to the Websterian and classical Marxist interpretations. It 
sees the space of unionism as a space of the workers’ preparatory stage and thus negates the need 
for a party as well as a need for participation in the state – not merely a capitalist state, but all 
states. Inevitably this will be a movement rooted in grassroots, shop floor activism, a movement 
of self-government from below, created in class struggle, and that will create a new society. As 
Schmidt and Van der Walt put it: “What is critical is that reforms are won from below: these 
victories must be distinguished from reforms applied from above, which undermine popular 
movements.”136
Van der Walt sees this as a necessary condition for a socialist change
. 
137
In this tradition are two important issues for the discussion at hand, which is how unions 
participate in the political conflict resolution in a capitalist society. One is non-appropriation of 
the state or integration into the polity; the other is defence and improvement of workers’ 
conditions of living from below.  Rocker argues when looking at the Spanish and German 
experiences that “...a new state which has been brought into existence by a social revolution can 
put an end to the privileges of the ruling class, but it can do this only by immediately settling up 
a new privileged class, which it will require for the maintenance of its rulership”
: that unions must be 
independent, militant and democratic, and not be led by an external political party. Underlying 
this understanding is that the state is a social force, in and of itself inhibiting unions’ 
revolutionary potential; not a simple instrument that can be wielded via a “strategic use of 
power”, the state is a hierarchical, elite class organisation necessarily at odds with the potential is 
inherent in the unions’ bottom-up democratic tradition and socialist demands. Corporatism 
directly requires unions to assimilate to the tendency of centralism inherent in the state. Thus 
unions should be against a state, as opposed to one form or another (e.g. the capitalist state). 
Hence there arises a broader question, which the anarchist tradition asks: how is participation in 
the state as a social force in and of itself a benefit to the working class? 
138
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Adler and Webster stated that “...pacting should not be seen simply as a function of the 
consolidation of democracy, but as a conflictual process of class compromise, the result of which 
may produce workers loyalty to democratisation”139
The other type of participation is the one with the objective to reach preliminary compromises – 
such as minimum wage and minimum dignified human working conditions. It is critical to firstly 
realise that this can be done without establishing bodies such as NEDLAC or participating within 
them, thus legitimatising capitalists and the state. As van der Walt puts it labour needs to 
combine “...building of a strong workplace organisation, mass struggle as a key tactic for 
pressing demands, and a refusal to identify with the goals of capital”
. However, it could be added, workers will 
remain only as loyal as this democracy serves their needs, but beyond mere improvements of 
working conditions is a political economic logic that these classes cannot stay in one entity 
working together for far too long, as they are fundamentally antagonistic. 
Indeed, radical reform has already proven to be unable to secure those needs, as demonstrated in 
the adoption of GEAR, and the weakening of unions insofar as members are in control of their 
developments: unionism comes to resemble a local government that is elected by the people and 
then offers service delivery to them. How will unions resist being a disciplining force for the 
bourgeoisie, if they persist in applying these methods regardless of securing nothing else except 
destruction? 
140
Thus, anarcho-syndicalists and the Marxists, even as they differ on the question of the state and 
the party, share an emphasis on the point that labour should not participate in coordinating 
capitalism alongside the state and capitalists. The contention is that the recommendation by 
social democrats that labour participates in structures of power for policy contestation and uses 
its mass base to persuade its interests on these structures weakens its revolutionary potential – 
turning it into an organisation that provides left cover for neo-liberal policies
. 
141
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. In addition, it 
has asphyxiated a type of politics that lays the basis of societal change from below. 
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While the conclusion drawn by Bramble and Callinicos seems at least likely to confirm Rocker 
and van der Walt’s prognosis, in that they suggest that co-determination has strangled the 
revolutionary potential of unions, there is to date frankly not much research using this approach 
in South Africa. In addition, within the period of the rise of the African trade union movement, 
1973 to 1999, at least the time this study is looking at, the tradition of anarchism is not influential 
within the trade union movement, or in the South African labour scholarship. Likewise, 
Neocosmos’ study is also very suggestive of this trajectory, but much more focused on 
community organisations. This is a pity as this tradition seems to have some insights. 
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Chapter 3 
Trade Union Strategy, 1987 - 1993 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to give an account of policy positions characterising CWIU’s strategy 
between 1987 and 1993. This era was preceded by two significant periods in the labour history 
of South Africa. The first was the rise of independent African trade unions characterised by 
recruitment and recognition battles. This period came after the 1960s, the pseudo-peace period in 
political and trade union resistance which saw the brutal repression of resistance politics, coupled 
with a booming economy which began to break down in the 1970s. The Gross Domestic Product 
had been growing with an annual rate of 7.3%; the growth rate began to fall to 4% in the first 
three years of the 1970s, falling to a low of 2.5% between 1973 and 1980142
The accompanying rise in unemployment and inflation, with real wages amongst black workers 
dropping, placed a heavy burden on survival, leading to the Durban strikes of 1973 that gave 
birth to the new independent African unions, including the CWIU, which was established in 
1974
. 
143. These new unions, however, operated within oppressive conditions imposed by the then 
labour relations system, often resulting in arrests of organisers and fear amongst workers to join 
them. The African workers were governed by a separate industrial relations system which rested 
in the 1953 Black Labour Relations Act; this did not recognise African trade unions, whilst the 
whites, Indians and coloureds were covered by the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act, which 
provided statutory bargaining rights. Nevertheless, most unions still made progress in 
recruitment, although not as rapid as seen after 1979 with the formation of FOSATU144
The second period is after the Wiehahn Commission in 1979 which initially aimed to only give 
rights to certain categories of African workers, and also sought to maintain racial divisions by 
not allowing racial mixing in unions. Unions contested this, resulting in more unrest in many 
industries
. 
145
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Webster conceptualised as “social movement unionism”,146
The rise of unrest in communities where black workers lived, mainly around issues that affected 
them directly, for example education, rents and police brutality, led many to argue for the joining 
of hands to form a united force against the state and capital. Thus, in her study of the CWIU, 
Rosenthal uses a major battle at SASOL ca. 1984 as a paradigmatic example of workers uniting 
with community struggles to combine workplace with non-workplace struggles
 a trade union practice where unions 
were involved in non-workplace struggles and in alliances with community organisations. This is 
after the 1973 unions had resisted participating in community struggles over fears of their 
independence and workers’ unity, prioritising building their unions, thus focusing much 
organisation on workplace issues. 
147
It was felt that we were not making any headway, because we were tackling the 
smaller companies and leaving the giants out – like AECI and Sasol. We had to 
concentrate on the bigger ones in order for us to win our rights to negotiate at 
plant level as well as to have our union recognised. And also build the union in 
general to be strong, to be built to a national union and so provide all the basic 
services that we needed to our members.
. 
In the period of formation and union building, the energies and efforts of members are focused 
on ensuring that it becomes a power to reckon with in industry. The victories of recognition in 
companies like Colgate and Revertex inspired ways towards organising in big firms in the 
industry. As one of the CWIU workers at the time put it: 
148
SASOL in particular was a national interest: “...the pride and joy of whites patriotic to the 
Pretoria Regime. It was a symbol of South African independence, South Africa’s answer to the 
oil embargo”; thus “Afrikaners said ‘Sonder die Arabiese sal ons lewe’ (‘even without Arab oil, 
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we shall live’)”149. The success of the Vaal Stayaway (1984) could therefore be seen to have a 
national impact with the disruption of SASOL, a state enterprise that was completing a process 
of privatisation. In addition, these stayaways (or general strikes) in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-
Vereeniging (PWV) region were often led by workers: for instance, in the East Rand, workers 
were often in the forefront, an understanding that youth and community organisations stressed150
This period saw the launch of the biggest trade union movement ever in the country in 1985, 
COSATU, which adopted the ANC-identified Freedom Charter in 1987 and also combined 
forces with the UDF. The mid-1980s also saw massive state repression through two states of 
emergency, leading to widespread arrests of activists in community organisations and in unions. 
The South African Labour Bulletin reported that “about 2 700 trade unionists and workers”
.  
151 
were known to be detained in the 1986 State of Emergency, with 15 officials of the CWIU 
included152. The unions nonetheless still grew large with mergers and more members joining 
following the successes of COSATU affiliates on many shop floor battles, including the CWIU. 
The CWIU grew from 16 551 in 1985 to 36 062 in 1989, with ongoing increases in membership 
throughout these years153
For the CWIU 1990 was particularly significant, seen as a year of “great jubilation and also great 
sadness”.
. 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s the economic crisis had taken its toll, with massive 
retrenchments taking place and a fall in standards of living. The period was also accompanied by 
change in regime practices with the removal of PW Botha giving way to FW De Klerk, who 
went on to unban proscribed political parties and release political prisoners, announcing a new 
era for negotiations for a new South Africa. This signalled a new period which can be considered 
as the era of the fall of the apartheid government, thus the beginning of transition to democracy. 
154
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country, and the rapid progress in cementing the tripartite Alliance between the ANC, SACP and 
COSATU.  
These developments, however, involved “sadness”, for these advances “...were shadowed by the 
violence that swept across the country”155, particularly Kwazulu-Natal and Transvaal, with 
violent clashes between ANC and anti-ANC forces, as well as security forces: these left 
thousands of people dead156. The violence had a big impact on the unions, as some of the people 
who were dying in these conflicts were union members, many at the forefront of “...digging 
trenches and organising community self defence” during the clashes157
Nevertheless, the union reported that it “...continued to set the pace in winning the highest wages 
in the country,
.  
158 the average wage [of] R6.28 per hour, higher than any other union in South 
Africa...” In addition the “...CWIU had the second highest number of strikes in 1990 in South 
Africa” with “membership crossing 40 000 threshold”159. If workers in “...some companies... had 
still not won reinstatement after being dismissed earlier in the year”160
This period was, Von Holdt notes, also the era in which the new type of unionism emerged, 
strategic unionism
, the overall picture was 
very positive.  
161
This unionism was shaped by a drastically changed political situation with the government more 
willing to work with labour and political parties in determining a host of policies. There was a 
proliferation of tripartite bodies and commissions, in which unions played a key role. The 
formation of new forums, like the National Economic Forum (NEF), and ongoing participation 
. This unionism drew on the older FOSATU and COSATU willingness to 
use negotiations and state structures to further union and working class interests, but now 
developed these into a coherent strategy to address the new context, and secure long-term goals 
of radical change.  
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in the National Manpower Commission (NMC), gave labour an opportunity to enter negotiations 
about legislation, policies and economic vision of the country. Strategic unionism seemed the 
way for labour to influence the transition, and to radicalise the democracy in the years to come. 
One outcome was the RDP, successor to the Reconstruction Accord (see previous chapter), 
which were hoped to, inter alia, replace the “apartheid workplace regime” with co-determination 
and industrial democracy.162
3.2 Trade Union Strategy 
 
In light of the above background, this chapter aims to provide an account of the policy 
developments of the CWIU itself. It seeks to critically assess them in light of what they assert 
and of the socioeconomic developments in the country, which have been introduced earlier. In 
essence, it will discuss trade union strategy thinking and practice as represented largely by 
CWIU union official documents and strategic in-depth interviews for the period 1987 – 1993, a 
period of important changes in the union’s approach. 
The chapter will begin by defining what trade union strategy is, thus developing a set of criteria 
upon which it will examine CWIU’s strategy, with particular attention to the rise of radical 
reform and strategic unionism in the transition. It will show how the union strategy changes over 
a period of time; it will mark similarities, continuities, discontinuities and contrasts in different 
stages of its development in time. 
A trade union strategy is the union programme, based on an analysis of the political economy of 
society, that seeks to alter the relationship of the working class to the means of production and 
political administration. Lehulere puts it best, arguing that it should respond to the following 
issues: 
What are the socio-economic conditions of workers in society and identify the 
sources of these conditions; Identify positions and interest of different social 
classes and spell out the ones it seeks to represent together with goals and interest 
of these social classes; It must identify classes or social groups who are actual or 
potential allies in its pursuit to realise these interests and goals; It must identify 
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classes or social groups who stand in the way of the realisation of its interests and 
goals; It must spell out changes in the political economic power relations that are 
required in order for its goals to be realised; It must spell out practical measures 
that must be undertaken to realise its goals and interests; It must spell out a 
political strategy to break the power of social and economic classes that stand in 
its way to realise its goals and interests.163
3.3 CWIU unionism, 1987 – 1993 
 
As shown in the literature review, there is no agreement on what the “political strategy” should 
actually entail, or even on the potential, revolutionary or otherwise, of trade unions to change 
society;  
Trade union policy in the CWIU is divided in this period (1987-1993) into four areas, as defined 
by the union itself in its 1987 and 1991 policy resolutions, and elsewhere: political policy, 
economic policy, social policy and trade union strategy/organisation. This report makes a 
distinction between all those policy positions that focus on internal organisational development, 
and those that speak to the unions’ policy positions around broad, external, socio-economic 
issues. This is a distinction that blurs, as the two will overlap sometimes; however, it is useful 
enough for the purposes of analysis. The focus will be on political and economic strategy, and 
excludes strategies (or what Von Holdt calls union social structure164
3. 4 Political Policies  
), which have much less to 
do with external strategy (pronouncements on alliances, legislation, macroeconomic policy and 
vision on future society). The report will ensure that the overall ideas and message of the 
resolutions and policies is not compromised, or at least an attempt will be made to do so. 
In its political policies, often the opening section in its documents between 1987 and 1991, the 
CWIU (hereafter “the union”) takes an opportunity to establish its positions on national political 
developments. It establishes this based on outlined principles stemming most of the time out of a 
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critique of the political situation itself. In its early stages the union uses an anti-capitalist critique 
of its political situation and communicates its aspirations, interest, goals and vision in the 
language thereof. However, in the later stages, the radical rhetoric makes way for a milder, co-
determinist rhetoric, emphasising collaboration with capital and the state.  
Here the political vision and critique of the CWIU can be summed up in the following broad 
themes: 
3.4.1 Theme one: Socialism, Democracy and Non-Racialism 
In the first period, that of 1987 to 1991, the union states its “...fundamental principles [as] worker 
control, democracy, non-racialism and non-sexism”165. Democracy as a vision of future South 
Africa and as a political practice can be traced to the rise of unions from the 1970s in the national 
liberation struggle166. The same holds for non-racialism and non-sexism167. Many identify the 
feature of worker control (or what Buhlungu called “democratic unionism”168) with these unions, 
and the CWIU would be amongst the foremost advocates of it from its formation in 1974. 169
The union also maintained a strong commitment to socialism, viewing it as the only viable 
solution to the socio-political crisis in South Africa. As to what exactly it meant by “socialism”, 
the union’s documents remain unclear: there is no time when socialism as a vision is clearly 
defined. The resolution states that “Only socialism can solve the current political and economic 
crises.”
 
170 In addition, “...unions in COSATU must participate in the formulation of an economic 
policy that reaffirms socialism as the basis for restructuring industries according to the needs of 
the working class and the society as a whole”.171
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To commit ourselves to a truly united, democratic, non-racial, just and socialist 
South Africa by: Educating ourselves on various types of political economies e.g. 
socialism and mixed economies etc... Carrying out research into planned 
economies …172
It seems the fight for a democratic future was seen as inseparable to the fight for socialism, as a 
CWIU slogan put it clearly: “build democracy, fight for socialism”
 
173. The link is also captured 
in the union’s analysis of the South African socio-economic crisis and massive retrenchments, 
which are blamed on both the profit-making imperatives of capitalism, and the failures of the 
apartheid regime174. Another aspect related to this articulation is COSATU’s adoption of the 
“...Freedom Charter as a set of basic demands for the removal of national oppression and 
economic exploitation” in 1987175, a step towards the achievement of socialism, and not 
socialism itself.  That is, while the union adopted the Freedom Charter, it saw it as too limited – 
at best it was a minimum, rather than a maximum, programme, and was therefore seen as 
incomplete by the CWIU’s strong “independent worker bloc”. As Baskin shows, the Charter was 
accepted with some reservations, and after a deep heated debate of its role as a stepping stone to 
socialism.176 (Baskin captures the developments of this debate in COSATU177, whereas 
Rosenthal gives an account of them within the CWIU178
In sum, the union in the late 1980s clearly placed socialism at the centre of its vision for the 
future society, problematising the socioeconomic situation as both capitalist and racist in nature. 
Much emphasis was placed on the democratic reform of the state with an emphasis on universal 
franchise and democratic planning of the economy. The “planning” is key: the future, it seems, 
had to be modelled through socialist principles. The Freedom Charter presented the basic 
demands for removal of national oppression and economic exploitation, but by no means the 
.)    
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complete aim: a socialist future. The union did not speak in the language of radical reforms, 
social democracy, or participation in corporatist structures.  
From 1991 to 1993, however, the union’s strong emphasis on socialism began to fade, compared 
to the previous period (1987 - 1990), as there is more emphasis on the Alliance and electoral 
politics, the democratic state and inclusion of worker rights in the new constitution. For instance, 
in a national policy workshop document, the NEC proposed a “review of CWIU position on how 
to achieve a non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa”, and socialism was largely left 
out in the 1991 resolutions179
3.4 2 Theme two: Solidarity and joining forces with community structures 
.  
The later documents do not have much politically radical analysis of developments and there is 
also less emphasis on working class leadership of the movement. Emphasis is on strengthening 
participation in restructuring the economy, a point that will be developed in the economic 
strategy section. In addition, the class character of democracy and non-racialism is not clearly 
articulated. However, while talk of socialism faded, it was never absent. The idea of socialism is 
a theme that runs throughout the union’s pronouncements, even after 1990, and it will be 
revisited after examining economic policies, in chapter five.  
The second theme in political policy is in that the union saw its politics as inseparable from 
community struggles. It had a commitment to ensure that it practices the type of unionism where 
workers are leading community struggles and fully participate in the shape of their development. 
This participation in the community is also seen as opportune to promote union struggles, 
creating a common understanding of struggle by the broad “working class”, resulting in a unity 
of action and vision. It is critical to note that these are post-1987 resolutions: before then the 
issues of participation in community struggles were contested, seen also as potentially allying to 
political organisations, thus bringing divisions in the membership180. However, in the post-1987 
period, alignment with the UDF had already taken place, also signalling determination to work 
with the ANC181
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By eighty six, there was another state of emergency which was very effective 
along with all the security apparatus of the apartheid regime, detaining 
people...killing activists and so on. So the mass democratic movement at that 
point had been in retreat, particularly community struggles and students...182
It is critical to note that a really new form of community politics had emerged in the 1980s where 
people were engaged in what they characterised as “building democracy today”
 
This commitment is in conjunction with the adoption of the Freedom Charter from 1987, seen as 
a set of basic demands for removal of national and economic oppression.  In sum, the conditions 
of the time of these resolutions, the late 1980s, were such that the union saw it as quintessential 
to be at the forefront and entrench joint efforts against the state repression that had resulted in 
more violence.  
183. This era was 
of great inspiration for those involved in building working class democratic and self-sufficient 
structures of governance; it made sense for a union that stressed worker control and socialism to 
align with radical community structures, many tied to the UDF, that sought to replace state 
power with “people’s power”, such as street committees. This is important because the street 
committees, the people’s courts, self-defence units, and people’s education structures were 
experiments of self-help and governance, and radically democratic (although not of course 
without limitations, including a sometimes repressive character).184
This is an important, often less stressed factor in consideration of social movement unionism. 
That is the similarity of political cultures between communities and unions that specifically 
stressed bottom-up democratic practices. State repression in many ways eroded this culture that 
carried strong elements of bottom-up democratic practice and self-sufficiency, followed by the 
shift towards elite pacting in the 1990s, discussed in the previous chapter – the tradition of 
“people’s power” and the UDF were to give way to more centralised traditions and emerging 
top-down politics, centred on the ANC and then the ANC government. However, the union’s 
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own internal democracy remained remarkably strong in the 1980s despite massive repression185
The 1991 resolutions were concerned primarily with two problems that it identifies with the state 
and capital. The first is dividing the working class. This division is understood in collaboration 
with the “...promotion and development of repressive structures and of undemocratic puppet 
structures”
, 
as compared to the fate of community formations. 
186. Of course, a whole lot of local government structures during apartheid, including 
the Black Local Authorities, were not based on the will of the people, but were in the service of 
the apartheid government. Secondly, the union is concerned with the violence performed by the 
state, to suppress community mutual aid and democratic structures, manifested in “...detentions, 
criminalisation of political activity, capital punishment and restrictions, which has weakened 
some organisations and in certain instances crippled them”187. The union goes on to note the 
impact of “...restrictions placed on the labour movement’s attempt to take up broader working 
class issues”188
The violence is, in essence, the stress of the union at this point: it resolves that its members 
should take the forefront in the planning of “...defence activities against all forms of state 
oppression and violence”
. 
189. One of the resolutions sums up the objective and spirit thereof, 
showing a commitment to continue in the traditions of “people’s power”: “The union must be 
actively involved in reviving community organisations such as civics and street committees and 
will encourage... the mass democratic movement to develop a joint programme of action for 
defending and advancing our struggle and in the process rebuild accountable mass-based 
organisations.”190
The union made pronouncements on building alliances with the SACP and ANC separately from 
building community structures, perhaps an excellent indication of political unionism and social 
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movement unionism as argued by Seidman191
3.4.3 Theme three: Transition and Alliance politics  
. The question is when these two join or co-exist in 
one era, what unionism results. The next theme looks at political party alliance with unions, and 
this question becomes even more important to try understanding the development of this time. 
It is in light of the very developments of the late 1980s and the unbanning of the political parties 
that a shift in political practice and imagination began to emerge. Reforms opened up the 
possibility of a new relationship to the state. The state’s actions emerged as a critical condition 
for how production and reproduction in political space (geographically), imagination and 
practice happen in resistance politics of the type of unionism that emerged at this time. The state, 
as the monopoly power in terms of the means of political administration, specifically security, of 
course claimed control over South Africa, with all political actors as its own subjects; it acquired 
legitimacy through their compliance, indirectly or directly, negatively or positively, and such 
compliance was the key feature of the 1990s, as opposed to the 1980s. 
The unbanning of political parties and release of political prisoners by the state should be seen as 
an activity that can only be performed by the central power with a monopoly of security means, 
the only power that could deny liberation parties access to the political space (geographically and 
to some extent ideologically) in the country and keep political prisoners outside the space.  This 
should be understood as such in order to make sense of why it was a significant shift in political 
practice on the ground for activists and unionists. 
The South African transition, and shifts in regime political practice192
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, begins in the late 1980s as 
the government realises it has to deal with its legitimacy being eroded by stayaways (the central 
one being the anti-LRA campaigns, 1989) and workplace actions that call for its blood, whilst 
disrupting economic activity in a time of recession. For the CWIU, this shift came largely as an 
unexpected development that resulted in it increasingly looking upwards, to the state power, for 
change, as opposed to the earlier focus on the struggles on the ground to drive change.  
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In most interviews conducted for this research, unionists in CWIU confessed to the view that 
they “...never thought the ANC could be unbanned”193. For instance, Michael Coetzee, member 
of the union’s NEC in late 1980s, argues that the ordinary membership of the CWIU received the 
news about negotiations with scepticism. He says, referring to negotiations, that the “...the union 
came a bit late to the understanding, the core leadership in COSATU had understood these things 
much greater, and were in bigger depth”194. This is because they had formed part of the 
underground processes through several briefings by the ANC. It is interesting that the insistent 
scepticism of the masses in the CWIU, which did not at the time foresee negotiations, was not 
reflected in how the top COSATU leaders thought of change. As Coetzee understands it: “The 
union at that level did not share the same political orientation, you know, where the discourse 
was still the overthrow of the state, you know, seizure of power; well they did not have the 
insurrection strategy, how the seizure was gonna take place and how this overthrow of the state 
was gonna take place, never spelled out in a political program... and their political theory and 
their ideological positions only believed in workers’ struggles.”195
But most importantly for understanding developments towards this period, Don Gumede, the 
third president, elected at the 1990 congress, related how choices for joining community 
struggles and the UDF were seen by some as pushing the union and workers closer to the ANC 
by “populists in the union movement”
 
196. Gumede believed himself to be an ANC advocate 
within the CWIU, along with Michael Coetzee and Ronald Mofokeng, at odds with the CWIU’s 
strong “independent worker bloc”. Stating that FOSATU was a “so-called workerist union”197
...insisted that we should not join political or form... alliances with political parties 
and... insisted that unions should be under worker control and... democratic 
control. But meaning that these were often used as excuse to move workers away 
from the alliance, particularly the ANC at that time... so now we had a struggle 
within now the Chemical Workers Industrial Union and then within FOSATU to 
 
and asked to expand on what this means, he argued that FOSATU: 
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change the outlook of the workers in order to support the alliance... our voice 
within the union over the years grew, and we used worker control and democratic 
control in order to have achievement in the direction of the alliance with the 
ANC198
Besides the groups which were confident within the unions of the ANC support and the whole 
federation’s commitment to work with it, there was the violence of the late 1980s and early 
1990s which continued to erode freedom of movement and political organisation in townships. In 
the early 1990s what CWIU captured as orchestrated violence “...perpetrated by state agents, 
sections of the armed forces, vigilantes and fascists groups”
. 
199 deepened and extended to 
“workers in factories, on trains and in buses”200
The union eventually accepted that the state was seeking to create a “...climate conducive to the 
negotiations to take place”
.  
201. It further resolved to “...promote COSATU’s participation in the 
alliance” (1990), with the view that it “...will ensure workers issues are taken to negotiation table 
through full consultation and based on mandates and accountability, full disclosure of 
information and no secrecy”202. Mass action to put pressure on the state is also proposed to 
“...create a necessary climate... and an end to violence” for negotiations203
The resolutions at the time aspired to broad unity, built across anti-apartheid movements, to 
culminate into a Patriotic Front. This was a proposed alliance of progressive forces who wish to 
see the end of apartheid. The union is aware that these could bring about different interests but 
pushes that COSATU should build the Front, and ensure that it focuses on negotiations and 
promotion and defence of working class interest
. 
204
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Constituent Assembly; One person one vote on a common voter’s roll; Basic worker rights to be 
included in a new constitution.”205
The other initiative that resolutions speak to is the establishment of an All Party Conference. 
This is how the union proposed that the establishment of a new constitution take place: in the 
form of a forum that would be a precursor to the constituent assembly with the following 
mandate: “Discuss the mechanism for the formation of an interim Government; the mechanism 
for the non-racial elections of the Constituent Assembly; and oversee through the setting of a 
committee in the creation of a people’s army; the setting up of a timetable for the Constituent 
Assembly.”
 
In addition, the Front must commit to engage in militant mass action around the political and 
economic requirements of the oppressed and exploited masses.  
206
Alliance implies our involvement in the election campaign. We need to propagate 
the importance of voting for the ANC... Need to ensure that workers’ interests are 
guaranteed. We therefore need to put human resources into the campaign.
 
This model, of a people-driven transition, consistent with the traditions of “people’s power”, was 
not successful: negotiations took the form of an elite pact through the Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA), which excluded unions and civics, and only included 
politicians through their political parties and state structures. It is, however, noteworthy is that by 
this time COSATU’s  participation in transition was in economic/corporatist forums, like the 
NEF and NMC, on specific policy matters, as opposed to the main political table of negotiation. 
However, by 1993, the union’s documents reflect shifts in political practice as elections for a 
democratic South Africa drew near. Here are centrally three critical shifts in terms of Alliance 
politics. Firstly, the union saw electioneering for the coming to power of the ANC as critical for 
the promotion of workers’ interests: 
207
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The idea of an ANC state that will represent workers, or in which workers’ interests will be 
pushed, is certainly not consistent with how the union imagined the future in the early 1990s. As 
noted before, the union had believed in a radically democratic state led and controlled by 
workers, and where working class interests are put above all other interests.  
The second shift is in what appears throughout as a broad “working class” interest versus a 
narrower “workers’ interest”. Before 1993, there was much discussion in union documents of the 
interests of the broad working class; subsequently the focus shifted to workers’ interests and the 
interests of CWIU members, even counterposed at times to a classless “national interest”208
The sense of working class identification that had been an emphasis in the 1980 no longer 
appears the same; the union speaks of inclusion of “basic workers’ rights in the new 
constitution”
. The 
union on the eve of democratic South Africa is working on workers’ interests to be pushed in the 
ANC, in negotiations, the constitution and policy developments.  
209 in its 1991 congress resolutions. This shift is discussed in more detail in chapter 
4; however, it can be noted here that the union linked this shift clearly to an emerging corporatist 
approach, focusing on participation under the structures of NEF and NMC, saying that “We 
should develop and put forward in all forums clear demands around worker interests.”210
It also stated, resolving on the tripartite alliance that “The CWIU will promote COSATU’s 
participation in the Alliance which will ensure that workers issues are taken to the negotiating 
table through full consultation.” (my emphasis)
  
211
In resolutions around support for ANC in the first democratic elections, the union states that 
“...alliance implies involvement in the election campaign. We need to propagate the importance 
.This anticipates radical reform unionism, in 
that the trade union movement participates in the structures of power, indeed whilst maintaining 
its independence outside. However the question is will it maintain its worker control and also 
secure gains for the working class? Is this participation necessary for achievement of whatever 
gains workers need? 
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of voting for the ANC... We need to ensure that workers’ interests are guaranteed.”212 Also 
pronouncing on elections, they state the need to “...review if and how can the ANC secure 
worker’s rights and interests”213. Thus, key responsibility for representing “worker’s rights and 
interests” was given to the ANC. The resolutions in the 1993 NEC workshop note the “positive 
aspects of COSATU involvement” in the election campaign – “...make sure the interests of the 
working class are pushed”. Even the resolution around involvement with the intended, but 
unsuccessful Constituent Assembly, which was to pull civics, unions, and all political parties, the 
union states “ANC will represent the worker’s interests”214
I do not think there was a direct effect. I think we tried to often radicalise as much 
as possible what was being negotiated, put demands through COSATU 
congresses and that sort of thing. But that is as far as it went, most of the things 
were ignored by the ANC leadership, they just did their thing.
.  
Asked to reflect, in retrospect, on what effect the transition had on the activities of the CWIU, 
Martin Jansen responds:  
215
Terms of the negotiations, how soon we should have elections, how should the 
elections be conducted, time off for workers for example to campaign. The other 
issue was about old soldiers, apartheid soldiers should be confined to barracks... 
we didn’t believe in the Government of National Unity... we tried to radicalise the 
negotiations process, but it was fruitless.
 
He goes on to specify what was “ignored by the ANC leadership”: 
216
Nonetheless, the union was taking steps to ensure that a radicalisation of democracy, a defence 
of a radical interpretation of the Freedom Charter as a stepping stone towards achievement of 
 
He also holds that a number of leaders in the union did not have a problem with the direction of 
the negotiations, while others conceded on some issues because there was no insurrection.  
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socialism, and a continued commitment to that broader goal. These steps were deeply shaped by 
the changing context, and centred on the emerging strategy of radical reform. In the policy 
workshop in 1993, the union observed was that the “...ANC may fail to deliver... people may 
have unrealistic expectations of achieving their demands”217
The third shift was related to the above. The unions decided not to seek direct representation in 
the Constituent Assembly (or the 1994 parliament). Resolutions states that “COSATU should not 
release people to the CA as candidates because of the problems of accountability. ANC will 
represent workers’ interest.”
. This was a strong signal of a 
changed focus, from a stress on change from below, democracy from below, towards an 
emphasis on radical reforms led by a few on top. 
This does not dispute, though, that the aims of the labour movement ideologically were social 
democratic or consistent with radical reform unionism. However, what it does is that it refuses us 
a rich, and indeed real picture of what labour went through in the transition, its influence and 
positionality in the political landscape. The reality is that labour is consistently undergoing 
compromises, both in objectives, but also in terms of how the practice of radical reform has 
impact on the conduct of its politics; transforming from change from below to one from above. 
218 This is an important shift since the union had held strongly to its 
participation in this process in the interest of the working class broadly. It went on to recommend 
an election pact, based on a Workers Charter219 and the Freedom Charter, with a push for job 
creation, housing and education.220
In general, these developments have been viewed by the Websterian school as very positive. The 
problem, however, is that (as seen earlier), the demands of the trade union movement about the 
transition were not achieved: neither the Constituent Assembly, nor the election pact or 
Reconstruction Accord, nor the RDP itself were actually achieved. Praise for the radical reform 
 These were the positions later captured in the Reconstruction 
Accord idea, and then the RDP.  
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strategy does not consider these weaknesses, presenting an unbalanced, almost super-heroic, 
image of COSATU and its role. At most, the Websterian account can point to the RDP – yet the 
RDP itself was contradictory, with important concessions to neo-liberalism, and COSATU was 
simply unable to defend its Keynesian side despite participation in NMC, NEF and then 
NEDLAC – the adoption of the RDP White Paper shows this.  
The unions were, too, worried even at this early stage that the new approach created problems for 
worker control, and membership participation in political and other transition processes. This 
concern is strongly expressed in the CWIU’s 1993 policy workshop, which argued for the need 
to strengthen accountability in negotiations and in the NEF and NMC, and to stick to principles 
of the union221. If, as Baskin claimed, the CWIU came from the “workerist” tradition, with its 
stress on unions and distrust of parties, it seemed that its “workerism” had now been reimagined 
to allow the Alliance with the ANC, and the reduction of “workerism” to radical reform - still 
pro-working class and anti-capitalist, it was no longer anti-ANC, nor set on a revolutionary 
assault on capitalism222
The ANC was now seen to be at the forefront. The unions did not give up on their mass 
character, but that also changed in important ways. The stress was on mass mobilisation and 
mass action, rather than on organisation via building of working class alternative organs of 
power. As Neocosmos argues, the organs of “people’s power” were sidelined in the 1990s, 
submerged by “state politics”, stripped of their radical and popular character, and denuded of any 
.  
In sum, the political strategy of the union captured in these themes signals a union that ensured it 
seized the times. As political developments altered in the country, so did the union seek to 
understand them and place itself, its interests and those of workers forward. However, the 
transition has been steps ahead of the union and came with developments that greatly impacted 
how politics were imagined and practiced. It is the contention in this report that oftentimes the 
union reacted to political developments. In addition, the union’s political activity; that is its 
involvement in building political resistance, takes a different role after the unbanning and as a 
result of the negotiations.  
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real power223
For the anarchists, labour should have organised outside and against the state, which positions it 
in a space where the articulations of its demands on the political process may have gained better 
ground. It need not have entered the NMC and NEF; it need not have argued for a place in the 
Constituent Assembly; it need not have adopted the route of radical reform. Since the unions 
were the single most powerful resistant movement in the late 1980s, both political parties and the 
state would have had to deal with them at the start of the official negotiations, regardless of 
. What place was left, then, for COSATU to mobilise the masses in more than brief 
demonstrations?  The new South Africa was based on an elite pact, signalled by CODESA, and 
NEF and NMC. The radical reform approach was part and parcel of this new era: simply praising 
radical reform can blind us to what it replaced, a libertarian politics based on a working class 
impulse towards self-sufficiency, creating change from below, a more radically democratic and 
participatory process. The Websterian praise for radical reform interpretation does well to bring 
the union into the centre of transition; however it obscures the reality that unions previously had 
alternative plans for how the transition should have occurred – plans that were lost in the 
negotiations, the decline of the more radical, anti-capitalist, and libertarian “peoples power” and 
“workers control” politics of the 1980s.  
A case can be made that a different route for labour was possible and desirable in the 1990s. 
Although Callinicos did not consider the dynamics of the transition in the terms presented above, 
it suffices to say his case against the social contract demands also that labour outside the alliance 
with the ANC would have introduced a different dynamic to the whole process, perhaps leading 
to a radically different outcome. The problem for Callinicos (and the independent Marxists) was, 
however, that the SACP was equally involved in the transition and in CODESA, long in alliance 
with the ANC, and disorientated by the fall of the USSR. Callinicos’ recommendations point to a 
revolution, but they do not deal with the scepticism that comes with the fall of the USSR for a 
practical way forward for comrades in the SACP at this time. Given the commitment to 
negotiations with the apartheid National Party, well-known for its fears of communism, a radical 
solution was not possible for the SACP; it seems only a non-negotiated transition that demanded 
socialism would be the way forward. 
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whether they participated formally, so long as the unions demanded to be dealt with. But given 
an Alliance that puts the ANC at the forefront, and concentrated discussion on internal debate, it 
was easy to be marginalised as this set up made the unions dependent on the ANC, rather than 
independent mobilisation.  
3.5 Economic Strategy   
The union’s vision of changing the economy is directly related to its pronouncements on politics 
as discussed above, and should not be understood in isolation from these. The economic strategy 
sections of the union policy documents in the 1980s had a strong critique of capitalism, and 
revolutionary aspirations based on working class struggle; the economic strategy of the 1990s 
viewed class collaboration with capitalists as a progressive and necessary, and downplayed 
working class identity in favour of national unity.  
The union believed (up to 1991) that the economic crisis of the time (1970-1990s) had been due 
to capitalism as well as apartheid: “The underlying cause is the profit motive and the failure of 
the racist, undemocratic government to redirect the economy in order for it to grow and produce 
according to the needs of the people.”224 It further noted the following as ways in which capital 
and the state responds to the crisis: “Retrenchments, privatisation, rationalisation, sub-
contracting, union bashing e.g. LRA, restructuring of industries and the economy as a whole, 
talks on possible social contract”.  In addition, “...capital and the state’s attempt to restructure the 
economy is not for the people but for profits”.225
In the strongest  terms, it drew the obvious conclusions, with the following economic aspirations: 
“The unions in COSATU must participate in the formulation of an economic policy that 
reaffirms socialism as the basis for restructuring industries according to the needs of the working 
class and society as a whole.”
 
226
Thus, the first theme that appears here, similarly to the political sections, is socialism as a vision, 
and as a critique of the economic situation. The working class is seen as the central identification 
point on behalf of which the strategy addresses itself. The CWIU also subscribed at this time to 
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“workers control” - not just of the union, but of production itself, and even at the start of the 
1990s, while well aware of the political changes and economic restructuring, still favoured 
socialism, even if via the Alliance. It is noteworthy that here the union is conscious of what this 
means as it explicitly defined it as follows: “Social Contracts under capitalism are agreements 
between labour, capital and the state on wide ranging national social and economic issues.”227
COSATU and its affiliates should initiate discussions and debates within their 
structures in order to have a mandated position on the Social Contract. Such a 
contract can only be entered into with a Workers Government where: the interests 
of the working class are placed above all other interest; workers participate in 
both economic decision making under the principle of worker control of 
production and political decision making through their own organisations.
 
The resolution on the contract is further extrapolated as follows: 
228
We should be involved in the restructuring of the Chemical Industry. The future 
economy of South Africa must have a socialist orientation based on: production 
for the needs of the people, the economy to be democratically planned, collective 
ownership of the means of production, state control over trade, investment and 
regulation of prices, working class control of the economy and the state at all 
levels. These principles should be in the preamble of a future South African 
constitution.
 
The radical message of the resolutions in this time is so explicit that it is worth quoting them in 
full: 
229
We must ensure that political developments are inseparable from the economic 
issues. COSATU must play an important role to fulfil this. That COSATU will 
only negotiate with the bosses at a national level for specific demands, which 
must be accompanied by a strongly coordinated programme of action as part of an 
 
Moreover, resolutions read: 
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overall campaign. We should demand a living UIF [Unemployment Insurance 
Fund] for the unemployed workers. Part of economic restructuring should be to 
nationalise the conglomerates.230
The union’s economic vision went well beyond radical reform here: in essence, it favoured a 
“Workers’ Government”, nationalisation of strategic industries, basic worker’s rights and other 
short-term demands, and these merely as stepping stone to a future that has a “...socialist 
orientation based on; production for the needs of the people, the economy to be democratically 
planned, collective ownership of the means of production, state control over trade, investment 
and regulation of prices, working class control of the economy and the state at all levels”
 
231. The 
term “Social Contract” was used, but certainly did not mean corporatism; it appears very radical 
in relation to what ultimately occurred in the first democratic government in terms of policies 
and politics. The union saw the “...Freedom Charter as a set of basic demands for the removal of 
national oppression and economic exploitation”,232
In 1993, however, union economic policy shifts, and not only begins to tone down on socialism 
and objectives such as a Worker’s Government with control of major industries, but emphasises, 
although cautiously, participating in economic restructuring in protection of workers’ interests 
and not the “working class”. Indeed, COSATU, as Von Holdt noted, “...became an active 
participant in various forums where the new order was being negotiated. COSATU’s 
programmatic vision was crystallised in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
– initiated as a strategy to shape the policies of the ANC”
 but not as the end goal. 
233
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liberal economic values like market-led growth, foreign direct investment and flexible labour 
laws. This approach – radical reform via strategic unionism – was directly justified by NUMSA 
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83 
 
for socialism in a vague future234
Yet in the history and practices of social contracts, which often encompass what the anarcho-
syndicalist Rocker called parliamentary socialism, there is never much in the way of a real 
development towards socialism. Socialism as a vision and dream, on the contrary, fades out, and 
Rocker insists this has to do with the power and nature of the state. He states that: “Participation 
in the politics of the bourgeois states has not brought the labour movement a hair’s-breadth 
nearer to Socialism, but, thanks to this method, Socialism has almost completely crushed and 
condemned to insignificance.”
. The radicalism of the 1980s and early 1990s had been replaced 
by radical reform. 
235 He adds that “...it destroyed the belief in the necessity of 
constructive Socialist activity and, worst of all the impulse of self-help, by inoculating people 
with the ruinous delusion that salvation always comes from above”.236
Social contracts require the centralisation of power at the top of the trade union 
movement, in order to facilitate the process of bargaining with capital and the 
state. And, in return for whatever concessions the ruling class is temporarily 
prepared to make, restrictions are placed on ‘workers’ power and organisation’.
 Callinicos, a Marxist, 
shares some of these sentiments: 
237
If Rocker and Callinicos might not agree in terms of overall strategy – specifically, in the 
question of the state and its usage in a revolution to eradicate classes – they have an agreement in 
that this type of method adopted by the union will not lead to socialism. They both agree that 
“...gradual transition to socialism by first winning control of the existing state”
 
238 not only defers 
socialism into insignificance, but weakens the workers’ movement. As Callinicos puts it, “Long 
term collaboration with capital and the state can only weaken the organised working class, not 
‘empower’ it.”239
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The second theme, directly related to the point above, has to do with a democratic state. It relates 
to resolutions and analysis of the union on taxes and sanctions. The union states that taxes are 
made of working class wealth and are made up of money from the most exploited, and that they 
go on to benefit the ruling class more that they do the popular classes. It resolves that sanctions 
should be supported, and taxes avoided, until such a time there is a democratic state: here the 
union does not refer to working class control, or a Workers Government, but to “control by all 
South Africans”240
One point is worth noting in the 1991 resolutions – especially considering the strategy adopted 
by the ANC government in 1996. Resolving on sanctions, yet stating that the economic problems 
in South Africa “...are structural, created by multinational corporations, local capital and 
Apartheid”, the union notes that “...the lifting of sanctions is unlikely to rescue the economy”
, the “nation”, not the “class” (chapter five will expand on this). 
241. 
The union therefore seeks a democratic state on the basis stated in its political strategy and 
summed up as follows: “CWIU’s resolution links the lifting up of sanctions with the convening 
of a Constituent Assembly and the adoption of a new constitution.”242
The class character of the future state, its nature as a state, is left without critique, as is the ANC 
itself – the language of workers’ control and a Workers’ Government fades out. The union’s 
early hopes to enter into a social contract on a very radical basis, with a Worker’s Government 
that puts working class interests above all others, is replaced by a certain faith in an ANC that is 
explicitly ANC is not a workers’ party
 
It is instructive that the 1994 RDP, which is largely a Keynesian policy, does not seek the 
nationalisation of strategic industries in principle any more, nor did it openly commit to a 
socialist future. Keynesian economics seek to restart capitalist economies during points of crisis, 
with a free economy to ensue with very little intervention from the state. This is important as the 
union does not pronounce on it particularly in light of its initial proposals and vision of 
socialism. 
243
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The movement character of the ANC also relates to our long established traditions 
of building a ‘broad church‘, a ‘hegemonic’ organisation that does not seek to 
define itself in exclusivist, or in narrow ideological terms. The ANC has been, and 
necessarily remains, home to a variety of progressive ideological currents 
nationalist, Africanist, socialist and of a variety of different classes and strata, all 
united behind a common commitment to national democratic transformation.244
a) The creation of employment 
 
Finally there are two other components of the economic strategy in which the idea of social 
contract is further used, which show the drift towards radical reform. The first is investment 
policy positions in this period leading to 1994; the second is centralised bargaining. 
On investment, the CWIU formed part of a group of unions in COSATU which assembled a 
team to come up with an investment policy to be pushed in the federation. The policy aims to 
determine a set of principles, a framework within which, upon the uplifting of sanctions, foreign 
investment will be coordinated. In consideration of the inequalities in income, race and skills, 
and with the continued rise in unemployment, the policy seeks to benefit workers and the 
working class. In summary, the following are central issues with which to bind foreign capital: 
b) Affirmative Action 
c) Respect for workers rights, particularly emphasising ILO standards 
d) Training for skills impartation at the company cost 
e) Occupational health and safety, also by ILO standards  
f) Investment in technological development, whilst capacitating workers with necessary 
skills 
g) Corporate social responsibility245
With such measures, the union hopes to create an investment practice that is not oppressive of 
workers. The union, inasmuch as it seeks the development of domestic industries
 
246
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Moreover, there are also responsibilities given to the state, expectations that it will intervene on 
their behalf in implementing this policy, but also that to entice investment to comply, things like 
tax exemptions will be given247
Centralised bargaining is viewed as one of CWIU’s successes in the federation. A campaign to 
get centralised bargaining in the industry was started in the early 1990s and sustained until the 
union got its demand in 1997. At this stage, the stage of inception, the union saw centralised 
bargaining to have an advantage: “...to unite workers, promote solidarity, combines common 
objectives, benefits weak and isolated workers, develops control and influence in industry, 
promotes high levels of organisation, saves time and resources, raises the profile of struggle, 
places greater pressure on employers, facilitates co-ordination of vacancies and information, 
mobilises workers more easily nationally”.
. This was a far cry from the notion of a Social Contract with a 
Workers’ Government, and a clear anticipation of the radical reform approach. 
248
The decline in political activities, the decline of workers, and the instigated 
violence has contributed to the non-attendance of union members to union 
structures. The workers are thus not responding to political challenges of the day; 
that organised workers and the working class has not taken the lead in this 
political process; the weak state of working class organisations.
  
The union went on to indicate that capital and the state, during crisis, place burdens on workers. 
Moreover, by the beginning of the 1990s, as stated earlier, the state of working class organisation 
was low outside the union movement which continued to grow in membership. With violence 
and reforms taking place, the union wanted to restore activity in mass action and place the 
working class at the forefront of political development. It notes: 
249
Thus, centralised bargaining was seen as a strategic means for realisation of this objective, 
through pulling of the workers and community into the campaign. In terms of economic strategy, 
too, the 1993 resolutions devoted much attention to tripartite bodies, like the NEF and NMC as 
well as sectoral economic forums. A social contract here must mean one in the standard 
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corporatist mould, tied to a faith in the ANC.  The restructuring of the economy is passed 
through a “reconstruction accord”250 which the union recommends as agreement “...that is 
necessary to have a plan to reconstruct the economy with the involvement of all major players” 
(my emphasis; obviously this includes capital)251
The union’s policy workshop raises issues around using these forums effectively. On the NEF, 
the workshop asks members to raise issues that must be pushed in it, calling for improvement of 
the accountability of COSATU leadership and involvement of membership.  As for the NMC, 
similar points are raised, but members are further asked to propose what should be done should 
ministers ignore demands and “...how do we prevent the NMC from becoming a committee 
remote from the members?” Finally, as regards the regional negotiating forums, the workshop 
asks how much of resources should be dedicated to participation and building of capacity for 
effective involvement: “How can we achieve a balance between the needs of broader 
development and the day to day needs of the union?”
. 
252
Yet the unions’ vision of such an Accord was never realised, any more than a formal social 
contract was ever put in place, even if new institutions were created, such as NEDLAC
 In sum, the economic strategy of the 
union can be characterised by the ideas of a social contract and Reconstruction Accord. 
253
Throughout all this, it quickly became clear that the chosen strategy had serious consequences 
for the unions’ organisational strength as a worker-controlled and militant formation. For 
instance, the CVWIU policy workshop in 1993 documents states: “There will be 
problems/dangers with union involvement; lack of resources, tensions between interests of 
members and national interest, secrecy laws in terms of information (price control), effect 
. 
Labour made major political shifts, abandoning the notion of a Social Contract with a Workers’ 
Government, yet never achieved corporatist “historic compromise” advocated by Adler and 
Webster (2000). Despite this, it continued to pursue this goal: the vision of socialism is believed 
to be unrealisable in the immediate future; thus capital’s brutality must be merely contained 
through agreements and compromises between labour, capital and the state.  
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balance of participation in decision making, union not changing to suit the interests of the 
members, threat to worker control because of high levels of negotiation, conflict with other 
sector/industries – inter union rivalry, no coordinated plan for the economy as a whole, 
government and capital can renege on agreement made with the union, dangers of major 
compromises.”254
In the 1993 workshop, there are reports of decline of membership involvement and lack of 
accountability of leaders. In addition, COSATU is said to develop to be more bureaucratic in its 
functioning. The CWIU sought to raise this within the broader federation
 
255
Yet the union (and the federation) unfortunately did not really undertake measures that will be 
ensured in order for these limitations and dangers to be averted. Except mentioning them, and 
raising questions and cautions, the union did not offer ways of bracing itself from becoming less 
worker-controlled, breeding unaccountable delegates and less involving of membership in 
decision making around forums such as the NEF and NMC. It asks: “How do we prevent the 
NMC from becoming a committee remote from the membership?”
 in the 1994 
congress.  
256 But it does not answer the 
question. In assessment of its participation and that of COSATU in the NEF it states that there is 
a need to address “...the accountability of the COSATU leadership and involving 
membership”257
Participation in the NMC and the campaign for the NEF reflecting a new strategic 
perspective. COSATU now combines mass struggle and organisation with wide 
ranging negotiations and participation in tripartite structures. Does this changing 
of strategy reflect a new and more sophisticated perspective on how to transform 
society? Or is it now ready for an accommodation with capital and the state? 
What is the future of labour?
.  But how to meet this need was not explained. The union quotes Von Holdt’s 
questions around new emergent unionism in the transition era, saying: 
258
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But no clear means to effectively “combine mass struggle and organisation” with “wide ranging 
negotiations and participation in tripartite structures” is spelt out.  
3. 6. Conclusion 
This chapter has done two things: first, it has provided a history of the development of trade 
union strategy mainly by looking at union policies over a period of time – 1987 to 1993. Second, 
it provided elements of critique of the radical reform trade union strategy of COSATU via an 
analysis of the CWIU, and challenged some of the claims made in South African labour studies. 
The chapter argues that the history of the union’s strategy in this period can be divided into two 
based on changes marked by political development in South Africa.  
The first period is one before 1990 with the beginning of official negotiations, which is a period 
where the union’s strategy is thought to be social movement unionism. The chapter has noted 
that the union’s strategy in this time sought to strike alliances with social movements in the 
community, but also sought to strike a relationship with the ANC, that these two relationships 
are different, and that the combination of the two resulted with the centralisation of political 
leadership in the political party (ANC). This is a precursor to the statisation of politics; the 
moment of inaugurating changes from above through a single central entity. This development of 
the union’s strategy brings a challenge to traditional ways in which the unionism has been 
understood under the guise of “social movement unionism” as the blending or coexistence of 
these relationships is instructive of a more complex and nuanced unionism.  
The chapter identifies the second period as that of negotiations for a democratic era and marks 
changes in union strategy from what is traditionally understood in literature as social movement 
unionism to a type of unionism characterised by social contract-oriented politics, a type of 
unionism that saw the union withdraw from the fore on political developments for the ANC to 
take the lead – radical reform indeed. In this period the union’s strategy aims at a radically 
constructed capitalism with a human face, through social contract: this requires it to enter into 
partnership with capital and the state. However, in the partnership the union lost out on several of 
its ambitions; chief amongst these are the Constituent Assembly, nationalisation of strategic 
industries, and a worker’s government that puts working class interest above all others. Indeed, 
the social contract never formally came into existence; instead, the RDP is understood as the 
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programme of the Alliance, an electioneering program integrating various interests, ultimately 
becoming a macroeconomic policy of the 1994 government. Nevertheless, it remained a critical 
force in the South African politics. 
It is the contention of this chapter that there are three different relationships that the union seeks 
to forge in this period: the first is with social movements/community organisations/civics; here 
the unions’ purposes to be in the forefront of building these structures, which includes radical 
democratic formations, like street committees. The second is with the political parties (the SACP 
and ANC) where the negotiations and electioneering are predominant. It is in this relationship 
that the union makes way from identification with “working class” in terms of its leadership, to 
“workers’/members’” representations in the Alliance. In addition it shifts from main political 
developments and makes way for the ANC to representing its workers in negotiations. 
Thirdly, the union aims at a relationship with the state in its plans about the social contract: 
indeed, as Pelelo Magane, a union organiser at that time, well put it: 
...the way that we started discussing in the union structures we were discussing 
almost like a government in waiting. You know, preparing for what we will do 
when we when we have the new government.259
In addition, the union’s vision of the transition is strongly linked to ensuring the achievement of 
socialism, and thus carries radical proposals that constitute popular participatory structures such 
as the All Party Conference, Constituent Assembly and Patriotic Front. The CWIU also has a 
radical critique of the economy and it is anti-capitalist, committed to the realisation of socialism. 
It seeks to participate in the restructuring of the economy through structures such as the NEF and 
 
Nevertheless, the point is that these organisations (community structures, Alliance structures and 
the state) inhabit different political spaces; they have different social roles and the nature of their 
politics is also different, sometimes contradictory. It is not surprising that the union cannot 
sustain the more radically democratic political activism like the ones needed in community 
struggles in its relations with the Alliance (ANC and SACP) and the state. 
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NMC and influence the creation of the new order. It is very critical to stress that this 
restructuring comes out of an anti-capitalist critique and efforts to realise the vision of socialism.  
The literature captures the unionism in this period as “strategic unionism”; however, it was a 
shift from the CWIU’s traditional aspirations to the democratisation of the workplace, including 
“control of production” by workers as part of a core commitment to the realisation of socialism.  
Thus, the study of union strategy also highlights the fact of an existing alternative to “strategic 
unionism”,260
Essentially, the union identified the positions and interest of different social classes and spelled 
out the ones it sought to represent, together with the goals and interests of these social classes. It 
further identified classes or social groups who were actual or potential allies in its pursuit to 
realise these interests and goals. The UDF, ANC and SACP partnerships are paradigmatic 
examples. It identified classes or social groups who stand in the way of the realisation of its 
interests and goals, mainly the bosses and their organisations and the apartheid state. It went on 
to spell out changes in the political economic power relations that are required in order for its 
 by recovering an earlier union vision that did not seek to merely alter racial 
relations, or create a more efficient or fair capitalism, but the radical alteration of production 
relations and realisation of socialism as an end goal. From that perspective, short term 
restructuring plans were to be evaluated regarding how they shift workers closer to controlling 
production; acceptance of capitalist profit-making was not part of it. This radicalism was lost 
with the rise of radical reform, but it certainly raises questions about whether strategic unionism 
was a necessary, let alone a desirable, road for COSATU to take. The older strategy had at least 
won major victories in the 1980s; the new strategy failed to achieve demonstrable successes from 
the very start. 
The central vision of radical reform via strategic unionism is building blocks for a gradual 
achievement of a “left vision of social democracy”, entailing the usage of legal structures, 
tripartite and dual alliances as means of securing gains for workers, all of which entailed class 
compromises and entanglement in the state apparatus. This will continue to be the central 
concern in the following chapter; it will look at the implications of this shift specifically in terms 
of the chemical industry. 
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goals to be realised – the democratisation of the state, workers’ government that prioritises 
working class interest above others, nationalisation of strategic industries and economic 
restructuring on the basis of socialism as an end goal. It came up with practical measures that 
were taken to realise its goals and interests, for instance stayaways, strikes and boycotts in the 
1980s, social partnerships for the defeat of apartheid, and attempts to radicalise negotiations. 
This makes the question of unionism even clearer: how do we understand or interpret the 
unionism that the CWIU reflected in its strategy and practices? The report will, in the next 
chapter, look at how the shifts identified in this chapter impact on the shop floor and industry 
level. Part of the central concerns is to see how the union makes shifts in the direction of 
securing a socialist future through its strategy, and the next two chapters focus on much attention 
in the period of democracy, post 1994. 
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Chapter 4 
CWIU Policies on Industrial and Plant Based Restructuring 
4.1 Introduction    
The previous chapter ends with an examination of the practice of radical reform and  “strategic 
unionism”, a type of unionism that emerged in the transition years in South Africa, the 1990s. 
This chapter, and the next one, continue to examine this practice by the CWIU, focusing on its 
successes and failures in securing gains for the workers. The report has treated radical reform as 
a strategy that was consolidated soon before the transition to democracy, where labour has been 
using “legal means” to secure reforms, with a long term vision of achieving socialism. It is 
committed to reforms that must be used as building blocks to the gradual achievement of 
socialism, meaning really “a left version of social democracy”. The strategy is favoured by 
writers in the Websterian tradition, who argue that a socialist revolution is not possible, and that 
labour has made gains due to this strategy. The previous chapter showed how the adoption of 
radical reform marked a major break from its previous anti-capitalist radicalism, a shift from a 
revolutionary to a more moderate, social democratic position.  
This chapter will continue this discussion with a focus on the industrial and plant restructuring 
strategy of the CWIU. Von Holdt stresses the importance of looking at this tradition in the world 
of work itself.261
                                                             
261 Von Holdt K and Webster E (ed.), 2005, Work Restructuring and the crisis of Social Reproduction, in Beyond the Apartheid 
Workplace: Studies in transition, University of Kwazulu-Natal Press: Scottsville, page 5 
 He poses the challenge here as basically one of overcoming the “apartheid 
societal order” – rather than both the apartheid and capitalist societal orders. Von Holdt argues 
that the unions responded to democracy with: “…a new strategy of reconstruction for contesting 
and shaping the process and mode of incorporation … a shift from social movement unionism 
characterised by the militant resistance of workers excluded both politically and in the 
workplace, to a new form of unionism characterised by participation and engagement with both 
the state and management … [with] new strategic elements designed to guide union engagement 
94 
 
with post-colonial reconstruction on the one hand, and to respond to the increased competitive 
pressures of globalisation on the other”262
This is a somewhat misleading characterisation of what the unions sought through radical 
reform. The CWIU certainly sought to influence the reordering of society, but never only in 
order to achieve a deracialised, competitive capitalism. Even if radical reform was moderate 
compared to the revolutionary outlook of the 1980s, it had the achievement of socialism in mind 
as an end goal, and sought to use the “new form of unionism characterised by participation and 
engagement with both the state and management”
. 
263 to put in place radical reforms for a socialist 
future. If the shift entailed a move from an emphasis on militancy, worker control, and alliances 
with social and political movements towards participation and engagement with the state and 
management, this did not come with the rejection of an anti-capitalist critique and socialist 
future. Nor did it assume that the removal of the “apartheid workplace order” results in a 
reconciliation of class interests on the shop floor; it was, even if moderate, still a vision of 
socialism that seeks to transform class relations through building blocks such as the 
‘reconstruction strategy”264
The Websterian tradition recommends that “...labour (should) shifts from deploying its power to 
impose its will – regardless of the resistance – to using its power to secure voluntary consent 
from other actors in the industrial relations system and beyond”
.  
265. It argues that “...this more 
nuanced use of power – characteristic of democratic polities – involves a shift from the 
mobilisation of power to the use of influence in the heart of decision making at the enterprise, 
industry and national level”266
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. Why, however, labour should hope for securing a voluntary 
consent from business, whose interests are to extract as much surplus value as possible, is left 
unexplained. That is to say, how can two forces in production relations who seek contradictory 
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aims reconcile without one losing out? In this case what is it that labour should compromise and 
for what gain? 
Yet the Websterian tradition not only analyses, but advocates, strategic unionism and radical 
reform, advising labour to “influence”, and build class collaborationist institutions in place of 
popular mobilisation of social movements. That the unions have adopted radical reform is clear; 
that the unions should do so is far from self-evident. Other scholars267 have challenged the 
strategy of radical reform for its very emphasis on “participation within formal institutions of 
power”268
Centralisation and bureaucratisation: policy engagement of this sort generates 
within the unions a need for a layer of highly trained technocrats, and shifts focus 
from militant struggle (by the grassroots) to technical talks about "policy" (by the 
technocrats and their state and capital equivalents)… This danger is usually 
neglected by the advocates of strategic unionism, who tend to stress the 
importance of developing research and policy "capacity" and "balancing" union 
democracy and policy – rather than seeing an inherent contradiction between a 
technocratic approach and a class-struggle approach.
. Van der Walt argues that this route leads to the following problems:  
269
He adds that it also results in “...political crippling: in taking (or seeking to take) co-
responsibility for the existing system, which is anti-working class, the unions (as movements of 
the working class) find themselves caught in an impossible situation (trying to govern yet also 
fight the system), while embracing its logic (competition, nationalism, wage labour, market 
relations etc.) and agreeing to ruinous compromises (in the metal industry, for example, such 
'strategic unionism' is usually tied to productivity agreements and 3-year no-strike 
agreements)”
  
270
Which of these two approaches to the strategy, the supportive/Websterian, or the critical, is 
correct? This chapter will evaluate both cases by examining the strategy of the CWIU in the 
. 
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restructuring of the chemicals industry and workplaces/plants, focusing on the union’s own 
reflections on the challenges experienced. It will also seek to locate the vision of the CWIU in its 
influencing of policy directions and its participation in centres of power and policy formation. 
Restructuring of economies is a factor of capitalism from one crisis to the next.271 This is the 
case with the economies of the world from the 1970s to the 1990s; the crisis of capitalism in 
apartheid South Africa was part of a global crisis of capitalist accumulation. Examining 
workplace restructuring in South Africa, Webster and von Holdt argue that the South African 
workplace restructuring is producing a work order with the following characteristics: “...a 
reduced autonomy in the context of economic globalisation; two dominant trends in formal-
sector workplace – authoritarian restoration, and stalemate brought about by ineffective 
management and resistant trade unions; the persistence and reconfiguration of the apartheid 
legacy in the majority of workplaces; the differentiation of world of work into three zones (the 
core, the non-core and the periphery) through processes of re-ordering the lines of variable 
inclusion and exclusion of South African citizens; the weakening of trade unions; and deepening 
poverty and exclusion among the great numbers of households, generating a crisis of social 
reproduction”.272
It is also important to note that neo-liberalism as a macroeconomic strategy and practice has been 
the major response to the crisis, both internationally and locally, and has been adopted by both 
the late apartheid government, and, from 1994, the ANC itself. In South Africa the results of this 
crisis were: “...the feeble GDP growth rate, which descended from its 5,5 per cent average during 
the 1960s to 1,8 per cent in the 1980s, eventually plugging into the negative range (-1,1 per cent) 
in the early 1990s, declining rates of gross fixed investment... and high rates of capital flight, low 
rates of private investment, which led to underutilisation of manufacturing plant capacity.. and 
declining competitiveness, plummeting levels of personal savings, which as a proportion of 
disposable income, dropped from 11 per cent in 1975 to 3 per cent in 1987, very high 
unemployment and the economy’s ability to create enough new jobs to absorb even a fraction of 
 
                                                             
271 Lehulere O, 1997  
272 Webster E and von Holdt (eds.), 2005, page 32 
97 
 
new entrants into the labour market, a trend exacerbated by under-investment in labour-intensive 
sectors; chronic balance of payment difficulties”273
The CWIU was faced with the challenge of restructuring in its own sector, the chemical sector, 
and had to find ways of securing the interests of its members, as restructuring comes with huge 
retrenchments, outsourcing and casualisation. It was able to respond precisely because 
\workplace restructuring had not necessarily weakened the unions. In fact Ravi Naidoo shows 
that the manufacturing sector unions in the period under study, the 1980s and 1990s, actually 
grew in density even as they decreased in membership numbers; he attributes part of this to fact 
that most workers who were affected were those with no unions
. 
The neo-liberal response is constituted by market liberalisation, privatisation, labour flexibility, 
low tariffs to attract foreign direct investment, and reduced state social spending, all included in 
the ANC’s GEAR. Indeed, such restructurings opened closed markets to the world resulting in 
stress from increased global competition. Many companies, in order to survive, have to adjust 
their productivity levels to compete with other goods flowing in the globe. Indeed, those who can 
produce mass of good at lower prices would make more profits, which make the stress of 
competitiveness about producing at the possible lowest prices.  
274. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, the weakening of unions has as much to do with union strategy as capital’s strategy: we 
have seen how the shift to radical reform has been associated with a weakening of the grassroots 
activism that underpins “worker control” and struggle from below. These are attributes that 
placed the unions as a power to reckon with in the 1980s275
Thus, the chapter will ask first what the union’s understanding of industrial restructuring is, and 
then go on to discuss its responses to restructuring. It does not base the information on data 
collected from plants and ordinary members, critical this as it may, but only on official (union) 
documents, meaning it will use the union’s official pronouncements and deliberations on 
, attributes that emphasised the 
inauguration of change from below, and that were entrenched in grass roots struggle against 
capital and the authoritarian racist state. 
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industrial restructuring. It will show how the practice of radical reform played out in workplace 
and industrial restructuring, beginning with an overview of union thinking up to 1991 on strategy 
around industrial restructuring. Then it shifts to an examination of subsequent approaches to 
workplace and industrial restructuring. The chapter report will examine what the CWIU 
understands by industrial restructuring; provide cases to demonstrate this understanding and 
some of the activities on the ground in branches and companies.  
4.2 The union’s thinking before 1994: overview 
In its 1991 congress resolutions, the CWIU argued that the South African economy was in a 
“structural crisis”276. The resolutions note the consequences the crisis has had for workers, 
stating that “...the crisis manifests itself in the form of mass retrenchments, poor education, 
expensive health services, poor infrastructure, a growing inflation rate and exploitation”277. It 
proceeds to note “...the profit motive and the failure of the racist, undemocratic government to 
redirect the economy in order for it to grow and produce according to the needs of the people”278. 
It blames capitalists for not investing in creating new jobs and recognises “...retrenchments, 
privatisation, rationalisation, sub-contracting, union bashing, restructuring of industries and the 
economy as a whole, talks on possible Social Contract”279
The union went on to argue against a capitalist solution to the crisis. It advocated the 
participation of the trade union movement in the formulation of “...an economic policy that 
affirms socialism as the basis for the restructuring of industries according to the needs of the 
working class and the society as a whole”
 as ways in which capital and the state 
have responded to the crisis. The union further insists that these attempts are not in the interest of 
the people but to generate profit. 
280
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. However, it insists that in the process of this 
participation, union independence must be maintained. The union goes on to state that “...the best 
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defence of workers’ living standards lies in strong organisational and militant action”281
The resolutions of the union at this stage centre on socialism as the aim in which all 
developments must culminate. It resolved, as discussed in the previous sections, on a social 
contract – but of a most radical type. For the CWIU, at this stage, the “social contract” can only 
be entered with a “Workers Government where”
 similar 
to the grassroots character of the struggles waged by the union at this time. 
282
a) The interests of the working class are placed above all other classes 
: 
b) Workers participate in both economic decision making under the principles of worker 
control of production and political decision making through their own 
organisations283
Emphasis must be placed in the last words of the latter resolution, which are “worker control of 
production and political decision making through their own organisations”
 
284
We should be involved (in industrial restructuring/industry policy) to prevent 
unilateral restructuring of the industry. Demands and policies that will advance 
interests of workers need to be developed. This needs an industry forum to be 
set
.  
The union shifted position towards corporatism in a 1993 workshop, which would dedicate a 
section on industrial restructuring. In this workshop, it reports a resolution taken in 1992, which 
reads: 
285
- Global restructuring of manufacturing on macro level – new production 
process/technology, decline in manufacturing in terms of employment. Shift in 
employment to service sector, lack of growth, similar trends in South Africa 
. 
The workshop goes on the cite reasons for the above resolutions, noting the following: 
                                                             
281 Ibid 
282 Ibid 
283 Ibid 
284 Ibid 
285 CWIU Policies, National Policy Workshop, Section3: Chemical Industry Restructuring, 5 – 7 February,1993 
100 
 
- Global restructuring on micro level – new manufacturing in plants, reorganisation 
of workforce – japanisation, core workers/periphery workers (temps, contracts 
etc), similar trends in South Africa 
- Employers are restructuring already without union involvement. Restructuring 
inevitable 
- Major problems in chemical industry e.g. based on coal, firms too small to be 
competitive in world market, massive capital investments – low capital 
productivity 
- Need to protect workers/community from restructuring on employer’s terms (i.e. 
with massive job loss, misuse of public funds etc.)286
The union poses questions in this workshop, with an aim to develop policies towards the above: 
 
If we do not positively intervene in the process of industry restructuring: What 
will the effect on the union be? What other options do you propose?287
Yet it then notes challenges with involvement of the union as follows: “Lack of resources; 
Tension between interests of members and national interest; Secrecy laws in terms of 
information (petrol prices); Effect on balance priorities within the union; Lack of worker 
participation in decision making; Union not changing to suit the interests of the members; Threat 
to worker control because of high level of negotiation; Conflict with other industrial 
sectors/industries – inter union rivalry; No coordinated plan for the economy as a whole; 
Dangers of major compromises”
 
288
We need effective research. Thereafter, we must push for state funding of external 
research; we will need to build our internal capacity by determining our priorities 
in the union and in the spending of union money; We need a long term education 
programme; We need disclosure of information and should therefore: – Demand 
information at plant level, – Push for legislation to ensure disclosure of 
. 
The union then goes on to note strategies to face the challenges noted above, saying: 
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information; We need to maintain worker involvement/control of the process – 
Demand time off for report backs, – [and] Training; We must stick to our 
principles.”289
The union, as implicit in the discussion to this point, distinguished two types of industry 
restructuring. On one point they refer to it as micro and macro; on other occasions, and in rather 
clearer terms, they speak of “...plant level – worker participation schemes, new technology, 
productivity, tariffs, training/ABE [adult basic education], retrenchment”
 
Significantly, these proposals understated the issues of “Lack of worker participation in decision 
making” and the “Threat to worker control because of high level of negotiation” – the problems 
were seen as solved merely by “time off for report backs” and a commitment to “principles”. The 
radical reform strategy was not seen as inherently at odds with workers’ control, although the 
link seems obvious. This obviously shows that the union implicitly chose to adopt peak-level, 
technocratic, bargaining – here it makes sense to relegate the involvement of workers to giving 
reports, without clear measures for the effective involvement in determination of processes. 
290. And “Industry level 
- tariffs, subsidies to Sasol/oil industry, investment, training, job creation, prices etc”291
The union sought to shape, rather than resist, restructuring. It recognises restructuring as 
inevitability, and thus seeks ways of engaging to secure the interest of workers. It did not 
consider, as Callinicos did, that restructuring under capitalism necessarily “...will be at the 
expense of the workers. They will find themselves having to work harder under tighter 
managerial supervision, often for lower wages, if they don’t lose their jobs altogether.”
. Thus, 
restructuring as understood by the union consists of changes that are undertaken by capital and 
the state, occurring at plant and/or industry level. These include technological changes in 
production organisation, job creation, skilling of workers, outsourcing, privatisation and growth.   
292
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 The 
union appears to think that co-management is a protection against this, which it is not: Callinicos 
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maintains that “...workers have to resist restructuring in order to defend themselves”293
The 1993 deliberations have established depth in the thinking about restructuring as opposed to 
the 1991 resolutions, indicating a level of preparedness to delve deeper, but also of the increasing 
importance of confronting restructuring; this is partly due to the massive loss of jobs noted in the 
deliberations. The union plans on investing time and expanding research, seeking disclosure of 
information, stressing training of workers, with an admitted danger of the state and capital not 
sticking to agreements
 as 
opposed to co-managing its implementation.  
294
The union does not, however, say what plans should be put in place to avert capital and the state 
from betraying agreements.  By this stage, as indicated in the previous chapter, the union had 
passed responsibility for political decision making to the ANC, and placed its hopes in an ANC-
led government. Presumably this is what will prevent deals being reneged upon. Yet this faith 
was ill-founded, for the ANC abandoned the RDP itself. This process Van der Walt calls 
“political crippling”: placing all hopes in the ANC, the unions are continually disorientated by 
the ANC’s overt defence of neo-liberal capitalism.
.   
295
So, there are two tensions that run in these deliberations by now. One is the claim that “...the best 
defence of workers’ living standards lies in strong organisational and militant action”
 
296
The other tension, indeed linked to the one above, is between class and nation. The union 
emphasises socialism as the objective of economic restructuring in the 1991 resolutions and 
working class interests are placed above others, but by 1993 aspirations to socialism run 
alongside talk of “national interest” and the need to balance that with (working class) “members’ 
interests”.  
, 
alongside a commitment to participation in the very structures of power that the union admits 
undermine that action: i.e. it is feared that worker control will be eroded by “too much 
negotiation” that come with such participation, yet the union resolves to participate in structures 
of power anyway. 
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The “nation” has not been a key political or economic category in earlier union documents; the 
union has been largely using the category of “working class”297, and in other instances it used a 
similar category, “the people”298
This shift, from working class to national interests, is important. Socialism centres its programme 
on the interest of working class, not the nation. The nation, however, is a political community 
characterised by its relationship to a state, it is what a state calls its subject – the nation. Its 
interest are not necessarily those of the working class
. It may have referred to the “nation” from one point to the 
other, but in the official pronouncements interrogated in this study inclusive of congress 
resolutions, NEC reports, minutes and workshops in the period 1987-1993 there is simply no 
mention of such concepts. Furthermore, also notable is the unions’ shift from speaking of a broad 
working class interest to the far narrower category of workers, and even merely “members”. This 
shift moves it away from a language of class struggle to a more sectional, narrow shop floor 
interest. Indeed, a movement that sacrifices political engagement in the interest of co-managing 
capital as opposed to building union strength on the shop-floor/grassroots like in its early years 
of inception – the 1970s. 
299
It is significant that the “national interest” makes an appearance at this stage. The Websterian 
recommendation that “...labour shifts from deploying its power to impose its will – regardless of 
the resistance – to using its power to secure voluntary consent from other actors in the industrial 
: the state’s interests are in this category 
more important – legitimacy being chief amongst them. Thus, for the state to acquire its 
legitimacy from its diverse subjects, bourgeoisie, working class, races, tribes, gender and age and 
so on, it needs to create the appearance of interest above all these groups, a “national interest” 
which pretends to reconcile contradictions when it merely contains them. This is because, should 
these contradictions spill into a revolution, the state’s legitimacy is indeed in danger. Thus, 
saying socialism on one hand, and balancing this with interest of the bourgeoisie state, results 
into tensions that may lead to compromises of the core interests of the workers should the state 
choose to prioritise capitalist interests – as it must, if for no other reasons that in a capitalist 
society, the state requires revenue generated by capitalist processes.  
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relations system and beyond”300
The Websterian tradition argues that “...this more nuanced use of power – characteristic of 
democratic polities – involves a shift from the mobilisation of power to the use of influence in 
the heart of decision making at the enterprise, industry and national level”
 assumes that working class (or worker) interests not necessarily 
paramount, but merely part of a society with many “actors”. The “other actors” are, of course, in 
the first instance capitalists, and, in the second instance, the state managers.  
301
This is, for van der Walt, to be understood as the unions facing an “impossible situation”, by 
“taking … co-responsibility for the existing system, which is anti-working class”, and in which it 
is futile to try and balance capitalist and working class interests.
. Decision-making 
does not thus pass into the hands of the working class; the working class, instead, holds hands 
with the other classes in the “heart” of society, on the basis of a common, “national”, interest. A 
focus on “industrial relations” requires labour act as an interest group – one among many others 
– and an organisation that seeks its members’ immediate wellbeing, rather than position itself as 
an insurgent force that can radically change society. This is a major shift: the South African 
black trade union movement has historically largely identified with a broad “working class” well 
beyond the industrial relations, has treated “industrial relations” as inseparable from the larger 
political and community situation of the working class as a whole, and has seen the solution in 
terms of socialism, not class partnership.  
302
Previously, labour’s presence on the streets was not only about support of its shop floor 
concerns, or, indeed, in support of negotiations. Rather, it went to the heart of what confronted 
working class people as a whole – issues of education, housing, self governance and protection 
against repressive government – and raised the need for a new social order that could resolve 
these problems. This political role has, with radical reform, not only been averted, it has kept 
. This is exactly what the 1993 
reinterpretation of labour’s role via radical reform means: labour is seen as part of society, 
embedded in “members’ interests”, industrial relations, and participation in centres of power to 
secure co-management of the system.  
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labour as a disciplined interest group of the workers. As Adler and Webster have it: “A labour 
movement capable of mobilising and restraining its members opens up possibilities of deepening 
and extending democracy during this phase of the transition process.”303
What Webster et al do not consider is what happens when the envisaged voluntary consent is not 
attained: if labour compromises, and capital does not, how can the compromised labour 
movements still fight for or defend working class interests? Moreover, where in the world, in the 
neo-liberal era, has voluntary cooperation with capital led to advances for the working class, 
rather than the weakening of their agency expressed through their organisations?
 Yet the very fact that 
“mobilising” takes place in a system dominated by another class means that “restraining” 
members is inevitable, and tends to preclude, rather than “open up”, “possibilities of deepening 
and extending democracy”  for the working class. 
304 Indeed, how 
has the goal of a socialist future been drawn nearer though such effort? Nowhere in the world: 
so, what is it that South Africa possesses that is so unique305
By 1994, the union was firmly committed to radical reform. In 1994, the CWIU General 
Secretary Rod Crompton resigned from this position, citing academic pursuits as his reasons. 
Crompton in his resignation letter makes a proposal to continue being employed by the union on 
part time basis. He then provided the union with a proposal for the union to establish a 
“Department of Economic Policy”
? Labour’s experience, as seen in the 
previous chapter, shows less evidence of “possibilities of deepening and extending democracy” 
than of ongoing retreat on demands meant to maximise working class power, such as 
“nationalisation” and an open Constituent Assembly to write the constitution. 
4.3 Policies on restructuring, 1993 onwards  
306
Coordinate CWIU’s engagement in NEF and similar bodies through the Industrial 
Restructuring Committee; To represent CWIU on NEF forums as appointed from 
time to time along with the other comrades appointed from time to time as has 
been the case; To work on economic/restructuring issues affecting CWIU 
. The department would be set out to do the following: 
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industries; To work on plant based restructuring issues; To attend COSATU 
workshops/conferences on related issues; To build capacity in these areas. 
Capacity building is a difficult area which needs careful thought. However in the 
immediate short term is no substitute for the people getting involved and learning 
on their feet, attending meetings, attending labour caucuses etc.307
Crompton argues in this proposal that “...an important part of the future trade union work will be 
fighting for economic policies, now that the political battle to remove apartheid is over. Also the 
emergence of the NEF and other forums it is clear that CWIU needs a capacity to deal with these 
demands.”
  
308 The proposal proceeds from an analysis that the new government has no industrial 
strategy for the chemical sector. And thus, its objectives are as follows: “Develop industry 
strategy for the various chemical industry sectors e.g. explosives, pharmaceuticals, consumer etc. 
to feed into ANC and CWIU policy thinking; Assist the CWIU and COSATU develop a shop 
floor response to “new manufacturing techniques” or “World Class Manufacturing”; To interact 
with and report back to the CWIU and ANC on the research as it develops and the results; To 
build CWIU and ANC capacity in the area both at the research level and at the union level”309
This proposal was adopted
.  
310 and the union set out to negotiate, as proposed by Crompton, that 
the funding would come from the ANC, CWIU and Industry Strategy Project311
The advantage of this proposal for the CWIU is that it would get, basically free of charge, 
access to research capability for its sectors and for shop floor level strategy (which is 
sorely lacking at present). It would begin a trend of influencing ANC researchers and 
policy planners not to forget shop floor in their approach to economic policy. Also, 
hopefully, a more union friendly type of industrial policy for the chemical industries and 
some capacity at low cost.”
. Crompton 
argues that: 
312
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We see here, again, that the 1994 state has been accepted by the union as an ally and a resource, 
which can be constantly influenced for the working class. This language of influence is far from 
attempts of the 1970s/80s, where a radical vision is matched to a pragmatic practice of 
influencing some of its policies and legislations like with the reforms of the late 1970s on the 
Wiehahn Commission in order to build more power on the streets313
Yet in the same meeting that would adopt Crompton’s proposal, the union noted that it had lost 
people to parliament and many more were leaving for better jobs in government. It noted the 
limited impact of its radical reforms, and emphasised the need to ensure that ways were found to 
engage different levels of government in an attempt to push for workers’ interests, or “to ensure 
workers’ issues are not ignored”
. Crompton and the union 
were now seeing policy and legal influence as an end in itself, as not a tactic, but a strategy. The 
aim was to participate in reforms, policy formation and determination, and the objective is to 
influence the state in becoming worker friendly, with a vague notion that such participation will 
lead to socialism (or at least, a “left version of social democracy”); the bold call for socialism, 
for a fundamental shift towards a socialist future seen in earlier CWIU resolutions, had 
disappeared. In its place is praise for a “low cost” engagement in “industrial policy”, with ANC 
monies. 
314. In addition, the meeting noted that some companies consult 
state officials on issues that should need the union. The idea of union independence also found 
prominence as these attempts were made to engage and deal with these challenges, as the item is 
mentioned under the heading “strategic position of organised labour under the new 
government”315
Need to ensure labour movement independence from employers, government and 
political parties. This should not be confused with political alignment for specific 
objectives.
. The minutes read: 
316
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As indicated earlier, the union does not proceed to say how this would be ensured. However, it is 
critical to note that the union is conscious of these challenges even as it seeks to interact with 
stakeholders on a more professional basis through research and forums. The participation of 
workers is still not addressed in more coherent ways, even though a threat of their distancing 
from the rank and file is noted. This is further demonstrated by research emphasis which aim to 
open groups or individuals to lead research and contribute to policy formulation in forums such 
as NEF, specifically exemplified by Crompton’s proposal. 
Nevertheless, we must to ask how the structures of research and the objectives set in this bring 
about the achievement of the union’s earlier claim that “Only socialism can solve the current 
political and economic crises”317, that socialism is the basis for restructuring industries according 
to the needs of the working class and the society as a whole,318 and the union’s commitment to a 
“socialist South Africa” and “research into planned economies”319
[We] need effective research. Thereafter, we must push for state funding of 
external research; we will need to build our internal capacity by determining our 
priorities in the union and in the spending of union money
. 
It is clear that the union’s research was now targeted into a rather different alternative; it no 
longer put research into charting adirection towards alternative economies, but to formulating 
policies with a bourgeois state and business. 
320
The challenges of this time, as noted by Crompton’s document and the union’s agreements upon 
it, are not different from the ones upon which the discourses as seen in the union resolutions are 
based in the 1990s. These are restructuring, globalisation and the resultant consequences: 
privatisation, retrenchments and outsourcing. The difference is in the nature of the state; the 
change in political machinery from authoritarian racist rule to democratic non-racialism, yet 
remaining bourgeois in character. It is perhaps equally imperative to delve into the activities of 
the union’s research units, or pillars as they call them, which came out of the Crompton proposal 
before drawing deeper conclusions. It will be clear that the strategy of “radical reform” aims at 
. 
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building blocks to the realisation of socialism, yet socialism itself is fading as a concrete 
objective; the immediate aim is to repair capitalism. It appears asphyxiated in the lungs of the 
union, as its body treads the line of bourgeois acquiescent unionism.  
4.4 The Industrial Relations Pillar Activities and the Pursuit of Worker Friendly Reforms 
The new approach played out in the different research units established to develop programmes 
for both the collection and creation of knowledge for policy engagement purposes. These would 
in turn be used to advice on strategy and in training different leaders, from shop stewards and the 
national executive committee to staff. The union had Industrial Restructuring (IR Pillar), Health, 
Safety and Environment, Education (Adult Basic Education), Women. This section focuses on 
the IR Pillar activities in the period 1994 – 1999, which, as Crompton’s proposal indicates, 
worked also as a resource to those who were in tripartite structures and forums such as 
NEDLAC. It will first outline the industrial restructuring strategy and how its practice is 
envisaged, give key cases that the union dealt with in this period (including tripartite structures), 
and then provide some of the branch reports on plant level restructurings. 
The union distinguished between two levels of restructuring in the chemical sector as earlier 
indicated: industry level restructuring and plant level restructuring. Noteworthy about this 
separation is that it was possible because of the possibility of tripartite bodies that gave union the 
platform to influence policies and legislations. Thus, here they deal mostly with industry based 
legislation, policies and activities which often involve the state and business, chief amongst 
which is the Liquid Fuels Task Force (LFTF) established by government and including business, 
state and labour to look into the restructuring of the liquid fuels industry. The other level is plant 
restructuring encompassing individual companies and factories in different sub-sectors of the 
industry. Here the union deals specifically with each company’s policies. These activities, at 
industry and plant level, demonstrate the unions’ contestations of the “world of work” and 
“workplace order” as Von Holdt calls them321
 
; moreover, they tell the type of union CWIU is, 
how it understands itself and its role in society. 
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4.4.1 Industry Level Restructuring 
At this level the union contested legislation formation and policies that were channelled by the 
state. Crompton’s proposal, as shown earlier, reports his attendance of the Chemical Engineers 
Conference about “the new government’s views on the chemical industry”322
4.4.2 Liquids Fuels Task Force 
 in 1994. In this 
conference, Crompton reports that the ANC government had no strategy for industry and it was 
important to ensure it did soon. This is understandable as business might have the upper hand in 
the inevitable reform process that had to take place in the new democratic order, unless the 
union, which was in a better position compared to the ANC, rescued it to come up with a 
strategy. The union was also part of the government initiated task forces looking at building 
consensus around policy direction; Trade and Industry Task Force (TITF), Liquids Fuels Task 
Force (LFTF) and the Petrochemicals, Plastic and Synthetic Fibres cluster. Here we consider the 
LFTF only. 
The body was established under the NEF and included business, the state, ANC and labour. The 
union reported in a 20 page document (authored by the ANC, Minerals and Energy Policy Centre 
or MEPC, and COSATU) that there was a push to lower protection of the oil companies, 
including SASOL and for “…future control of regulation and price setting to be taken out of the 
hands of the department of Minerals and Energy (depoliticised) and put into the hands of new 
Independent Petroleum Authority”323. Business is said to have pushed for minimum state 
interference, and bluntly put their positions on the suggested independent regulation authority as 
“fok of” (“fuck off”)324, directed in no small part at the union. The union goes on to note two 
issues that need attention and hope can be resolved through negotiations, “a Petroleum price hike 
together with restructuring and a possible implosion of the entire industry”325
Without delving into much detail, the union is convinced that the problems of the rise in 
international petrol prices and the weak rand have potential to lead to chaos in the industry with 
deregulation possibly leading to some companies closing and others retrenching workers. The 
. 
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idea is that some companies will not increase their prices and worries if the ANC government, 
with its preoccupation with foreign investment, “…want, as its first action, to force a small 
retailer to put up petrol prices”326. This is because when it last happened, the apartheid 
government used the “Petroleum Products Act to force companies on line”327; however, the new 
constitution might not do the same due to “its rights of economic activity”328
In the next meeting of the task force following the one reported in these minutes, the union 
argues that there was “no substantive progress... since”
. 
329. It says “…a new pricing mechanism, 
which would adjust the pump prices every month” had “been agreed to and implemented”330
We have made little progress on other issues... given the general lack of 
progress... the oil companies suggested that a ‘Scenario building’ workshop be 
convened in Cape Town to try and break the deadlock in the forum, and develop a 
plan to restructure the industry. While this workshop was valuable in certain 
areas, such as the development of a social plan for service station workers and in 
finding ways of opening the retail market to new participants, it was far from 
victory for labour. The views of the oil companies predominate in certain crucial 
areas, including the deregulation of the petrol price – the element of the current 
system on which everything else rests. If the oil companies’ proposals are 
implemented the industry will be deregulated within two years.
 but 
only in the interim. The union also reports that: 
331
Taken this account the report recommends that  
 
The union needs to discuss whether we should continue participating in this 
process and if so, based on what terms of reference. If we refuse to be part of the 
nest Scenario workshop, we will be back where we started in the LFTF. In all 
likelihood the task force will collapse, and the pressing decision which must be 
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made about industry will be dealt with by politicians. We need to determine 
whether we stand to gain more from leaving the restructuring of the industry to 
government, or whether we can go back into the workshop, continue with those 
issues where we have made progress and try to rectify the areas where our 
positions have not held sway.332
The union’s NEC went on to note the issues raised by the report referring discussion of the 
recommendation to a preparatory workshop. It further reaffirmed its opposition to deregulation, 
and noted the labour opposition of “a permanent price regulating authority which will be 
independent of government”
 
333
The NEC went into a workshop as indicated, and the workshop served as a platform to reflect on 
its strategy and find ways of either improving or abandoning it
. The union further cast doubts at the government indicating that 
they are aware of its possible reactionary nature taken its emphasis of foreign investor 
confidence as stated in the earlier. 
Notice that we are now dealing with a union that has proactive proposals and alternative ways in 
which some of the concrete issues facing industry – implicitly, issues of competitiveness and 
sustained profits – can be addressed. The focus is on “reconstruction”, rather than revolution,  
334. After an elaborate process, the 
union emerged with a framework of engagement in the process of restructuring and reform of the 
industry. It pronounced on plant level restructuring as well, however, pertinent at this point are 
its reflections on its participation on the liquid fuels task force. It sought to cast an overarching 
analysis that incorporated plant level activities to evaluate its progress and chant a way forward. 
The following were therefore some problems it identified in the companies falling under the 
LFTF: “Job loss and retrenchment taking place in industry; Contradiction between interest of 
members and wider society; Deregulation – seem to be losing the battle; No link between LFTF 
and what is happening at plant level”335
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The union also noted achievements: “Petrol pricing mechanism in place; Saved jobs of petrol 
attendants; Unions recognised as important players in industry stopped unilateral actions; 
Opened up ‘secrets’ – transparent process in place”336
The lessons learned were generally seen as a positive confirmation of the radical reform 
approach: “Being involved in national policy formulation e.g. trade/tariffs, competition, allows 
us to influence policy; gather information; forewarns us of things to come; Workers and 
organisers need to be involved in sectors affected by policy as soon as possible”
. 
337
The primary objective of industry or plant restructuring should be to 
promote/defend the interests of workers (working class); Restructuring should not 
lead to job losses. Restructuring should maximise job security and job creation; 
Restructuring should not lead to ‘outsourcing’ or subcontracting; Change of 
ownership in favour of workers through mechanisms such as nationalisation 
should be a goal of any restructuring; There should be worker involvement in all 
levels of negotiations with full time off for attendance, mandating and report 
back
.  
The workshop then came up guiding principles for its involvement in industry restructuring. It is 
perhaps of critical importance for our discussion to cite some of the principles. 
338
The union’s initial position was the setting up of a national oil company incorporating SASOL 
and all other state oil assets, including MOSSGAS and SOEKOR (these were later merged to 
form PetroSA in 2002), which would be called “South African National Oil Company” 
(SANOCO)
. 
In 1995, the important test for the union’s ability to actually “promote/defend the interests of 
workers” by “Being involved in national policy formulation” was provided by attempts by 
government to privatise MOSSGAS.  
339
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. In the same meeting John Appolis (an executive member from the powerful 
CWIU Wits Region) introduced a discussion document on industrial restructuring. This 
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document rejected the dominant approach, radical reform, positioned restructuring in a broader 
capitalist crisis and called, echoing the union sentiments, for nationalisation of strategic assets of 
the state as mentioned above. It went on to emphasise worker control of activities in the 
restructuring of plants and broader industry, an aspect that remained missing in the Pillar 
activities throughout, even if constantly hoped for. The document seemed to stress that the 
reform taking place must be worked from below as opposed to above340
The meeting’s response was, however, to reaffirm radical reform. There seems to have been an 
attempt to establish Pillar activities at a branch level. In 1996, the privatisation of MOSSGAS 
was underway; the union, in the spirit of helping manage the restructuring, even conceded that it 
will not oppose voluntary retrenchment by workers “…in exchange for management’s 
commitment to full negotiation over future of retrenchment in structures set up in terms of the 
national framework agreement”
. 
341
Management totally abused the agreement – nearly 150 more workers were 
retrenched with the voluntary package than was agreed to and senior managers 
used the packages to award themselves golden handshakes... generally there is 
poor communication between branch and Head Office which has hampered our 
ability to respond to development at Mossgas coherently. In addition, we have not 
been able to develop the idea of SANOCO as endorsed by the NEC. Our vision 
for the future of Mossgas and for restructuring in the industry more broadly is still 
vague and unhelpful.
. This was an abject failure, the union reporting the following 
outcome: 
342
Here we can see that the union finally puts thought into the idea of nationalisation as envisaged 
in its congress resolutions and workshop as earlier outlined. However, there still needed to be 
efforts to outline the idea of SANOCO more explicitly and put resources into pushing it both 
within the alliance and in society broadly. MOSSGAS, however, at this period remains in the 
process of being privatised and the union reports failures in averting this. Parallel to MOSSGAS 
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was also a SASOL restructuring process, which entailed the retrenchment of over 100 workers, 
and the union agreed to put on hold until the end of 1996.343
The union developed its response in a document it called “Restructuring of State Assets”. In this 
document, the union observes that there is a clear commitment on the part of the ANC 
government to privatisation, deregulation and market-led growth. It further problematises the 
alliance that COSATU, SACP and ANC share, and resolved to reaffirm its original positions on 
restructuring; anti-privatisation being chief amongst them
 
Meanwhile, at a national level, the government adopted GEAR with its market-led frameworks 
for running, restructuring and expanding South Africa’s economy. These had been policies that 
the union movement as a whole had long been opposing; now they were being adopted by the 
very ANC government they had helped put into power, that they given the mandate in 
negotiations to represent interest of workers, and that they had helped release from prison in the 
1980s and early 1990s. 
344
In the July Secretariat Report, it is noted that government has finally decided to “…invent about 
R910 million of MOSSGAS profits to keep it open until end of the year. The option of selling it 
or finding a business partner has not been abandoned.”
. MOSSGAS continues to receive 
central attention; however, more efforts are sort to involve ANC, although it is clear, even 
acknowledged by the union, that it pursues privatisation. 
345 On the same note, SASOL is reported 
to be “…restructuring and about 1 600 jobs could lost in December”346 that year. And more 
plans are made to negotiate with the companies. However, the IR Pillar reported MOSSGAS 
plans for privatisation to had actually flopped as “…no-one came forward with enough money, 
so this is a sort of victory for the union”347
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. The pillar further recommended that more resources 
had to be put in developing the idea of SANOCO. 
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The November NEC meeting would receive a report from the IR Pillar of government’s 
commitment to deregulate the liquid fuels industry. Again, there is little evidence that radical 
reform was working, the report stating that: 
Despite repeated requests and enquiries, the department of Mineral and Energy 
Affairs has made no attempts to discuss restructuring with the union or reconvene 
the Liquid Fuels Task Force. There is a growing concern that the department will 
buckle under pressure from the oil industry and deregulate the industry.348
From henceforth, the LFTF would appear in union minutes as a dead structure, and restructuring 
issues in this industry at this level were not much discussed in NEC meetings. In 1997 there were 
developments with the discussion of the Liquid Fuels Policy that seemed to suggest improved 
fortunes. The union noted interactions with parliamentary portfolio committee on Minerals and 
Energy Affairs, and the ANC caucus in parliament, highlighting the following points: “Revival 
of the Liquid Fuels task Force; Research to be jointly commissioned into the implications of 
various policy options; CEF [Central Energy Fund] restructuring in terms of the National 
Framework Agreement; Social plan to be negotiated for the Liquid Fuels industry; Advancement 
of policy through united action by union and progressive organisations; Restructuring of the CEF 
Board”
   
349
There is no space to elaborate on most of the developments, or on each resolution. However, the 
minutes reflect that upon the dissolution of the LFTF a different team within the union was 
developed to deal with liquid fuels issues on industry level
. 
350
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. The union would therefore use this 
team to develop the above engagements with parliament.  
In short, we can see how the union was now a strong advocate of radical reform. Although very 
aware of the pitfalls of this strategy, the union still prefers to go with it to influence policy 
developments. The union at least reflected on the decline of worker control, demonstrated by 
both Appolis’ discussion document and union reflections, resolutions and several workshops in 
1993, 1994 and 1996.  
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Regarding the success of the radical reform approach, the LFTF case shows that the union did 
not score fundamental victories except saving jobs of petrol attendants and stopping 
retrenchments in the short run. The union did not get the proposal of a national oil company, 
SANOCO, adopted by anyone. The privatisation of MOSSGAS showed that state policies 
developed to the right and in the interests of business.  
The practice of radical reform as reflected by the activities of the LFTF is based on research, 
negotiations, and seeks to influence policy, resulting in co-management of capitalism in ways 
that only temporarily and partially avert its most dire consequences. Hence the agreements to 
stop retrenchments in the short run (Engen, SASOL), or privatisation in the short run 
(MOSSGAS), but no progress on nationalisation (SANOCO), or shifting the state from its 
commitment to deregulation.  
The union raises challenges with its strategy, its limitations and disadvantages, but continues 
with it, despite resistance from the state and business on core issues – and despite its 
demonstrable failure. It also insists that restructuring is inevitable, but also assumes this implies 
co-management of capitalism. This idea moves from one where there is emphasis and 
expectation of a Workers’ Government, as shown in chapter 3, that puts the interests of the 
working class above all other interests, to one that is on the retreat from a pro-capitalist, post- 
1994, ANC-led state. This raises the question, therefore, of why the union sticks to this strategy 
despite its failure – a failure that the union’s own reports admitted.  
The issue of choice is critical. It may be that, through corporatism, a neo-liberal state seeks to 
“…conceal the centrality of conflict in the fundamental structures of capitalist relations of 
production”351
The literature on social movement unionism also tends to efface this element of choice. In 
Webster’s classic formulation, the militancy of black trade unions is the product of their 
exclusion from the political system; this is the exceptional condition that prevents the unions 
. However, it does not follow that the unions are simply absorbed without choice. 
This chapter shows that the union is consciously choosing to cooperate with business, and 
rejecting the alternative – the militancy associated with it in the 1980s.  
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from following the classical path of “maturing” within a formal industrial relations system under 
democracy.352 As noted in chapter 2, this explanation does not really question the maturation 
thesis, as suggest its inapplicability in certain eras in certain Newly Industrialising Countries; if 
democratisation occurs, it would seem normal that the union movement now tends to a “mature” 
approach, and “…shifts from deploying its power to impose its will … to using its power to 
secure voluntary consent from other actors”353
Unions, anarcho-syndicalism suggests, are potentially revolutionary, no “mere transitory 
phenomenon bound up with the duration of capitalist society”, but the “germ of the socialist 
economy of the future”
.  
354. That potential is shaped by the political outlook of unions, and their 
methods of struggle and organisation.355 A reliance on the state creates a type of unionism that 
downplays “the necessity of constructive socialist activity” and “the impulse to self-help”, 
breeding a union bureaucracy and a passive membership356
To also attribute blame for union failures to a powerful and cunning state (or business sector) 
blinds to the responsibility of the union’s own strategy for those outcomes. It was the decision to 
undertake strategic unionism that led directly to efforts at the co-management of capitalist crisis, 
as well as the rise of a technocratic leadership specialised in research and negotiations rather than 
“class struggle”
. But since union oligarchy is 
therefore the consequence of a particular strategy, then the choice of strategy is the ultimate 
cause of union bureaucracy itself. The state may be seeking to co-opt labour, but labour’s own 
strategy helps or hinders cooption – and in the case of CWIU, it was labour’s adoption of radical 
reform that was crucial.  
357
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labour sticks with this strategy when it clearly demonstrated no usefulness both for defending its 
gains and drawing to the direction of socialism. 
4.4.3 Plant Level Restructuring 
The reorganisation of work in South Africa is linked to the apartheid system, which prioritised 
whites at the expense of blacks. The apartheid workplace was as characterised by white 
domination, as other aspects of apartheid society358. This is exemplified by the strengthening of 
homeland policy in the post-1948 period which exerted “…tighter controls... to safeguard the 
continuing supply of cheap migrant labour for South African industry”359
The union since the early 1990s demonstrated an understanding of what plant level restructuring 
entails, best captured by a document which the IR Pillar would develop to assist plant level 
players to use as a resource in dealing with their challenges. Efforts are made, often with little 
success throughout this period, to have a strong link between activities at the plant level and 
national IR Pillar level, discussed earlier. However, this report will not delve much of the details 
of these developments. In addition, it is imperative to note that the information used here is 
gathered from union official documents, as opposed to interviews of shop stewards or workers 
on the ground. Therefore only an outline of the policy on plant restructuring and selected cases 
as reflected in minutes and reports are used as tools to draw an understanding of what occurred 
and how it was captured by actors then. 
. Thus, the workplace 
“belonged” to whites and not blacks who were cheap, often unskilled, and often coerced into 
working in dire conditions, while whites generally earned relatively high wages, had secure jobs, 
were often skilled and dominated the cooperate hierarchy; that is not to say that working class 
whites were in charge of the system, and were not also victims of extraction of surplus value. 
However, the struggle against apartheid, contrary to the Websterian emphasis, was not against 
this racial order only, but also against waged labour and capitalism itself. The order that lay at 
the core of the workers’ struggle is that of capitalist exploitation and extraction of surplus value. 
The reconstruction of the plant/workplace in the 1990s is the subject of this section, particularly 
how the CWIU understood and envisioned its development.  
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Crompton wrote a discussion document after the proposal he had tabled on industrial 
restructuring. The document tabled to NEC in May 1994, entailed “Plant Based Restructuring 
and New Forms Work Organisation”360, argues that from the 1980s management moved from 
“scientific management” and Taylorism361. It stated the reasons for this to be as follows: 
“Increased global competition – with an emphasis on price, quality and rapid response to 
customers’ needs; Increased technological complexity and speed of change required flexibility 
workforces; Speeded up information systems required more rapid responses”362
In short, the document stated, “…firms have to change faster than their competitors”
. 
363. It argued 
that there were new forms of work organisation, that is, “World Class Manufacturing” or “Total 
Quality Management” or “Lean Production” and these had a “twin thrust”:- “Human Resource 
Management techniques; Manufacturing techniques”.364
It maintained that the unions in South Africa were faced by challenges that came about from 
these new forms of work organisation and had no answers to them. Human Resource 
Management techniques stressed “…careful staff selection, communication with workers, 
involvement of workers, individual at expense of collective, fewer grades for flexibility, better 
training , fewer layers of management, use of temporary workers”
  
365, whilst manufacturing 
techniques stressed “…statistical process control, multi-skilling, team work and autonomy, 
quality self inspection, total preventative maintenance, internal and external customer suppliers 
relationships, few suppliers”366
The document argues that the challenge is in “…how we should respond or what counter 
proposals we should put on the table. That we need to develop them quickly is imperative for the 
survival of the unions as we know them. However, if we are honest with ourselves, we cannot 
respond quickly to such issues”
. 
367
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understand these developments and “…try to attach political agenda which is not helpful”, but 
does not say what these agendas say and why are they not helpful. However, the document 
makes proposals as follows: 
Leadership of the union, (staff and NEC) should learn what these issues are and 
begin to understand them. This means running seminars...; the leadership should 
begin to fashion counter proposals. This would run in conjunction with the 
research proposal (if accepted) by Rod; Interim guidelines. These are urgently 
necessary as a lot of these developments are taking place in the factories, indeed 
have already taken place368
Crompton’s proposals, as demonstrated above, stress expert leadership and peak-level 
bargaining, and have no real mention of “worker control”. The guidelines he refers to would be 
adopted as follows in 1995: “Restructuring must not result in job losses; Restructuring must 
improve the employment conditions of workers; There must be full information disclosure in any 
decision making structures in the restructuring process, not just consulted; Before the union 
engages in a restructuring exercise, the industrial restructuring pillar should be informed”
.   
369
In 1996 the union would compile a document in which the strategy and practice of plant level 
restructuring is packaged for workers or shop floor activism to refer to. Note also that shop floor 
activities are not only to consult the IR Pillar, but are deemed not to understand restructuring. On 
what basis Crompton assumed that workers on the ground did not understand workplace 
restructuring is unclear. Masondo’s recent work on NUMSA at BMW in South Africa shows, 
indeed, that workers’ knowledge (accessed through “workers’ participation”) has played a key 
role in improving productivity (and the extraction of surplus value)
. 
370
In the document entitled “Defend, Empower, Advance: Responses to Plant Level 
restructuring”
.  
371
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 CWIU makes pronouncements on “…management restructuring programs, 
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retrenchments, outsourcing and casual labour, company mergers, take-overs and relocations, 
flexibility in working hours, gain sharing schemes, the introduction of new technology, team 
work”372
South Africa’s manufacturing sector has been in crisis for over a decade. Nearly 
100 000 manufacturing jobs were lost between 1984 and 1994... The most 
important threat is from imported products which are becoming cheaper as the 
government reduces tariffs
. Without going into too much detail, the document in its strategy deliberations does not 
depart at all from the guidelines as mentioned above. Critical to note are its insights on what has 
been the impact of restructuring in the manufacturing sector. The document indicates the 
following: 
373
Over the past 10 years, there were different employment trends in the CWIU’s 
sectors. Look at these figures from the Industrial Development Corporation
. 
374
23% of jobs in the rubber sector were lost; Petrochemical sector employment fell 
by 6%; There was little change in glass and consumer; Plastic employment 
increased by 60% … 
: 
375
The document notes expectations that these figures would only increase, thus they set the union 
to strongly oppose retrenchments by negotiations, looking at alternative options like taking 
workers to other plants in the company, reducing management benefits such as “…cars, business 
lunches, reducing dividends and profits paid to shareholders, cut social responsibility budgets, 
finding ways of reducing waste, downtime and other wasteful practices”
  
376
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. These are a clear 
statement of the union’s commitment to improving competitiveness – and its aspiration to run the 
company, on that basis, yet to do so even better than the capitalists. The document also 
recommends “solidarity action”; here the union will engage in blacking action which puts 
companies against the wall to negotiate. 
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On outsourcing, the union resolved on three strategies, the offensive, preventative and defensive 
strategies. On the offensive strategy, the document says “…the union must get a regular 
agreement from employers that they will not outsource jobs or departments. If the union 
negotiators cannot win this, then they must negotiate that short term or contract labour must not 
undercut permanent labour.”377 In the preventative strategy, “…the union must fight to keep the 
department that the company must release information on the motivation, results and alternatives 
to be released by the company and negotiate on this information”378. Then the defensive strategy 
comes in “…where the union cannot stop outsourcing, the union must first insist that workers are 
transferred into new positions in the company with the same pay and conditions. If the union 
cannot win this demand, then it must demand that workers keep their jobs at the same wages and 
conditions with the contractor and that these workers must continue as members of the 
unions.”379
In the November 1997, the IR Report gave a rather detailed report of branch level activities 
regarding company restructuring. These are factories and companies that have restructured and 
branches had just been told to report on these, without reflecting on dynamics per se. Overall, the 
reports reflect a combination of failures, success in short term basis and small victories. The 
following are some of the reports from branches. 
 
The union goes further to elaborate on other aspects of outsourcing such as team work and 
company mergers. In addition, the document stresses the strengthening of union structures. Here 
the document highlights the threats of dividing workers, but also weakening union structures. 
The strategy prioritises negotiations as we have seen; however, the question is whether at the 
plant level there were successes. In an attempt to answer this question it is critical to re-
emphasise that this research is unable to see the concrete relations on the shop floor as this would 
require a more bottom up driven research. Nevertheless, that be as it may, an overview of some 
of the reports from branches on activities on the shop floor may be useful to further demonstrate 
the practice of radical reform in the CWIU. 
4.4.4 Company Restructuring, some cases 
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The Eastern Cape branch reported that in Dimbaza Fibres, a company that buys and sells textile 
fibres and by-products, “92 workers were retrenched for economic reasons. Financial 
information showed no reason for the company to retrench but it went ahead. Conciliation at 
CCMA failed and the matter has been referred to labour court.”380 In Rope Laboratories the 
reports says “57 workers were retrenched in September, in addition to the 45 that were 
retrenched in July for economic reasons. The branches view is that the company’s problems are 
not economic, and is planning to discuss restructuring with the company in order to avoid further 
retrenchments. Part of the plan includes doing research.”381
In the Wits Branch, Consol Clayville, a glass manufacturing company, is reported to have 
retrenched “70 workers” and had been taken to CCMA. In Millrox, which, amongst other things, 
deals with supply of industrial thermal and dry process equipment, “57 workers were 
retrenched”
 
382. The company is reported to have given reasons of a failed business deal and was 
in danger of closing down. While “Mineral Binders and Clays closed down after owner 
committed suicide”383, Paragon Rubber closed down and the union was consulted. Finally the 
Atlantic Manufacturing also closed and the reports says about 70 workers were affected384
In the NET Branch, SASOL’s process of restructuring which had taken two years affected about 
636 workers. “149 were re-deployed and 501 took packages – some packages were compulsory 
because workers did not want to be re-deployed.”
. 
385 The report notes that the “…majority of 
membership is losing hope and do not trust the union. Nationally the union should assist to build 
the local.”386 It adds: “The feeling then was that the agreement was the right agreement, but it 
had to be implemented and monitored. Problems included the agreement not being implemented, 
the size of SASOL, and shop stewards deciding to take packages.”387
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AECI Mankwe, which is in explosives and accessories, is reported to be closing down at the end 
of 1997, with “about 500 workers”388 being affected; the reason is that it had “…duplication of 
activities with Mankwe and Modderfontien, another company in the same field. Multifoil on the 
other hand, suppliers of aluminium would relocate to Zimbabwe due to competition and 140 
workers would be affected.”389
In other instances, companies were closing down and the union reports being consulted (Paragon 
Rubber), whereas in other instances the union was not informed (Mineral Binders and Clays). In 
similar cases, the union would be fighting legalities till the company is closed down and no more 
(an example is KBS which “…closed and 31 workers were retrenched... the company applied for 
liquidation order without informing the union. The issue went to dispute resolution, and 
additional one week per completed year of service was negotiated. At that stage, the company 
had ceased to exist.”
  
The above reports do not tell us how the union dealt with these situations in detail, particularly in 
relation to its strategy on restructuring, except appeals to legal bodies in the formal industrial 
relations system. However, this report situates them as examples of restructuring that have taken 
place in which the union intervened. The examples chosen show that in some instances (Rope 
Laboratories), the union could not save the retrenchments, and plans are made to put more 
research and discuss restructuring with the company. In other instances (Dimbaza Fibres, Consol 
Clayville) after failed attempts to prove the management wrong on falsity of financial limitations 
as reasons, the union sets to proceed to use legal measures for conciliation and mediation. 
390
The essence of these examples, which simply serve to give a sense of some of the developments 
reported in meetings, is that they indicate very little success was attained with the strategies 
noted. The union’s commitment to “…finding ways of reducing waste, downtime and other 
wasteful practices”
) In SASOL, implementation and monitoring of the agreements are noted 
as problems.  
391
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 did not save a single job. Indeed in other instances the strategies would 
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yield good results: an example is in the case of FOSECO, which supplied consumable products 
for use in the foundry industry. The union details the process as follows: 
The holding company is embarking in international restructuring. All 
manufacturing plants are being rationalised and made to compete with one 
another. Company has closed one division and sold it to ISCOR – which is 
producing more volume and needs FOSECO technology. Another division is 
going to be mechanised. Job losses are inevitable on both the mechanisation and 
subcontracted out. The union was invited to make input. The organiser and branch 
pillar coordinator are to draft a response. Divisions and tensions amongst shop 
stewards and workers need to be resolved before plans can be implemented ... The 
company negotiated the sale of Steelmill department to ISCOR.  Reason: business 
was lost to Alusaf. ISCOR has indicated it will be able to accept affected workers. 
A number of workers proposed to volunteer to retrenchment – they are close to 
retirement age. Negotiations on alternatives are continuing and workers have 
agreed that only after alternatives are exploited, will packages be discussed.392
Indeed a sense is that much of the strategy is implemented; somewhere the process of 
restructuring, which has been taken as an inevitable outcome by union policy, takes place with 
less harsh consequences; yet by and large workers are getting retrenched. A report published in 
1999 by the National Labour & Economic Development Institute (NALEDI), a research wing of 
COSATU, supports this. It states that “…manufacturing unions have declined in actual 
membership, and compared to other COSATU unions... The decline in manufacturing unions 
mirrors some of the changes occurring in the economy. Changes in employment in these sectors 
are occurring on a wide scale and at a rapid pace. Slow economic growth and industry and 
workplace restructuring have resulted in job losses of about 3% to 5% each year since 1996.”
  
393
The report proceeds to add that “…unions in manufacturing have entered a new terrain of 
struggle: they are organising in a declining and rapidly restructuring sector”
 
394
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. However, it 
shows that COSATU unions did improve union density in this sector “…from 39% of all 
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workers in 1994, to 45% in 1999”395. The report argues that partly this is because most 
retrenchments affected un-unionised workers396
Nevertheless, these developments, like job losses, also reflect the failure of the broader policy 
positions of the union movement, which seek building blocks for socialism through the co-
management of capitalism; the question is how the developments are leading to this end. Indeed, 
the data shows the union to have lost to job loss, and to casualisation, although its density 
increased in this regard. Moreover, much is stressed on negotiations without militant action like 
strikes and boycotts; this factor can be understood with the union’s acceptance of restructuring as 
inevitable, all of which tells how the union practices radical reform. Labour’s participation only 
comes at a cost that does not translate into improvements of living standards for the broader 
working class
.  
397
The union’s perception that restructuring is inevitable and potentially beneficial to workers leads 
it to see corporatism or co-management of capitalism as the way to deal with it. This does not 
follow. The union’s history is indeed one of militancy and mass mobilisation as shown by the 
. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The CWIU comes out as a strong union in this period, post-1994, yet professed difficulties of 
consolidating its base level structures and ensuring worker participation, all pointing to “political 
crippling”. Union officials’ views on restructuring, and the practice of strategic unionism in 
industry and plant restructuring, necessarily emphasise negotiations, research and influencing 
policy formation, over the militant style of politics associated with unions in the 1980s. Unions 
do not plan to deal with restructuring through combining efforts with social movements, boycotts 
and strikes, but emphasise scoring victories with legislation, policy and monitoring restructuring 
with companies (like in the case of SASOL) – co-managing the crisis the union has attributed to 
bosses. 
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SASOL action in 1984398
Despite a call by Appolis and others for a return to a more worker controlled activity in its 
approach to restructuring, the union failed to balance radical reform with a strong shop floor. On 
the contrary, CWIU is one of the unions who “…have responded to lean production as a threat 
but who have in varying degrees accepted its inevitability. However they argue that there is a 
dialectic of development acting as well and that by contesting the terms of lean production there 
can be many gains to be made for the trade union movement in this period.”
. However, Crompton’s discussion document set the militancy aside, 
arguing that now that apartheid is removed, the way into making gains around the challenge of 
restructuring is influencing policy developments, particularly because the ANC is understood not 
to have an industrial strategy, the union sees an opportunity take it into the road that is labour 
friendly.  
 
399
Appolis further argues that “…the other thing that has emerged is the fact that in most cases, not 
all, workers and shop stewards are mere spectators in terms of issues that are negotiated at 
NEDLAC”
 
400. In addition, he says “…there is no longer that notion that we can struggle and 
defend our gains in spite of the law”401. Indeed, this notion epitomises the zeitgeist of the historic 
militancy associated with the union even at the turn of the decade (e.g. anti VAT strike402
The data, overall, does not confirm the optimistic assessment of radical reform presented by the 
Websterian tradition. On the contrary, it bears out the critiques of that approach by scholars who 
see the approach as unable to yield fundamental results for the trade union movement
).  
403
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. It 
supports Callinicos’ warning against “…unrealistic [expectations] that organised labour can 
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count on the ANC’s support when it bargains with capital”404. The ANC not only did not stand 
with labour in bodies like the LFTF, but also sought privatisation (MOSSGAS). Furthermore, it 
adopted a macroeconomic strategy that confirmed business in its restructuring through 
privatisation, retrenchments and outsourcing. The data supports Van der Walt’s view that 
corporatism will deliver no gains, but many defeats, for the unions, and suggests consideration of 
his claim, looking at the occupations in Daewoo plants in South Korea in 2001, that “…current 
struggles demonstrate there is a serious alternative means to save jobs as the crisis bites: 
occupation and the refusal to be retrenched”405
 
. 
In the following chapter the report will focus on reporting on the 1997 congress in light of the 
developments in the post 1994 socio-political context as exemplified by deliberations in this 
chapter.  The chapter will delve into the discussion of macroeconomic policy shifts by 
government, seeking to situate deliberations in the 1997 congress in the context of the realities of 
the time. The question, as posed earlier on, is why the union stuck with radical reform even when 
the government decided against its core principles. This question will be entertained in detail in 
the concluding chapter, but it is the role of this chapter and the next one to show the practice of 
strategic unionism and radical reform by the union, insistence to continue with this strategy 
regardless of the state’s macroeconomic shifts, and the privatisation, retrenchments and 
outsourcing seen in this chapter.  
The contribution of this chapter to the broader report can be summed up as showing the practice 
of radical reform and strategic unionism in the chemical industry by the CWIU. It has 
demonstrated how the CWIU practices its unionism, but also shown that in this end, the union 
makes no gains on its core demands. The chapter adds a piece in the developed picture of this 
practice in the CWIU from the previous one that looks at the era of 1987 to 1993, and focused 
much analysis on macro socio-political role of the union. The question it will still confront is 
what weakens socialism in the union vision and practice, and it will do so in the final chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion: Radical Reform and the Goal of Socialism 
5.1 Introduction 
This report has examined the practice of radical reform / strategic unionism in the CWIU, largely 
using the union’s official pronouncements and reflections in reports and discussion documents, 
as a means to assess the viability of this COSATU strategy. The report finds that in the period 
under study, 1987 – 1998, the CWIU has not made any gains towards the establishment of 
socialism via a series of radical reforms. Instead, not only has it watered down its demands (for 
instance, moving from a union-driven Reconstruction Accord to an ANC-controlled, and, later, 
ANC-abandoned RDP) but it has consistently lost battles over industrial policy and workplace 
restructuring (with privatisation, casualisation and outsourcing taking place despite careful union 
policy interventions through corporatist structures). At the same time, it has been faced with 
serious internal problems in the form of a growing leadership/ rank-and-file division.  
What has been lost has been the older, radical union tradition, based on an anti-capitalist practice 
and analysis, and tied to an emphasis on self-management, a tradition displayed in the 1980s and 
persisting into the early 1990s. The Websterian analysis that sees radical reform and strategic 
unionism as the best possible policy for the unions downplays this break, and its costs, 
championing a narrow project of national-level policy intervention, international 
competitiveness, and workplace deracialisation. The break entailed has been obscured; the major 
shifts involved have been underplayed; an alternative, potential, radical, trajectory has been 
ignored.  Choices were made, and not necessarily the best ones. 
At the same time, the Websterian literature has tended to overstate the advantages of radical 
reform. The COSATU unions, including CWIU, indeed aimed at a gradual transformation of 
South African society to socialism (or at least, a “left version of social democracy”), and 
emphasised participation in structures of power as a means to do so. This report has, however, 
shown that rather than create building blocks for socialism, this strategy did not secure any 
advances on labour’s core demands; instead it has led to dire consequences for workers, in the 
context of a relentless neo-liberal onslaught that has lasted from the 1980s late apartheid period 
and straight through into the new parliamentary democracy.  
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Rather than systematically moving towards the implementation of a “radical version of social 
democracy”,406
Within the strategy of the CWIU sits an irreconcilable tension. On the one hand, the union 
pursues “legal means of struggle”
 this report contends that in the usage of this strategy, the workers have achieved 
nothing but met with losses and defeats.  
407
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, moving from merely using a few laws, selectively, under 
apartheid to make strategic gains, to an overt commitment to corporatism and class partnership 
through participating in policy formulation. On the other hand, the unions’ power (and their 
appeal as class partners) rests upon their mass base, linked in through a practice of “worker 
control”. However, it is precisely that mass participation that is undermined by the current union 
strategy. The strategy rests on, yet undercuts, that very power.  
The report insists that an examination of the union’s own reports on activities reflecting practice 
of radical reform (for instance in structures like the LFTF, and restructuring agreements in each 
company) the strategy has made nothing else but losses for the workers. Besides this, the union 
has experienced problems with keeping the workers in control in the practice of radical reform 
itself (see chapter 4). This failure, the report argues, should not come as a shock, since 
emphasising “legal means of struggle”, and policy interventions, you require technocracy, 
resulting in reduced worker control. The report argues that the union is quite conscious of this, 
yet has chosen to persist with the strategy anyway. 
This chapter will bring the report to a conclusion by discussing the 1997 CWIU National 
Congress Resolutions, specifically to note that the union stuck with radical reform against all the 
evidence of its failings. It will, following this discussion, try and give light into why labour, 
particularly the CWIU, has persisted in usage of a strategy that results in the weakening of 
worker’s control of the union and its representatives in bodies like LFTF, and failed to defend 
the workers from assaults by capital and the state in the form of privatisation, outsourcing, 
casualisation and job loss. It will then proceed to discuss interpretations of this unionism, mainly 
critiquing radical reform as a strategy.  
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The chapter will conclude by examining the relationship between radical reform, worker control 
and socialism, reinforcing an argument developed in the previous chapter about a tension in this 
combination, and advocating the abandonment of radical reform for class struggle based on the 
principle of worker control for the achievement of socialism. Only in “militant class struggle 
based on autonomous organisations acting outside and against the state”408
The 1997 congress of the CWIU was the last before its 1999 merger with PPWAWU; thus, it is 
the last congress of the union as we know it since formed in 1974. It underwent several mergers 
in the 1980s, but these did not result in a name change and largely did not affect the CWIU’s 
structure, or its position as a radical union within COSATU
 as opposed to “legal 
means of struggle” are worker control as well as the defence and procurement of worker’s gains 
possible. 
5.2 1997 Congress resolutions: synopsis  
409
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. What the CWIU became after the 
1999 merger with PPWAWU is a subject for another dissertation. Overall, the 1997 resolutions 
do not reflect a fundamental shift ideologically from the previous resolutions (1987-1994). 
However, there were important reflections on industrial and plant-based restructuring, the 
macroeconomic strategy, GEAR, and the possibilities of breaking from the Alliance. The union 
also made pronouncements on legislation, occupational health and safety, environment, and 
women’s challenges in the workplace and in the union.  
This section will discuss these resolutions under three broad themes, which come out of selective 
seeking of parts of the resolutions that best represent union strategy. These are: alliance 
reaffirmation; rejection of GEAR and stress on return to the RDP; and building organisation and 
worker control. The third theme must be read in connection to the developments discussed in 
chapter 4. Essentially, this chapter demonstrates that radical reform is a choice of the CWIU, but 
sets a ground for a deeper discussion about trade unionism. 
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5.2.1 Theme 1:  Alliance Reaffirmation 
In reading these resolutions, it is clear that there was a debate on keeping with the alliance and 
support of the ANC government. The resolutions thus begin by giving a background to the 
tripartite alliance: 
The April 1994 elections victory provides a framework through which citizens of 
our country can collectively determine their destiny as political and constitutional 
equals. We are called upon to correctly assess the current situation, take 
advantage of the many possibilities which this situation provides and fulfil the 
strategic objective that is socialism.410
- To attain national liberation  
 
The aims of the Alliance were the following: 
- To have the working class as the dominant force in the struggle so as to have its 
views and demands adopted as the overall guiding principles for the struggle to 
end poverty and exploitation411
Alliance partners adopted the RDP as a policy and means through which to ensure the 
delivery of basic needs. This has not been fully implemented
 
412
The union further made pronouncements on what it called “objectives of our struggle”
. 
413
That our struggle is for total transfer of political and economic power to the 
working class; That our key objective is that of building an interventionist 
government geared towards efficient service delivery through engagement of the 
people.
: 
414
In this congress the union made assessments on the government and the Alliance in light of the 
objectives of the struggle and the history of the Alliance. Notice that the building of an 
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interventionist state points to the idea (captured in the strategy of the RDP) that the way in which 
the union seeks to arrive at a socialist set-up is by gradual changes as opposed to revolutionary 
rupture.  
While there is a renewed mention of the “total transfer” of “power to the working class”, this has 
been directly linked to the social democratic project of radical reform, not a Workers 
Government, as suggested in the early 1990s. It is not surprising, then, that the formulation is full 
of tensions: between an appeal to all “citizens of our country” as “equals”, and the call for the 
“total transfer” of “power to the working class”, between the stated aim of a “total transfer” of 
“power” and the very modest and hardly radical objective of “efficient service delivery”, and 
between the call for the “building of an interventionist state” and the “strategic objective” of 
socialism. An interventionist state is not a workers’ government, and it is unclear why it should 
lead to socialism, especially if it serves “all citizens”, drawn from all classes, as “equals”.  
The next sections try to overcome these problems. On the government, the union notes that “the 
CWIU supported” the tripartite Alliance, which “is subject to review from time to time”415
The RDP is threatened by the legacy of an economy which is in a structural crisis, 
by the results of decades of systematic racist, capitalist and patriarchal under 
development and by the neo-liberal policies of globalisation; That the RDP is also 
threatened by class forces that are opposed to the strategic objective and who seek 
to purport it as a modernising and normalising project; That the RDP has to be 
under the working class hegemony; That the strategic programme for 
transformation, the RDP has not been fully implemented, which lead to the 
adoption of the following policies i.e. GEAR, LRA, 1995, BCEA, 1997 [Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act] etc.
 as 
well as the largely Keynesian RDP. It noted that the objective of the Ministry of the RDP was 
constant evaluation of the programme’s implementation. The union further argued that: 
416
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Why capitalist “class forces” should be opposed to the RDP is not explained; this formulation 
does help to let the ANC off the hook for abandoning the RDP, as blame can now be directed 
elsewhere, with the hard questions about the class character of the ANC thereby sidestepped.  
That said; the union had to admit that the Alliance has blocked working class participation in 
important ways. It is argued that: 
No programme was formulated for engagement of the masses; as such masses 
remain largely spectators in the theatre of the struggle for transformation; That 
this is because of the objective and subjective weaknesses that confront the 
alliance and in particular the ANC; The alliance leadership is not accountable to 
the masses and operate without a mandate; There is a notion that we should break 
the Alliance with the ANC and the SACP and form a worker’s Party; GEAR 
undermines all the principal features of the RDP – in its provisions around 
housing, health, social welfare, jobs, high real interest rates, etc.; Mass 
organisations are weak. There is little consultation with constituencies and 
decisions are made on top down basis; Campaigns have generally not been 
successful and they have not led to the strengthening of mass organisations.417
Yet the while the CWIU considered a break with the Alliance, possibly to form a new workers’ 
party, it chose not to do so. The CWIU resolutions stress continuity with current policy. The 
resolutions went on to argue that “as COSATU” they “do not have the capacity to form a 
political party”
 
These pronouncements are so crucial that they warrant full quotation.  
418, without indicating the basis of this assertion. This indicates that the proposal 
for a break of the Alliance and formation of a separate workers’ political party did not receive 
popularity. The union stressed, instead, the critical disadvantages of breaking with the Alliance, 
chiefly the consciousness of the working class, also reflected in a survey conducted by 
Buhlungu419
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. Indeed, most of the workers’ attitudes in COSATU unions at this time reflected 
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favour for the ANC;420 the CWIU union also noted this reality, saying: “The political 
consciousness of the working class still reflects support of the ANC as reflected in the 1994 
elections.”421
The objectives of the Alliance have not yet been achieved; The resolution of the 
National Question – calls for an alliance with the ANC, COSATU and SACP; The 
struggle against apartheid and social transformation is not complete therefore the 
Alliance is still necessary; There is no alternative organisation with mass support; 
[Thus] we need to rescue the ANC from any anti-working class elements in and 
outside the ANC.
  
The union’s other reasons for not breaking the Alliance can be summed up as follows, 
422
It is mainly for these reasons that the CWIU sees the relevance of the Alliance, and it therefore 
plans to save it from “anti-working class elements”, rather than leave it.
 
423 The union does not 
say how it will defeat the forces that push an “anti-working class” agenda in the Alliance; neither 
does it say how it will ensure the ANC returns to RDP, or even how it would deal with the 
obvious fact that “the Alliance” did not have shared “objectives”, inasmuch as the ANC was for 
neo-liberalism, and COSATU was for social democracy. The union states critical disadvantages 
of breaking with the Alliance, chief amongst which is the consciousness of the working class, 
also reflected in a survey conducted by Buhlungu and reported in his work on Trade Unions and 
Democracy424
                                                             
420 See Buhlungu S (ed.), 2006, Trade Unions and Democracy: Workers’ political attitudes in South Africa, Human Sciences 
Research Council, Cape Town 
421 CWIU, Congress Resolutions, 1997 
422 Ibid 
. A major reason is the need to resolve the national question, which is the racial 
tension and divides that still characterise the South African society. The resolution of the race 
problem caused by the history of colonialism and apartheid is evidently hoped to be resolved by 
a strategic alliance with progressive nationalists. It is significant that the union does not refer to 
its own history of liberation struggle in South Africa throughout apartheid days: a history that 
423 See Van der Walt L, 2009, The South African Elections, Neo-liberalism and the working class strategy, 
http://www.nope.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=76:the-south-african-elections-neo-liberalism-and-
working-class-strategy&catid=42:other-stuff&Itemid=49 
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shows its strength, without much help from the ANC, to lead communities to defend themselves 
and workers to win shop floor struggles; a history of developing largely independently from 
political parties, a history of resolving the national question through class struggle and mass 
action425
Perhaps debating what type of a party is needed as an alternative would have been more helpful 
than dismissing it on the basis of assumptions about the consciousness of “the working class”. 
The very notion of a “workers’ party” itself could have been interrogated as well, by examining 
histories of socialist revolutions elsewhere in the world with the hope of picking up lessons and 
developing strategy
.  
426
In essence, the conviction that runs underneath the assessments of the union is about the potential 
of the trade union movement in the context of South Africa to lead a revolution in and of itself as 
a union. Therefore, if the union asks whether other unions have managed to lead revolutions in 
other spaces in the world, a different outcome and reasoning would have emerged. For instance,  
the role of the CNT in the Spanish Revolution, 1936-1939, suggests that labour movements can 
be “parties” of their own and have the capacity to lead revolutions, without recourse to 
parliament or electoral or vanguard parties
. It would have been useful, for instance, to consider the history of 
anarcho-syndicalist unions like the famed National Confederation of Labour (CNT), which made 
a revolution in Spain the 1930s. In so doing, the South African political situation and its 
dynamics would bee situated in a broader global history. In addition, the union should have 
asked questions about conditions for a socialist transition, examined socio-political pros and 
cons.  
427. In addition, an assessment that considers 
international lessons would have also shown how radical reform in other parts of the world 
affected the unions428
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427 See Schmidt M and van der Walt L, 2009, Black Flame: the Revolutionary class politics and anarchism and syndicalism, 
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Taking its assessments of the alliance, the government and the economy into consideration, the 
union comes out in favour of implementing radical reform more effectively:  
To deepen the understanding of Socialism in the National Democratic Revolution 
Project and the transformation of state institutions to ones that are responsive, 
answerable and accessible to the people; To maintain the Alliance by... keeping 
masses up to date with developments around policy changes and NEDLAC 
negotiations. Coming up with a programme of action to ensure the 
implementation of the RDP; To build the organisational authority of the ANC in 
all three tiers of government and ensure that ministers and other representatives 
are not absorbed by new elite’s agenda (of modernisation) and they must remain 
answerable to the Alliance and the masses; We need to ensure the ANC wins the 
1999 elections; In building community structures of CBO’s, ANC, SACP and also 
provide leadership; Actively participate and hold leadership positions within the 
Alliance components as the case may apply in the Alliance structures and provide 
clear class perspective; Ensure working advancement, defence and deepening of 
working class interest; Where a leader is a union official and decides to stand, 
his/her job will remain open until the election results have been announced. The 
NEC shall make the final decision on participation that will be in the interests of 
the union429
The overall message that is represented by these pronouncements is a hope of redirecting the 
ANC from its neo-liberal route through more direct union participation in the state and in the 
economy, as opposed to leaving the development of the economy largely to market forces; in 
addition, the union will ensure that the problems of an Alliance without mandate and 
accountability to the “masses” will be resolved by “keeping masses up to date with developments 
around policy changes”. The question is: should an alliance be continued with the ANC 
regardless of it maintaining GEAR, since the understanding is that it cannot implement the 
objectives of the RDP? If this be so, it positions the union in a context where it is no longer 
necessarily fighting one battle with the ANC, but fighting the bourgeois forces in the ANC. This 
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results in two battles: one is within the ANC against elites with the agenda of bourgeois 
“modernisation”; the other is against capitalism. 
The ideological underpinnings of this approach, which accepts the Alliance with an ANC that is 
overtly neo-liberal, yet seeks to achieve socialism, clearly need to be justified by the union. It is 
also not clear how, exactly, the ANC would be saved from “anti-working class forces” – or what 
the way forward would be if the ANC resisted a return to the RDP. By 1997, radical reform was 
evidently not working, yet the union drew no lessons from this, essentially recommitting itself to 
radical reform and a stronger Alliance. It seems that leaders of the movement would be sent into 
the ANC, ensuring that it undertook its supposed responsibility to represent the workers, as was 
the position in 1993 (see chapter 3). This obviously raises several questions: why should it be 
acceptable for the ANC to be an open space for anti-working class forces to emerge? Should the 
energies of the union be focused on convincing or fighting for the ANC, as a broad church, to 
defend the working class? Above all, how does it affect the achievement of socialism in the 
future? 
5.2.2 Theme 2: Rejection of GEAR and to return to RDP 
In discussion of its resolutions on economic issues in this congress, the union begins its 
pronouncements by recalling the past congress and notes that it decided: 
The state to prioritise the provision of jobs, housing, health care and free and 
compulsory education for the working class; Nationalisation and renationalisation 
of selective industries such as the building and pharmaceutical industries and 
privatised former state enterprises as a way of achieving these immediate 
priorities, and; The RDP to advance our struggle for socialism.430
These assertions point to the idea of socialism. The union thus sees the state as central in 
achieving its strategic objectives: for example, it calls for the state to provide “jobs, housing, 
health care, free and compulsory education; nationalisation and renationalisation of selective 
industries such as the building and pharmaceutical industries”
 
431
                                                             
430 Ibid, page 34 
431 Ibid 
. Indeed, the RDP is understood 
as a critical tool for the achievement of socialism, albeit of a social democratic type, with social 
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welfare and other Keynesian aspects. This throws light on why the union pursues the ANC 
alliance: because the ANC serves as a best tool to win elections due to its mass base and support.  
The congress goes on to make assessments of the international and South African economy, and 
argues: 
That the world economy continues to be in the hands of a few who own the entire 
wealth of the world; that a neo-liberal agenda of globalisation of capitalism stands to 
benefit transnational corporations and: 
- It campaigns against the active participation of the state in the economy  
- It campaigns for the deregulation, privatisation and cutting of public sector 
spending 
- It targets organised labour, arguing for flexibility in the labour market  
- It seeks to push our economies into export centred strategy, to an extend of having 
our economy dependent on the good will of the most powerful economic forces 
That implementation of neo-liberal agenda leads to increased impoverishment; That 
liberalisation has the most effects on women workers; That despite the 1994 elections 
and the adoption of the RDP; The capitalist class is still dominant over the working 
class therefore, the economy is in the hands of a few and the majority do not have 
access to wealth; The government has no say in political decisions.432
The union further notes that: 
 
The present government’s Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
economic strategy is committed to: A bosses led economic growth; A withdrawal 
of the state from economy; Cuts in state expenditure, including health and 
education; Job loss in the civil service; Large-scale of privatisation; Deregulation 
of markets, including cutting of tariffs which will lead to further job loss; Labour 
flexibility and cheap wages; An overall approach of international competitiveness 
and export-led growth, unlike the RDP’s commitment to meeting the basic needs 
of the people. 
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International competitiveness and labour flexibility will lead to greater profits for 
bosses and greater misery for the workers, resulting in lower wages, longer 
working hours, job losses, casualisation and sub-contracting; GEAR is essentially 
an anti-working class economic programme and a setback in our struggle for 
socialism; The current government’s economic policy deviates from the RDP and 
that it is a direct contrast of the RDP though cushioned in the same language as 
that in the RDP; That our comrades in government appear to be accepting the 
logic of those who drive the globalisation process.433
The union thus situated the South African economic dynamics within a global context, noting the 
economic liberalisation process that reached its height in the 1990s through structural adjustment 
programmes advocated by World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Indeed the 
union was correct, as the South African economy did not produce the jobs GEAR envisaged
 
434, 
but most of all the union was experiencing at first hand the consequences of privatisation, sub-
contracting and casualisation on the shop floor from many companies that had started 
restructuring way before the coming of GEAR,435
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434 See Heintz J, 2003, Nattrass N, 2001 
435 See the previous chapter on the discussion of Industrial Restructuring 
 as shown in chapter 4. Indeed, as previously 
indicated, neo-liberal policies had in fact been applied in the 1980s by the outgoing apartheid 
government. Thus, for the ANC government to take this route only consolidated the strife 
workers had already been experiencing.  
The congress further resolved on GEAR: 
That our economy should aim at the following goals: Working class control of 
strategic companies as Banks; Ensuring state control over the economy; Ensuring that 
more land is available to the landless; Job creation; Promotion investment in new 
factories that will create and not on shares in the JSE; Promoting the development of 
local industries; That all the steps we take are part of the process leading to socialist 
society, democratically controlled by workers. 
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Reject GEAR as an economic strategy, on the basis that it is an anti-working class 
economic strategy; To call the Alliance partners to reject GEAR – with immediate 
effect; To campaign against all areas of GEAR: – privatisation, welfare grants, job 
cuts, jobless growth; To unite with civic, youth, student, women and other 
organisations to campaign against GEAR; Strengthen COSATU’s role in the 
NEDLAC through greater accountability of NEDLAC representatives, regular report 
backs to workers and a programme of mass action to back up working class 
demands.436
The role of the state: 
 
The state should be both producer and regulator of economic activity; In order for the 
state to deliver on infrastructural development, it will be necessarily for the state to 
ensure nationalisation of; 
- Water, land, educational institutions, forests, pharmaceutical companies, transport, 
telecommunications, building material industry, mineral wealth and mines, hospitals, 
electricity.437
The logical conclusion lies with the state at the centre of the economic practice that CWIU 
believes will lead to achievement of its objectives. The building blocks for socialism as an end 
goal are central to the capture of the state. But the state that the union is dealing with at this point 
is certain to be opposed to this goal due to its macroeconomic strategy; thus the union plans to 
campaign for the strategy  to be altered.  
  
Such appeals will be made; the union does not plan a radically militant strategy in dealing with 
GEAR, but calls for the Alliance to reject GEAR, joining and campaigning for the government of 
the ANC (“comrades in government”) to have a change of heart. The problem is that it is not 
explained why, if the “world economy continues to be in the hands of a few who own the entire 
wealth of the world”, with a “neo-liberal agenda of globalisation of capitalism” applied 
universally, the ANC itself being committed by the use of GEAR to a “bosses led economic 
growth”, there was any prospect of the ANC rejecting this route. 
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Obviously a liberal-pluralist view of the state is assumed. It is assumed that the state is open to 
all social forces, and can readily be won over by the working class. It is neither a bourgeois 
instrument (as Marxism would have it), or an inherently elitist structure (as the anarchists argue), 
but somehow open enough that reforms in the Alliance and the other methods of radical reform 
will suffice to can shift its direction towards a “left version  of social democracy”. This is shown 
by the way in which the state is presented as a victim of neo-liberalism: “our comrades in 
government appear to be accepting the logic of those who drive the globalisation process” 
This is exactly in line with Websterian hopes that the state can be part of a “counter-movement” 
against the “social destruction wrought by the market” – a view that casts the state as saviour 
from, rather central perpetrator of, neo-liberalism. Somehow capitalism is seen to have an 
inherent logic that is so firmly embedded that only socialism can suffice, in the final analysis, as 
a solution, yet the state is viewed, despite the history of both apartheid and post-apartheid South 
Africa, as somehow free of any inherent structural imperatives. Hoping to present the state as 
open, Webster and Von Holdt even quote President Thabo Mbeki’s 1998 speech, about “two 
nations” divided and living in two economies, as evidence of shifts by the ANC towards 
redistributive policies
(emphasis added). 
438
It seems a bit naïve to recommend that labour remains in alliance with the ANC state on the 
bases of speeches, rather than demonstrable policies, or on the basis that the state provides some 
welfare, not withstanding its concrete overall and ongoing commitment to the very policies that 
cause growing demands for welfare – neo-liberal policies
. Yet Mbeki never wavered from GEAR, occasional left rhetoric aside. 
439
If the state provides jobs through public works programmes that offer employment at low wages 
(sourcing cheap labour) and on temporary terms (months), this is not Keynesianism, but simply a 
. If the state does not turn back from 
the route of privatisation and outsourcing, which affects workers, and from market led growth, it 
is simply not on the side of the working class, no matter how much welfare it gives to the poor, 
this does not lead to any worker control of production, any self-sufficiency, let alone radical 
reforms. The underlying assumption here is that the state is an instrument, an entity with no 
interests of its own, thus it can be swayed to and fro.  
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neo-liberal outsourcing of labour; it is very different to a situation where workers are permanent 
employees of a particular company in which organisation of resistance over a period of time 
could lead to control of production. Even as social spending on things like education, health and 
housing can indeed reduce the burden on the poor, employment is important for access to the 
means of production that are separated from the majority. All that has happened, as shown in 
chapter 4, is the threatening of workers through retrenchments, outsourcing and privatisation, 
which also results in the weakening of labour movements. As Callinicos puts it: 
The embryo of an authentically socialist form exists in the workplace – and 
delegate-based democracy that has evolved in the unions. It is through the 
preservation, strengthening and expansion of these forms that workers can 
develop their ability to take control of society and run it along radically different 
lines from those involved in any conceivable variety of capitalism.440
Likewise, the congress wants the strengthening of participation of COSATU in NEDLAC 
structures, and seeks to ensure accountability of representatives to members and affiliates. This is 
despite the proof that the experience of the CWIU thus far has proven fruitless, as shown in the 
previous chapter on industrial restructuring. The union still seeks to use these structures with a 
hope that this will not reduce worker control of decisions in the union, even though its own 
reflections indicate that this is exactly what has happened, for it is hard for representatives to 
maintain the report-back system as agreed in the 1993 National Policy Workshop
 
An obvious alternative to fighting the neo-liberals in the ANC, while blindly supporting its 
election efforts, would simply be abstaining from participation in the 1999 elections - the ANC 
does need the Alliance – or let us say, COSATU - to win elections. This bargaining tool is not 
even evoked by the CWIU in its deliberations.  
441. Indeed this 
challenge of accountability has been running as a concern since the establishment of NEF and 
NMC, and their successor, NEDLAC442: “How do we prevent the NMC, NEC from becoming a 
committee remote from membership?”443
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It is clear that participation in these structures stems from the need to use the state to score gains 
and building blocks for socialism, and it is not considered by the union as a strategic choice in 
pursuit of its objectives. 
5. 2.3 Theme 3: Building the Organisation and Worker Control 
Once more in this conference, the union dealt with the lack of participation of workers in union 
activities, as is clear from the discussion above on restructuring and tripartite structures. It noted 
“that lack of participation by workers in many unions, including the CWIU may lead to 
bureaucratisation”444. In addition, “within CWIU and COSATU and the mass movement, worker 
control and democratic accountability has been weakened in our structures”445
- All forms of oppression and exploitation will be eradicated  
. It further argued 
that worker control and working class leadership are cornerstones of the ways to achieve 
socialism. The union insisted: 
It is only under a democratic, socialist society where the working class, under the 
leadership of organised workers, is in control of the state and the economy that: 
- All citizens will be guaranteed collective democracy 
- All people will be ensured decent housing, living wages and full education  
Therefore resolve:- 
To strengthen worker control in our union at all levels; To advance worker 
control/participation and working class leadership at all levels of society based on 
class struggle; Promote worker participation in all structures outside the union 
(community, COSATU, ANC, SACP and meetings with the State and Capital); 
To continue our struggle for socialism.446
Here the union admits the weakening of worker participation, without asking what causes it – 
and, particularly, its relationship to the radical reform strategy – and without explaining how it 
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can be averted in the future. Indeed, if the union has had worker control before, something must 
have caused its reduction; the recognition of this activity is crucial for sustainable solutions to be 
put in place. Moreover, extending worker control on the shop floor links to worker control in the 
union, yet this is lacking from the union’s discussion. The organisation also insists on ensuring 
worker participation and leadership at all levels of society before achieving it and articulating 
how it will be achieved in the union structures first, such as IR Pillar activities, before achieving 
it in structures like NEDLAC and on the shop floor.  
It is noteworthy that the union aims to “strengthen COSATU’s role in the NEDLAC through 
greater accountability of NEDLAC representatives, regular report backs to workers and a 
programme of mass action to back up working class demands”447, while on the same note it 
speaks about advancement of “worker control/participation and working class leadership at all 
levels of society based on class struggle”448. Strengthening the participation of COSATU in 
NEDLAC through “greater accountability” and “back up with mass action” seems to have a 
similar meaning with achieving “control/participation and working class leadership” through 
“class struggle” to the union.  Whilst for scholars like Van der Walt449 and Callinicos450, the 
notion of “class struggle” implies militant abstention from all forms of class partnerships, 
including corporatism, refusing to co-manage capitalism. The union retained its faith in a 
combination of mass mobilisation and participation in the structures of power, a process Adler 
and Webster called “dual emphasis”451
Indeed, Van Meelis, CWIU’s industrial strategies co-ordinator, who represented the union in 
various NEDLAC structures stresses that the idea was “not to get co-opted”
. 
452
Nevertheless, the union continues to assert its dedication to socialism and democracy: that is, the 
democratic control of the state and economy by the “working class under the leadership of 
 in these structures 
and keep workers involved and informed in what happens in at NEDLAC.  
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organised workers”, and not the ANC. Indeed, the current ANC, from the reading of this 
resolution, cannot be this organisation; thus the union will “promote worker participation”, 
indeed a word used interchangeably with “worker control”, and working class leadership in the 
ANC.  
 
The idea is that the ANC must be turned into an organisation that is controlled by workers and 
serves the working class; it must create a democratic state controlled by the working class 
through an organisation under the leadership of organised workers, where it must control the 
economy and society for “all forms of oppression and exploitation [to] be eradicated; All citizens 
[to] be guaranteed collective democracy; All people [to] be ensured decent housing, living wages 
and full education”453
These assertions are confirmed by the COSATU congress that took place later in 1997. In a 
document entailed “Building socialism now: preparing for the new millennium”,
.  
454 which “is a 
result of a 1997 COSATU congress resolution on socialism”455 intended “for use in COSATU, 
SACP and affiliated for education programmes”,456 the union movement outlines its radical 
reform approach explicitly: “the COSATU resolution on socialism calls for a programme of 
‘building socialism now’ and details ‘building blocks for socialism in the present’”,457 which are 
“building a robust anti-capitalism – which mean relentless criticism of capitalism, building 
working class hegemony in many areas”458 of society; “rolling back the market” from providing 
basic services such as “water, education, shelter, health care”459; “transforming the state – a 
powerful public sector is crucial component of socialism... our vision is that it should be 
developmental and facilitate participation and consultation”460; “advancing and experimenting 
with other, non-capitalist forms of ownership such as cooperatives”461
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is organised and managed – towards worker control and worker self-management”462; 
“strengthen worker organisation”463
The way in which radical reform is articulated is that the process of building these blocks brings 
workers into a state of self-management and self- determination. Part of the belief is that in 
nationalisation, the control must be by worker structures and not the state
.  
464; indeed, activities 
such as “consultation, negotiations, and participation on company boards”465
The same document, however, expressly views these radical reforms as taking placing through 
the Alliance with the ANC and SACP, rather than against it, and thus, ends up reaffirming the 
view, seen earlier, that the task is to win the ANC away from “anti-working class” forces. 
Equally, however, all the proposed measures are assumed as measures that will be achieved 
peacefully, the assumption being one of endless advance; the question of what will be done if 
capital or the state refuses to engage in class compromises that gradually advance workers’ 
control is not addressed, nor is the possibility of a basic contradiction between the strategy, class 
compromise and co-management of capitalism, and the goal, socialism. 
 are preparatory 
stages for the ultimate control by workers; “if real industrial democracy is to be achieved, 
workers have to advance beyond” these. So, in essence, in radically reforming the state, economy 
and their institutions, workers are in preparatory stages for socialist democratic control. 
5.3 Why pursue Radical Reform against all odds? 
This report does not claim to entirely answer the question of why the labour movement sticks 
with the strategy of radical reform. However, it will provide some reasons that may explain the 
persistence of radical reform as a choice of the ways in which the unions seeks to advance, 
defend and realise the interest of the workers. This is largely because of the scope of this 
research, which focused on archives and in-depth interviews with strategic leaders, limiting the 
extent to which conclusive conclusions can be made in this report about why the union sticks 
with radical reform. A study to do this will have to examine the grass roots impact of all the 
choices the unions makes, look at NEDLAC and other state institutions, as well as the socio-
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political dynamics of the chemical industry and the whole economy and how it affects the 
workers and the union. Here, only the view of the union, and, indeed, the interpretations of those 
interviewed will be engaged to develop an understanding of why this might be the case. Even in 
this pursuit it is important to keep in mind that respondents did not include stewards, and thus 
their intellectual interventions to this question would be of even greater importance. 
In the 1987 historic congress of COSATU, which Baskin argues proved that COSATU could 
offer leadership at a time when all other progressive anti-apartheid movements were weak (they 
ultimately got banned in 1988), unionists resolved on the adoption of the Freedom Charter. This 
decision almost divided the movement, for all its complexities, but marked the consolidation of 
the ANC/ Congress influence in the union.  
Indeed, the CWIU did not have an official position on the Freedom Charter, as it had divided the 
union so deeply: leaders thought a return on the issue after congress would be more practicable 
for unity to prevail. However, the CWIU did adopt the Freedom Charter eventually, although 
along the lines of a radical interpretation similar to NUMSA i.e. the Freedom Charter was merely 
a stepping stone towards socialism, a minimum programme466
The debate around the Freedom Charter was generally; to what extent does the 
Freedom Charter actually provide a good basis for directing the struggle into a 
socialist direction. One particular criticism of it then was that it does not 
guarantee the right to strike to workers as an example. And so the other point 
made was that working class leadership has to be won in practice not just in 
theory.
. The Freedom Charter would be 
the basis upon which both capital and the state would be reformed, laying a basis for the socialist 
transition. Indeed, part of the critique of the Freedom Charter was its limitations in put ting 
necessary conditions for the ending of national oppression and exploitation. Blake Moseley 
captures the debate as follows: 
467
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In the post-apartheid state and economy, the union clearly regarded nationalisation, expanded 
workers’ rights and ongoing worker leadership as steps towards ultimately realising socialism. 
This is indeed a radical reform agenda, which in essence seeks, in the short term, a compromise 
with capital and the state, prioritising the removal of national oppression; “a left version of social 
democracy”, as the Websterian tradition would prefer to call it468
The union’s deliberations in the 1997 congress reflect that this ANC/ Congress influence still 
remains very strong. Indeed, the union’s return to an admittedly failing strategy of radical reform 
is linked to support of the ANC, to the Alliance. The support for the ANC, which had adopted a 
largely neo-liberal framework, necessitates support for the state. In justification of the support of 
the ANC, the congress noted the support workers still gave to the ANC, as demonstrated by the 
1994 elections; thus, we can assume, a break with the ANC would be unpopular with a majority 
of the working class. This congress also cited the importance of the national question as 
justification of the Alliance. Indeed, the national question is the resolution of racial inequalities, 
which the ideology of National Democratic Revolution argues needs an alliance with nationalists 
for its resolution in a two-stage approach to socialism
.  
469
This is made even clearer by the COSATU congress in that very year
. 
470
Scepticism about splitting from the ANC was indeed noted in the early 1990s by the CWIU, as 
shown in chapter 3 of this report. Fears were specifically expressed around the ANC’s insistence 
on attracting foreign investment. However, it is important to see that radical reform tries to 
. This further suggests 
that if unions do not support the ANC, as a black government, it may make way for a white 
government, a factor perhaps not favourable with the not-so-far-off history of white rule in this 
country. Whatever we may think about the national question necessitating the Alliance, taking 
into cognisance the failures and the detriments neoliberalism has caused for the life of the black 
working class in this country and which the ANC has persisted in implementing, what is clear is 
that unionists see the national question as important, and then assume that the national question 
can only be resolved by means of staying in the Alliance.  
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resolve, or at least rhetorically promises that it can combine “legal means of struggle” with “a 
radical version of social democracy”; and we must note that this promise is critical for how the 
union understands the political situation in South Africa, for it allows the union not to be 
unpopular with the majority of the working class by leaving the Alliance, yet holding on to its 
vision of socialism. In addition, it is noteworthy that unionists had a great hope in that upon 
agreeing on a soft version of what they initially thought of the reconstruction strategy471
The unions were not the answer but they were the key to change. They were 
operating legally and we had that space to operate. But I think the tensions started 
to come up in the 1980s, especially when we were moving towards starting to 
form to unified trade union movement. I think on the kind of FOSATU side there 
was a softening up and an opening up, to some extent – not massively – but 
definitely they also started to enter more populist ways of doing things. 
Beginning… like with the boycotts, and with stayaways, starting to move much 
more to try and accommodate what was happening… Where you got the other 
, they 
had come with a government that would make necessary interventions against capital, and for the 
working class, through the RDP. Finally, the union (without much justification) believed it does 
not have capacity to establish an alternative to the ANC.  
These reasons present a predicament in the union’s strategy, which is indeed demonstrated by 
adoption of radical reform in the first place: how do we pursue a radical vision of socialism 
without contradicting the support of the ANC, without being unpopular to the majority of the 
working class? This is the predicament the 1997 CWIU Congress found itself to be in.  
In addition, the interviews reveal that among the reasons for resolutions to take the direction of 
the ANC is the influential Congress/populist tradition within the union movement. Indeed, from 
the late 1980s, as Chris Bonner, the CWIU’s organiser in the 1980s and National Education 
Officer in the 1990s, argues, there were shifts to accommodate the Congress influence in relation 
to what was happening in the country. She says: 
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groupings talking much more about working with the communities, that kind of 
thing472
Bonner insists: “Within Chemical you also had different tensions. You had those who were more 
aligned with the ANC, then you had the more workerist grouping and then you had the more far 
left groupings”
 
473. This pattern is confirmed by Don Gumede, who was president in early 1990s. 
He believed that the union was dominated by ‘workerists’ from its formation, but in the 1980s , it 
tilted to Congress ‘populists’474. Aligned to the ANC, they used democratic structures of the 
union, of which the ‘independent worker bloc’ was so proud, to influence members to agree to 
the Alliance with the ANC475. So in essence, there were three main tendencies in the CWIU; 
Congress supporters (also called), workerists/ the ‘independent worker bloc’ (who were thought 
to be pushing union independence; sometimes also incorrectly called ‘syndicalists’) and the 
independent left (also called independent Marxists)476
Initially, we supported the idea of the Workers’ Charter... but gradually we began 
to shift, more so because of the popularity, it was a bit opportunistic, of the 
Freedom Charter... We also felt that what was contained in the Freedom Charter 
was quite radical, and could be interpreted as socialist in character, so eventually 
as the debate raged on we then supported the congress elements within the CWIU 
cause; with the ANC’s rising popularity more and more congress ANC type of 
people emerged from the ranks and were employed in the CWIU... so within the 
. 
In the late 1980s and the 1990s the Congress tendency became more influential in the union; 
according to Gumede, the adoption of the Freedom Charter and the Harare Declaration (which 
included a set of principles to guide negotiations for the removal of apartheid), were indications 
of this influence. Martin Jansen, who identified himself with the independent Marxist or left 
tendency, states: 
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CWIU ANC gained more popularity because of their popularity in the mass 
struggle.477
Furthermore, for Appolis this shift became necessary “because the syndicalists [he meant the 
‘workerists’ – MQN] 
 
478 accepted the hegemony of the Congress movement”479
part of... shifts that sort of took place in the early 1990s, and that is why you find 
in post-1994..., many of them, of the syndicalists [sic.] are actually moving to 
various positions within the post-apartheid state, you find them being directors in 
the department of the Presidency... they occupied sort of different positions in the 
state because of that shift that sort of took place
; he explains that 
this is: 
480
There is nothing radical about... the notions of radical reform, that was just 
rhetoric... from the side of myself and others who were more Marxist oriented... 
we took reforms very seriously, or the need for reforms or workers’ struggle for 
. 
These tendencies are important considerations if we are to understand the choices or resolutions 
reached by the union. Appolis argues that the lines of workerists were blurring in the union with 
those of the Congress, they were changing and effectively reconfiguring their views in a pro-
ANC, and pro-social democratic direction. So for him, in the post-1994 political spectrum in the 
CWIU, these two groups, ‘workerists’ and ‘populists’, were increasingly uniting and were often 
opposed to the independent leftists. That is, the issue was no simply the rise of the ‘populists’, 
but the shifting views of the ‘workerists’ as well. Thus, if sympathisers with the Congress 
movement are the majority and dominant tendency in the union, choices to stick with the 
Alliance relate exactly to this reality. When asked about radical reform and its working in the 
union, Jansen had this to say: 
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reforms very seriously... We always tried to enradicalise them, and give it more 
revolutionary content to build workers consciousness and build the strength of 
workers’ organisation... which is why personally I always jumped into getting 
involved in mass campaigns and organising.481
Indeed, it appears that the meaning of class struggle seems must be clarified; nevertheless for 
some, there were no radical gains out of radical reform politics, which instead led to participation 
in state institutions and reduced activity on the part of the workers. Indeed, the 1993 NEC 
workshop did ask about the “threat to worker control because of high levels of negotiation”
 
482 
despite some officials denying the existence of this threat at this time483
5.4 The power of interpretation: Websterian radical reform and the promise of socialism 
. 
The understanding is that part of the reason why the union chose to stick with radical reform is 
related to the ANC supporters or Congress tendency, which was predominant in the CWIU. Be 
that as it may, there is nothing new the CWIU hoped to do except intensifying control of those 
who negotiate through mandates and reports, fighting the liberals in the ANC, and strategic 
abstention from teams and factory forums on the shop floor. Noteworthy as well, is that the 
alternative tendency did not have concrete responses to the critical concerns that confronted the 
union at that time. This is so especially with very idea of the national question, which the 
congress types emphasised needed alliance with the ANC.  
The COSATU/SACP document on “building socialism now” uses the term “transformative 
unionism”484
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 instead of “strategic unionism”, and speaks of specific gains that must be achieved 
for socialism to be realised. However, it is basically the same “building blocks” approach 
towards gradually achieving socialism, entailing cooperation with the state and capital, and 
falling in the reformist tradition of socialism (evolutionary socialism/ parliamentary socialism, 
‘democratic socialism’, social democracy) as opposed to the two revolutionary traditions of 
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socialism: political/authoritarian socialism (mainly classical Marxism) and libertarian/anti-state 
socialism (mainly anarchism/syndicalism)485
If you cannot say how you will install socialism tomorrow, you are not necessarily saying you 
also do not know how to defend gains against the enemy: defend employment, working 
conditions and high wages. These gains which the union movement has secured through class 
struggle can be defended, even extended, without necessarily cooperating with capital and the 
state; there is also nothing that makes such cooperation is an inevitable outcome of the transition. 
Indeed, if by “social movement forms of protest and struggle”
. 
The Websterian tradition refers to “legal means of struggle”, and we ought to see how this is in 
direct tension with ambitions of worker control of the union – let alone workers’ control of 
production. “Legal means of struggle” justify the need for state and capital power structures on 
the basis that socialism is not possible yet, but even if this were true, it still does not follow that 
just because you cannot inaugurate socialism tomorrow, today you have to work/collaborate with 
the class enemy. 
486 we are saying something that 
makes employers come to the table and give you what you want, and then in this case can you 
negotiate, make a gain, then the focus on “legal means of struggle” is misleading, Labour is not 
powerful because it registered under the LRA, or active in the NMC, NEF and then NEDLAC, 
but powerful because of its mobilisation of the masses through shop floor struggle outside the 
centres of power. Even the NMC/ NEF/ NEDLAC were born from struggles like the twenty-
one–day strike that shook the Chamber of Mines in 1987 where “340 000 miners were involved, 
and almost five million working shifts were lost”487; the 2,5 million people who went on 
stayaway in 1987 May 6 and 7, the 10 000 workers of OK Bazaarswho  went on strike488, and 
approximately 800 000 participated in a Transvaal stayaway in 1985, 6 000 of whom belonged to 
SASOL, a factory organised by CWIU,489
These battles which took over a decade or two from the early 1970s and ranged from recognition 
battles to battles for the political struggle of black people, are what makes labour a power to be 
 and so on.  
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reckoned with. If this be so, when labour no longer does this, what will make it a power? The 
state will always have the military ready any day to execute its instructions, capital will control 
the means of production; but indeed labour has only its unity, and its class struggle as the sources 
of its bargaining power. Any strategy that undermines these – and I have suggested radical 
reform is precisely such a strategy – poses a real danger to the very power of the unions.  
Radical reform, discussed and advocated by the Websterian interpretation, is appealing because 
it promises to resolve the tensions between a radical version of social democracy, and “legal 
means of struggle”, and “social movement forms of protest and struggle” and the new 
parliamentary democracy. However, it fails simply because it does not work, providing a left 
rhetoric for ongoing working class defeats. Thus, COSATU claims optimistically that “The 
transition may... be marked by contradictions, stagnations and major reverses. History is not a 
smooth process and does not have a guaranteed outcome.”490
Nevertheless, it is critical to notice the changing meaning of worker control in the discourse of 
radical reform, and how this is related to the difference of meaning espoused in ‘class struggle’. 
Tendencies in the union against radical reform are not able to depart from radical reform even as 
they critique it, because they still think you can intensify mass mobilisation in parallel to 
radicalising negotiations: both the discussion document by Appolis and some of the interviews 
quoted above demonstrate this. 
 But if “contradictions, stagnations 
and major reverses” are the primary outcome of the radical reform strategy, there is no reason to 
assume that there will be any outcome “guaranteed” besides defeat after defeat.  
5.5 Radical Reform, worker control and socialism 
The goal of the union has persistently been that of socialism and “workers’ control”. The 
Websterian school has tended to overstate the progress of radical reform in yielding results 
towards the achievement of a “radical vision of socialism”. In looking at the transformation of 
”apartheid workplace” the Websterian school does not consider whether the strategy brings 
labour a step closer to control of production means or self-sufficiency, or makes a fundamental 
shift in capitalism. Rather we are left to assume that efforts are informed by this goal, and that, 
overall, enough progress is being made to justify the strategy being maintained. 
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Websterians speak of “dual emphasis” as part of the process in the practice of radical reform. In 
essence, the Websterian tradition promises to balance worker control, a radical vision of 
socialism and ‘legal means of struggle’, but sacrifices ‘class struggle’ labelling it ‘social 
movement type of protest’. In this dual emphasis, you have a changed role of workers in that 
they sacrifice actively determining union activities within the union itself, turning towards “high 
levels of negotiation”491 that require technocracy. The role they therefore play is that of “a 
passive mass ready to be mobilised by union leadership to reinforce institutional positions and 
policy influences”492
Our vision of socialism is no longer saying that the state should own the 
economy. Experience has shown that the state can exploit just as easily as the 
private sector.
. 
The union’s clear description of socialism has never wavered from seeing the use of the state as 
imperative: this is demonstrable in CWIU’s congress resolutions from 1987, 1989, 1991 and 
1997, as well as the 1993 Policy Workshop and the COSATU/SACP pronouncements about 
building socialism. The difference is that the view of the state is increasingly a social democratic, 
rather than a Soviet one, COSATU and the SACP state: 
493
What is this vision of socialism? The document states:  
 
Socialism is a transitional social system between capitalism (and other systems 
based on class oppression and exploitation) and a fully classless, communist 
society. The socialist transition may well be of long duration. The transition may 
also be marked by contradictions, stagnations and major reverse... Socialism 
requires working class hegemony, and it is characterised by four core features: 
democracy, equality, freedom and the socialisation of the predominant part of the 
economy.494
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Socialisation of the economy includes worker-controlled production and distribution of social 
surplus, inclusive of control of pension and provident funds. However, in achieving this, the 
labour movement sees the usage of the state as key. 
The reality is that in the assessments of the practice thus far, the state has not only refused to 
promise socialism, it has diverted from a more interventionist role in the market to one that 
emphasises private sector ownership and direction of major sectors of the economy, coupled with 
privatisation and outsourcing. Even Websterian radical reform requires a different state. 
Therefore, what do workers do when radical reform failed at least to provide a state that it needs? 
What indeed is to be done, if you are to defend the gains of workers (employment and its basic 
conditions), and draw closer to socialism? The first step is to interrogate the theory of the state 
that is being deployed. We have seen that radical reform assumes a liberal-pluralist model of the 
state, but given COSATU’s manifest ability to have even so moderate a programme as the RDP 
implemented, perhaps it is worth revisiting Marxists and anarchist views of the state, as perhaps 
better guides to action. 
It is also the contention of this report that a clear distinction must be drawn between mass 
mobilisation in “dual emphasis” and in “class struggle outside and against the state”. This 
distinction has implications for the idea or practice of worker control against bureaucratic 
tendency in the union. If workers are to control their unions, as Ulrich notes in the case of the 
Trade Union Advisory Coordinating Council (TUACC), the immediate predecessor of FOSATU, 
tension arises “between the creation of a democratic trade union culture and the workers’ support 
of more autocratic political and traditional leaders and populist movements”.495
5.6 Militant class struggle and radical reform 
 In the TUACC 
period, the contradiction was manifested in the support of a substantial section of unionists for 
the Kwa-Zulu homeland government. Today, the tension centres on participation in bodies such 
as NEDLAC, and in the Alliance – it is a tension that must be resolved. 
The maintenance of a democratic culture embedded in the union structures such as the shop 
stewards, branches and executive committees requires mandates, report-backs and the option of 
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recalling leaders496
Indeed, the agenda of the state is also neo-liberal and seeks privatisation, and should be subjected 
to such withdrawal. However, in addition, we need to ask how participation in the state as an 
institution that is able to shift from a worker-friendly (RDP) agenda at one point to one that is 
overtly and unmistakeably hostile (GEAR), will affect the workers’ movement. Rocker argues 
that participation in the politics of the state “destroys the belief in the necessity of constructive 
socialist activity and, worst of all, the impulse to self help, by inoculating people with the 
ruinous delusion that salvation always comes from above”
. However, in interaction with bodies such as the state and its structures, a 
theorisation of the state will be helpful for how that relationship will better function. Indeed, the 
CWIU’s idea of withdrawing participation from teams and forums because they discuss 
retrenchments, issues that affect workers negatively, is a starting point in that the agenda of the 
structure is considered before participation. 
497. This constructive socialist activity 
in which the ‘impulse of self help’ by workers or “self confidence of workers’ organisations” is 
built498
The tools of militant class struggle outside and against the state, indeed driven through worker 
control principles that the unions in South Africa built as their legendary achievement, gives 
 concretely speaks to a type of political activity where solutions and victories are worked 
out from popular direct involvement of workers. 
The strategy of radical reform, in its insistence on participation in state institutions, has eroded 
the activity of workers’ organisation from the shop floor to negotiating forums like the LFTF. 
This involvement, beyond its requirement of technocracy, focuses workers’ attention on 
solutions to their struggles from above, building confidence to expert negotiation, technocracy 
and research, which, in the period under study, failed to yield results. However, a different 
political activity that gives workers direct involvement in planning, building from the shop floor 
through worker leaders by mandates and report-backs, results in confidence in their own efforts 
to create a better life for themselves. The “self-help impulse”, which is important for self-
confidence in one’s own organisational capacity, cannot be realised through “legal means of 
struggle”, as these have isolated workers and divided the unions. 
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workers the direct schooling in organisation, planning and fighting that is required to lead and 
control production in a socialist society. The struggle fought this way makes more possible the 
schooling of workers for control than the practices of “dual emphasis” that use mass mobilisation 
to merely support a process largely beginning and ending in negotiations remote from workers 
direct planning, organisation and fighting. 
The intensification of militant class struggle outside and against the state – which consists of 
“militant abstention” from managing neoliberalism and capitalism, and of struggle waged 
through shop floor mobilisation, including occupations, strikes and boycotts – if it does not yield 
victories in terms of short-term demands, nonetheless promotes a self-help impulse involving 
popular democratic participation of workers. Indeed, the promise of radical reform not only 
failed in implementation, but was simply an illogical pursuit that sacrificed worker control 
traditions and has resulted in retrenchments, privatisation, outsourcing and casualisation, which 
got managed in collaboration with the enemies of the working class.  
As Callinicos argued in 1992 against Godongwana, South Africa will provide another example 
of failed social democratic politics and unionism. He insisted to South African socialists that “if 
[they] do not learn from mistakes elsewhere in the world, they run the risk of repeating them”499. 
Godongwana dismissed this as mere “rhetoric and dogmatism”500
This history of union strategy proves that ‘having tea and biscuits with the masters’
 at the time. Yet today, 
Callinicos’ prognosis can be confirmed by the South African historical record of more than a 
decade of “strategic cooperation with capital and the state”. It is the refusal to learn from 
“mistakes elsewhere in the world” that is truly “dogmatism”, the road to a blunder that went 
against historical lessons, and that ended with compromises that left the workers vulnerable but 
weakened their militant self-built organisations. The results of privatisation, outsourcing and 
retrenchments are proof of gains lost, asphyxiation of socialist dreams and activity as worker 
control of organisations was undermined.   
501
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results, while militant class struggle outside and against the state and capital certainly does. 
501 This is adapted from Steve Biko, referring to whites as masters who often invited blacks for tea to discuss their struggle in 
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Restructuring could have not taken place in the 1980s in the same way as it did in the 1990s, for 
the epoch of the 1980s was one of emphasis on worker control and militancy, not of “legal 
means of struggle”. The words of Rudolf Rocker are also true in the South African case: 
Participation in parliamentary politics has affected the Socialist labour movement 
like an insidious poison. It destroyed the belief in the necessity of constructive 
Socialist activity and, worst of all the impulse of self help, by inoculating people 
with the ruinous delusion that salvation always comes from above... Socialism 
steadily lost its character of a cultural society, and, therefore, could not let itself 
be halted by the artificial frontiers of the nation states... So inevitably the labour 
movement was gradually incorporated in the equipment of the national state and 
restored to this the equilibrium which it had actually lost before.502
In essence, this report, above all it does, contributes two significant points to labour studies in 
South Africa; firstly is that radical reform has, as a strategy, not benefited the workers. Secondly, 
the herein argumentation is such that even if it did defend worker’s gains or benefit them, it still 
would have weakened the labour movement. It has affected it like an “insidious poison” 
specifically realised in the existent failure to bridge the gap between the leaders, researchers and 
technicians above, and the rank and file – leading to the annihilation of the “necessity of 
constructive Socialist activity and, worst of all the impulse of self help” that manifested in the 
1980s through the idea of worker control. These are the years of worker control, strategic 
partnerships and solidarity with social movements and other organisations of the oppressed, 
indeed, the years of no having tea and biscuits with the bosses. 
 
The history carried by these years must speak concretely to worker’s present realities, and inform 
the strategy to advance their interests in a world of continuous precariousness of social security 
manifested in forms of casualisation, outsourcing, privatisation and other social ills. This 
nostalgia must be used to resist “inoculating people with the ruinous delusion that salvation 
always comes from above”, and seek to release the movement of the workers from the 
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asphyxiation caused by radical reform. It must help realise self sufficiency and socialist activity 
that labour is capable of; a revolutionary potential of the working class labour movement. 
This report is a conversation about and with trade union strategy from the union’s point of view. 
The idea of socialism, what it means, and how, taking conditions of the working class at this 
point, can it be achieved, remains central. A clear vision, concretely extrapolated will assist to set 
an achievable program. Nevertheless, the report dealt with what was present in union strategy, 
and how this affected the union overtime, that is to say how its conceptualisation of strategy and 
the practice thereof interacted and shaped the life of the union. Thus, it is an evaluation of set 
objectives, ideas and aspirations of the trade union movement. 
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